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Race relations in the United States have a tumultuous and painful history.  The current legal 
battles over race-conscious affirmative action policies simply add more fuel to the fire and 
rekindle centuries-old racial conflicts and biases amongst many Americans.  Some researchers 
are concerned that the current never-ending legal battles are being used to eliminate race-
conscious education programs and destroy the original intent of affirmative action policies to 
equalize opportunities between Blacks and Whites alike.  Researchers fear that the policies will 
be eradicated before the playing field has been leveled.  
This study critically examined how the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate in 
higher education has evolved from the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until 
2006.  The researcher used two constructs of critical race theory – interest convergence and 
whiteness as property - to guide the study in the examination and analysis of federal race-
conscious legal cases in higher education and state anti-affirmative action policies.  The 
researcher evaluated whether the evolution of the legal debates supports white privilege.  
Additionally, the researcher used case study methodology to investigate whether the legal 
debates relate to changes in a specific race-based legal education program, the CLEO program.  
The researcher analyzed multiple sources of evidence inclusive of both qualitative and 
quantitative data.   
 iv 
The findings in this study indicate that more reverse discrimination lawsuits are 
saturating the legal landscape and include multiple White plaintiffs.  Concurrently, CLEO, which 
has assisted underrepresented racial minorities with entering and graduating law school, has 
experienced significant changes to its funding, programs, and the racial/ethnic and academic 
profiles of its students.  The data support a correlation between the race-conscious affirmative 
action legal debates for more than 30 years, and the significant changes in CLEO’s funding, the 
types of programs offered, and the types of students served.  The findings show that an unequal 
and unlevel academic playing field still exists, yet the race-conscious affirmative action legal 
debate in higher education will continue until all policies and programs are annihilated.  The 
findings also suggest that the evolution of legal cases and anti-affirmative action policies support 
the maintenance of white privilege in American society.   
 
 
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ XII 
1.0 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 WHERE THE LEGAL DEBATE BEGAN....................................................... 1 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM................................................................. 4 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY .............................................................................. 7 
1.3.1 Research Questions....................................................................................... 9 
1.3.2 Background – The CLEO Program .......................................................... 10 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – CRITICAL RACE THEORY (CRT) 18 
1.4.1 A CRT Construct - Interest Convergence ................................................ 19 
1.4.2 Another CRT Construct – Whiteness as Property .................................. 20 
1.5 RESEARCHER’S ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................ 22 
1.6 RESEARCHER’S BACKGROUND................................................................ 23 
1.7 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.............................................................. 24 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................... 25 
2.0 SECOND CHAPTER ................................................................................................ 26 
2.1 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ...................................................... 26 
2.1.1 A History of Race-Based Legal Cases and Legislation............................ 27 
2.1.2 Race-based Legal Cases in Education....................................................... 36 
 vi 
2.1.3 What is Affirmative Action - The Pros and Cons .................................... 48 
2.1.4 Federal Affirmative Action Education Programs.................................... 59 
2.1.4.1 TRIO Programs and GEAR UP........................................................ 60 
2.1.5 The Origins and Development of Critical Race Theory.......................... 71 
2.1.5.1 Major Criticisms of CRT ................................................................... 78 
2.1.5.2 CRT and Education............................................................................ 79 
2.1.5.3 CRT and Affirmative Action ............................................................. 86 
3.0 THIRD CHAPTER .................................................................................................... 91 
3.1 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 91 
3.1.1 Research Design – The Case Study ........................................................... 92 
3.1.2 Setting and Data Sources............................................................................ 95 
3.1.2.1 Document and Archival Records ...................................................... 96 
3.1.2.2 Interview Sample Selection................................................................ 98 
3.1.2.3 Federal Legal Cases and State Anti-Affirmative Action Policies... 99 
3.1.3 Data Analysis............................................................................................. 100 
3.1.4 Use of CRT Constructs............................................................................. 105 
3.1.5 Format of Addressing the Research Questions ...................................... 108 
4.0 FOURTH CHAPTER .............................................................................................. 109 
4.1 THE EVOLUTION OF AN ENDURING LEGAL DEBATE..................... 109 
4.1.1 The 1970s – The First Wave of Federal Legal Cases............................. 110 
4.1.2 The 1990s – The Legal Debate Gains Momentum ................................. 121 
4.1.2.1 Anti-Affirmative Action Policies and Executive Orders............... 130 
4.1.3 The 2000s – Revisiting Bakke as the Legal Debate Intensifies.............. 139 
 vii 
4.1.4 Analyzing the Legal Debate from a Critical Race Theory (CRT) 
Perspective ................................................................................................................ 152 
5.0 FIFTH CHAPTER................................................................................................... 167 
5.1 THE CLEO PROGRAM: THE FINDINGS ................................................. 167 
5.1.1 CLEO’s Operations: Then and Now....................................................... 168 
5.1.1.1 CLEO’s Purpose, Funding, and Programs .................................... 173 
5.1.2 CLEO’s Students:  Past and Present ...................................................... 181 
5.1.2.1 Students’ Undergraduate GPAs and LSAT Percentile Scores..... 182 
5.1.2.2 Students’ Race/Ethnicity.................................................................. 193 
6.0 SIXTH CHAPTER................................................................................................... 206 
6.1 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................ 206 
6.1.1 Summary of Research Findings............................................................... 209 
6.1.2 Current Climate Surrounding the Legal Debate, Law School, and the 
Legal Profession ....................................................................................................... 222 
6.1.3 Conclusions and Implications .................................................................. 229 
6.1.3.1 The Future of Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Legal Debates 
and the Implications for CLEO and Other Race-Based Programs ............ 230 
6.1.3.2 The Future of Underrepresented Minorities in Law Schools and the 
Legal Profession ............................................................................................... 231 
6.1.3.3 Conclusions from a Critical Race Theory Point of View .............. 233 
6.1.4 Recommendations for Future Research ................................................. 240 
6.1.5 Final Thoughts .......................................................................................... 242 
APPENDIX A............................................................................................................................ 246 
 viii 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 248 
 ix 
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Chronology of Key Legal Cases and Legislation Leading to Affirmative Action ......... 45 
Table 2: Top 15 States Impacted by Upward Bound and Talent Search Budget Cuts ................. 68 
Table 3: Research Questions, Analysis, and Respective Data Sources ...................................... 103 
Table 4: CLEO’s Financial Statements for 1997 and 1998 ........................................................ 172 
Table 5: CLEO’s Financial Statements for 2001 through 2005 ................................................. 178 
Table 6: Students’ GPAs in Summer Institutes – by Time Period ............................................. 184 
Table 7: Students’ GPAs in Summer Institutes - Post-Hoc Results ........................................... 185 
Table 8: Students’ GPAs – Comparison by Program (AIE and SI)............................................ 187 
Table 9: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores in Summer institutes - by Time Period ................. 190 
Table 10: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores – Post-Hoc Results .............................................. 191 
Table 11: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores – Comparison by Program (AIE and SI)............. 192 
Table 12: Race/Ethnicity of Students in Summer Institutes (SI)................................................ 195 
Table 13: Race/Ethnicity of Students in Attitude is Essential (AIE).......................................... 198 
Table 14: Outline of Legal Cases/Policies and Changes in CLEO’s Data (By Decade)............ 220 
Table 15: Number and Percentage of Racial/Ethnic Groups Admitted Into Law Schools......... 228 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Number of Summer Institutes – by Time Period ........................................................ 180 
Figure 2: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison by Time Period (SI) .................................... 196 
Figure 3:  Students’ Race/Ethnicity - Comparison by Time Period (AIE) ................................. 199 
Figure 4: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison of AIE and SI (2004)................................... 201 
Figure 5: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison of AIE and SI (2006)................................... 201 
 xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
To God be the glory for all He’s done for me!  I am truly thankful to the Lord for the strength 
and resolve to persist through the doctoral journey and the challenges of the dissertation process.  
I dedicate my dissertation to my guardian angels in heaven, especially my father, Edward 
Thompson, my grandmother, Eartha Simpson, and my sister, Karen Howard.  Additionally, I 
dedicate this dissertation to my angel on earth, my loving and compassionate mother, Norma 
Jean Thompson, who has always been my inspiration and my biggest cheerleader.  Mom, I reach 
for the stars because you make me believe that I can do anything.  I love you and thank you! 
 I would like to thank all of my family members and friends who continually encouraged 
and supported me throughout my life, but especially during this process.  I would especially like 
to thank the Hilton family, my sister, Terri, my brother-in-law, Tony, and my nephew, Tré, who 
opened their home to me, were very understanding and patient with me while I stressed about 
writing and meeting deadlines, and offered a lot of fun and laughter when I needed it.  Terri, I am 
so blessed to have a wonderful sister like you who spent late nights with me reading, editing, and 
re-writing this document and reassuring me the entire time.  I extend a special thanks to my 
uncle, Harold (Jacey), for his words of wisdom, to my aunt, Rose, for her caring spirit, and to my 
loving and supportive brother, Ronald Wilson, and his family.  I would like to thank my dear 
friend, soror, and colleague, Michele Scott Taylor, with whom I struggled and lamented about 
life and the dissertation process, and who had my back and was willing to help me no matter 
 xii 
what.  I am also deeply grateful to the following mentors, colleagues, and close friends who 
counseled and guided me throughout this experience and shared both insightful and encouraging 
words on a regular basis:  Dr. Shirley Biggs, Dr. Cassandra Richardson Kemp, Dr. John Murphy, 
Dr. Elaine Rubinstein, Alaine Allen, Judith Touré, Lutitia Clipper, Renée Galloway, Erroline 
Williams, Kara Whitman, all of the Alliance of Urban Scholars (All of US), Nichole Gardner, 
Eunice Whitted, Tracey McCants Lewis, Dr. Jerome Taylor, Dr. William Thomas, Dr. Stanley 
Denton, Dr. Jennifer Scherer, Dr. Janeula Burt, Dr. Darnella Davis, and Emily Warner. 
 I am truly appreciative to my awesome dissertation committee members for their 
leadership, knowledge, direction, and advice.  Dr. Bickel, you are the best advisor that any 
doctoral student could ask for.  You believed in me, were patient with me, and made me feel 
good about my writing while giving excellent constructive criticism and a lot of comic relief.  
Dr. Lewis, I thank you for taking the time to read over my drafts, offering great feedback on my 
work, sharing your expertise on critical race theory and higher education, and showing scholarly 
support and encouragement as a professor and mentor.  Dr. Lincoln, I really admire your wisdom 
and passion for the law.  One day educational equality will be realized in Pittsburgh and the 
surrounding areas, and I am sure that you will have contributed significantly to that remarkable 
feat.  Dean Kevin Deasy, I am really grateful to you for being an incredible legal research and 
writing professor.  But for your talent and patience, I would not have learned and loved the art of 
reading, writing, and arguing like a lawyer.  Additionally, I am thankful to you for helping me to 
understand the CLEO program, for putting me in touch with CLEO’s Executive Director and 
staff, and for encouraging me to pursue my research study.  
I offer a special thanks and debt of gratitude to the CLEO staff and personnel, namely 
William Blakey, Cassandra Sneed Ogden, Roderick Terry, Thomasine Williams, and Laura 
 xiii 
Zamfir.  I am honored that you welcomed me into your office to learn more about the 
organization and all the wonderful programs that you offer to students.  I appreciate you for 
giving your time, sharing your experiences, and making your documents and data available to 
me.  I hope that I have done your program justice by sharing your story.  I am confident that the 
CLEO program will continue to prevail as the successful program that it is.   
  
 
 
 
 xiv 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation study is a historical, legal, and critical analysis of the race-conscious affirmative 
action legal debate in higher education.  The study concentrates on the evolution of federal race-
based affirmative action legal cases in higher education, with an emphasis on legal education and 
the legal profession.  The intent of the study is to understand why there has been and continues to 
be an incessant legal and political debate regarding race-conscious affirmative action, 
specifically in legal education, and how these debates are related to a specific program, the 
Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO).  The study serves as an investigation into 
whether the constant legal debates and waning support for race-based programs may be related to 
the United States' legal history with race and maintaining white privilege in higher education, 
specifically in law school and the legal profession.   
1.1 WHERE THE LEGAL DEBATE BEGAN 
Some events and subjects in American history are taboo and often a hotbed for fervent debate.  
An unmentionable event in history is the enslavement of Africans in America for more than two 
hundred years and the subsequent issues that emerged immediately following the abolishment of 
slavery, such as racial segregation and discrimination.  The discriminatory practices that resulted 
from legalized segregation led to inequitable educational access, resources, and opportunities for 
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many minorities.  In the renowned 1954 case of Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
almost a century after the end of slavery, the United States Supreme Court found racial 
segregation in public education to be unconscionable and illegal.  Nevertheless, it took another 
10 years before the advent of the Civil Rights Act and the utter death of legal racial segregation 
and discrimination. 
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress implemented affirmative 
action policies to place supremacy on group rights rather than on individual rights (Graham, 
1994).  Thus, racial minority groups, specifically once-enslaved African Americans, held a 
priority claim to benefit from what affirmative action had to offer - access to equal opportunities.  
Congress’s attempt to level the playing field between subjugated minorities and the white 
majority led to a resurfacing of racial tension in the form of disputes over race-conscious 
affirmative action policies and programs.  Today, the remnants of racial segregation and 
discrimination live on through the firestorm of legal battles over race-conscious affirmative 
action, which has become one of the current taboo topics resulting in divisive and explosive 
discussions between individuals and groups.  
Since the 1960s, the height of the Civil Rights Movement, affirmative action has 
supported race-conscious policies and programs as a necessary means to address entrenched 
racial inequalities in American society that had occurred for hundreds of years (Moore, 2005). 
Since that time, race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs have remained a bone of 
contention amongst American citizens, legislative bodies, the legal system, and educational 
institutions.  The challenge to race-conscious affirmative action policies has emerged primarily 
in the form of reverse discrimination legal cases, legislation, and political debates, particularly 
with regards to higher education programs.  The legal fights began in the 1970s with the United 
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States Supreme Court cases of DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al. (1974) and Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke (1978).  The number of higher education legal cases and 
policies continued to increase throughout the 1990s, but the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
2003 Michigan cases of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger is a fresh memory in 
people’s mind.  Even today, the country waits with bated breath for the Supreme Court’s 
impending decisions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
(2005) and Meredith, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, et al. (2005) to see if the 
Court will offer more guidance in interpreting the 2003 Michigan cases.  The Supreme Court 
heard oral arguments on December 4, 2006 and will likely render a decision in the summer of 
2007.  The legal debates over race and affirmative action in education continue to escalate.   
Although the United States Supreme Court has held previously that affirmative action, 
specifically race-conscious admissions policies, has a place in the educational arena in order to 
maintain a diverse student body, many individuals and groups complain that these policies are 
not based on academic merit, and are therefore, illegal forms of reverse discrimination (Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 2003; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  Proponents of 
affirmative action maintain that such policies and programs are necessary to correct past 
discrimination, to eradicate present discriminatory practices, and to level the playing field for 
certain minority groups with access to employment and educational opportunities (Bell, 2004; 
Moore, 2005).  Opponents, however, argue that minorities benefit from the preferential treatment 
of affirmative action simply because they are born into a protected class, and this occurs to the 
detriment of qualified Whites (Moore, 2005).  Regardless of the position that individuals take, 
the main issue in many of the reverse discrimination legal cases revolves around the legitimacy 
of minority students’ access to graduate and professional programs.  In particular, resistance to 
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minority groups’, especially African Americans’, admission to law school has been the crux of 
many race-based higher education legal cases since the 1930s and continues today with 
opposition to race-conscious law school admissions programs.  
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Race relations in the United States of America, specifically as they pertain to the relationship 
between Blacks and Whites, have a turbulent and painful history that in many respects have not 
been forgiven or forgotten.  The current legal battles over race-conscious affirmative action 
policies simply add more fuel to the fire and rekindle centuries-old racial conflicts, biases, and 
misunderstandings amongst many Americans.  The racial divide gets wider and some say that it 
is attributed to race-sensitive policies and programs that are discriminatory and no longer have a 
place in today’s society.  Legal and education researchers are concerned, however, that the 
current never-ending legal battles are being used to eliminate race-conscious education programs 
and destroy the original intent of affirmative action policies to equalize opportunities for Blacks 
and Whites alike (see Bell, 2003, 2004; Bowen & Bok, 1998; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Lawrence, 
2001).  The fear among researchers is that the policies will be eradicated before the playing field 
has been leveled between White Americans and people of color.  In their compelling study on 
race-sensitive admissions programs at elite and selective higher education institutions, Bowen & 
Bok (1998) believed that the fight over race-sensitive policies is deeper than the issue of whether 
the policies are fair or appropriate in this day and age.  They noted, “In colleges and professional 
schools that admit nearly every qualified applicant, there is little to debate….It is when there are 
strict limits on the number of places in an entering class and far more qualified applicants than 
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places, that the choices become difficult and the issue of … race comes to the forefront” (Bowen 
& Bok, 1998, p. xxvi).  In other words, as more racial minorities vie for these limited spaces, 
more arguments arise regarding the use of race in admissions policies, and who has the right to 
be admitted into certain programs at certain institutions of higher education.   
Admission to law school is a prime example of where these racial arguments arise most, 
even though more Whites dominate the legal profession.  In fact, the percentage of minority 
lawyers, which has been stagnant and on the decline since the mid-1990s, is still diminutive 
compared to the percentage of White lawyers (Chambliss, 2004).  Conversely, the number of 
minority groups in the United States is dramatically increasing every year, yet the legal 
profession does not reflect this increase in minorities.  The U.S. population is 70 percent White 
and 30 percent people of color, but the number of minority lawyers hovers around 10 percent 
(American Bar Association, 2004).  According to Moore (2005), the legal profession, with 
lawyers being the representatives and gatekeepers of the United States Constitution, should 
reflect a diverse society of all races, colors, and creeds in order for equity and democracy to 
prevail.  The legal profession, however, has had a history of excluding racial minorities, 
particularly African Americans.  One researcher estimated that in 1950, there were only 1,450 
Black attorneys out of a total of 221,605, which was 0.65 percent of the profession (Kidder, 
2003).  After several racial discrimination legal cases, such as Sweatt v. Painter (1950), the 
Supreme Court held that Blacks had a right to an equal education like their White counterparts, 
so more Blacks entered institutions of higher education and law schools.  However, another 
barrier to the legal profession was created - the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).   
The LSAT was developed in 1948, but the Law School Admissions Council’s (LSAC) 
record of scores go back to around 1958 (DeFunis, et al., 1974; LSAC, 2006).  Due to the timing 
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of when the LSAT was implemented, required as a part of law school admissions, and tracked by 
the LSAC, it appeared as though the LSAT was being used as yet another bar for Black students’ 
admission to law school.  After all, Black students were not receiving the same educational 
opportunities or access to knowledge as many White students attending elite undergraduate 
institutions and apprenticing for practicing lawyers; thus, high scores on the LSAT posed a 
challenge to Blacks (LSAC, 2006; Pye, 1987).  One legal scholar acknowledged that the LSAT 
was originally created to be a tool to aid the admissions process, not a foolproof gauge for merit 
(LaPiana, 2001).  Since the 1960s, however, the LSAT’s use has been perverted since law 
schools often use the LSAT as the sole tool for admissions, which excludes entire minority 
groups who can do the work (LaPiana, 2001).  Given the exclusionary nature of the legal 
profession generally and LSAT specifically, it was not surprising that by 1960, the number of 
African American attorneys had only risen to 2,180 out of a total of 285,933, which was still a 
dismal representation at 0.76 percent of the profession (Kidder, 2003).  In the 1970s, two legal 
scholars predicted that the challenge of the future would be increasing the number of Black 
lawyers from 1 percent to 12 percent (Parker & Stebman, 1973).  Unfortunately, the challenge 
remains to this day.   
In 2000, minorities1 comprised approximately 9.7 percent of all lawyers, which is only 2 
percent higher than in 1990 (Chambliss, 2004).  About 3.9 percent of these minority lawyers in 
2000 were African American (Chambliss, 2004).  Minority representation among lawyers is 
significantly lower than minority representation in other professions, such as 
accountants/auditors (20.8%), architects (14.9%), physicians and surgeons (24.6%), physical 
scientists (30.1%), postsecondary teachers (18.2%), computer scientists (23.1%), and civil 
                                                 
1 The author of this document used the terms “minorities” and “minority representation” to encompass the following 
racial/ethnic categories: (1) African American, (2) Hispanic, (3) Asian American, and (4) Native American. 
  6
engineers (16.7%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Moreover, according to the 2002 Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, combined African American and Hispanic representation among U.S. 
professionals was 13.6 percent, compared to 7.7 percent among lawyers (U.S. Census Bureau, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002, 2004).  Based on these statistics, the playing field 
is not level between racial minorities and White Americans in the legal profession, yet the 
ferocious legal debates regarding to utilization of race-sensitive affirmative action policies in 
higher education admissions are alive and well. 
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Traditionally, African Americans and other subjugated racial minorities have been excluded 
from law schools because they usually have lower LSAT scores and undergraduate grade point 
averages (GPAs) than their White counterparts, even though they may be just as capable of doing 
well in law school and in the legal profession.  Higher education admissions scholars have 
conducted studies that revealed no meaningful statistical relationships between test scores and 
academic performance for minority students, especially in law schools (Olivas, 1999).  During 
the Hopwood v. Texas (1996) lawsuit, researchers found that for Black students attending the 
University of Texas Law School, the correlation of combined LSAT scores and undergraduate 
GPAs to first-year grades was only 0.28 (Olivas, 1999; Sturm & Guinier, 1996).  Similarly, at 
the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, the correlation for all students was 0.11 for first-
year, 0.15 for second-year, and 0.21 for third-year grades (Olivas, 1999; Sturm & Guinier, 1996).  
Based on a LSAT cut-off score of 145, however, over 60 percent of Black applicants will be 
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presumptively denied compared to only 20 percent of White applicants who would be 
presumptively denied (Randall, 2005).   
Wightman (1997), an education researcher, studied bar passage rates among students who 
were admitted into law school, successfully completed law school, and passed the bar 
examination.  She researched how some of these same students typically would have been denied 
admission if only their LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs were considered in the admissions 
process (Wightman, 1997).  Wightman’s study (1997) focused on students who would not 
typically gain admission to law school and those students who would gain admission using a 
LSAT/GPA-combined regression model.  The results of the study indicated that the students who 
were predicted not to be admitted based on lower LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs, which 
were primarily Black and Latino students, had bar passage rates that ranged from 72.5 to 93.3 
percent (Wightman, 1997).  The students who were predicted to be admitted based on their 
higher scores, had very similar bar passage rates that ranged from 85.2 to 96.6 percent.  
Wightman (1997) concluded that there is little to no difference in the likelihood of passing the 
bar examination between students predicted to be admitted into law school and those predicted 
not to be admitted according to the model that depended only on LSAT scores and undergraduate 
GPAs for admission.  Thus, abolishing race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs, 
namely legal education programs, in favor of relying on test scores for admissions that have little 
or no significant correlation to academic success and bar passage rates will likely result in the 
reduction of qualified racial minority students in law schools and thus the reduction of racial 
minority lawyers in this country.   
Professional schools, particularly law and medicine, are highly selective, so “the effect of 
barring any consideration of race would be the exclusion of more than half of the existing 
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minority student population from these professions” (Bowen & Bok, 1998, p. 282).  
Nevertheless, successful race-conscious education programs are under attack in the legal system 
and are being phased out before higher education access and opportunities have been equalized 
between the white majority and racial minority groups.  Therefore, this dissertation study 
critically analyzes the federal race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher education 
and state anti-affirmative action policies that have emerged since the implementation of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  Furthermore, this study examines how the legal cases and policies may be 
related to the function and feasibility of an actual federally mandated race-conscious affirmative 
action program, the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO), and the future of similar 
programs. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
The following research questions guide this dissertation study: 
(1) How have the federal race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher 
education and state anti-affirmative action policies evolved since 1964? 
(2) How, if at all, do the ongoing legal debates in higher education reflect the support for, 
or maintenance of, white privilege as defined by the interest convergence and whiteness as 
property constructs of critical race theory? 
(3) How, if at all, is the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate in higher education 
related to the original intent, current operations (i.e., the admissions criteria of fellows and 
associates, the number of summer institutes, funding, and the creation of new programs), and 
future viability of the CLEO program? 
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(4) Given the legal debates, what are the future implications for race-based affirmative 
action policies and programs, and the admittance of racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, in law schools and the legal profession? 
1.3.2 Background – The CLEO Program 
CLEO is a federal preparatory program for potential law students, which was started in 1968 due 
to the low numbers of racial minorities in American law schools and the legal profession.  Prior 
to the creation of CLEO, on average only 200 African Americans graduated from law schools 
annually out of 10,000 law students in the 1950s and 1960s (Gellhorn, 1968).  The Law School 
Admissions Council (LSAC) was disturbed that law schools were placing significant weight on 
the LSAT, which was having a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged minority groups being 
admitted to law schools.  In fact, some law schools established an arbitrary floor to the LSAT of 
around 400, which was equivalent to around the 13th percentile and operated as an absolute bar to 
many minority students (Slocum, 1979).  The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 
Committee on Racial Discrimination found on a national basis that Blacks and other minority 
groups were not getting into law school because of “low aptitude scores plus academic records 
that were usually spotty at best and were made in substandard colleges” (AALS Proceedings, 
1964).  Accordingly, in 1965, the American Bar Association (ABA) and the AALS created a 
special Minority Groups Project to survey the overall enrollments of racial minority groups 
gaining access to law school and the legal profession (O’Neil, 1970; Slocum, 1979).   
The Project’s survey found that 700 Black students were enrolled in ABA-approved law 
schools during the 1964-65 school year, which was 1.3 percent of total law school enrollment 
(O’Neil, 1970).  This overwhelmingly low percentage of Black students was inflated because 
  10
267 of the students attended predominantly Black law schools, such as Howard, Texas Southern, 
and Southern University; thus, less than 1 percent of Black students were enrolled in 
predominantly White institutions (AALS, 1964).  O’Neil (1970) opined that the law and the legal 
profession were either attractive to only a very small portion of minority graduates, or the 
application and admission process to law schools presented higher than usual barriers for 
minority applicants attempting to enter law schools.  Rosen (1970) claimed, however, that the 
law schools’ lackadaisical attitudes to redress the racial imbalance within the schools strongly 
contributed to the low number of racial minorities in law schools. 
While some law schools developed special minority programs in the early to mid-1960s, 
such as the University of Toledo, New York University, Emory University, the University of 
Denver, the University of New Mexico, and Harvard University, to insure that Blacks, Latinos, 
and other underrepresented minority groups had an opportunity to enter law school, these 
programs were not far-reaching enough to make a significant impact on the number of minorities 
entering the legal profession (Slocum, 1979).  Furthermore, these special admissions programs 
created other problems.  First, the programs led disadvantaged minority students into a world that 
did not welcome them into the student body and did not consider the minority student’s history 
and interests when teaching; therefore, many of these students did not perform as well, dropped 
out, or failed.  In addition, minority students in the special admissions programs were often 
stigmatized and accused of entering law school on lower academic standards than their White 
counterparts (Cerminara, 1996).  Undoubtedly, something more was needed to make a 
difference, or something that would have a dramatic effect on recruiting qualified, 
underrepresented minorities and increasing the retention of these students on a national level. 
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As a follow-up to the initial 1965 survey, the American Bar Association’s Board of 
Governors authorized a committee to explore the type of program best calculated to encourage 
and assist qualified minorities to enter law school and the legal profession (Burns, 1975).  In 
1967, the committee found that although minority groups, such as African Americans, Latinos, 
and Native Americans comprised about one-third of the United States’ population, attorneys 
from these minority groups comprised only one to two percent of the legal profession (Burns, 
1975).  The committee’s report articulated that many minority students had the necessary 
qualifications to become lawyers but were not entering law school because of lack of financial 
support, cultural and academic disadvantages, and misunderstandings of the purposes of law and 
the legal profession (Burns, 1975).  During the same time, the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) sponsored a series of meetings of leading educators to discuss the shortage and problems 
of minority law students.  These meetings led to the formation of the Council on Legal Education 
Opportunity (CLEO) (Parker & Stebman, 1973).  The ABA in partnership with the AALS, the 
LSAC, the National Bar Association (NBA), and LaRaza National Lawyers Association (a 
Latino organization) sponsored CLEO to provide opportunities for qualified minority persons 
from economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds to enter law school (Burns, 
1975; Slocum, 1979).  OEO provided most of the funding, with a $500,000 grant during CLEO’s 
first year (CLEO Annual Report, 1998).  The partnership later reached out to include the 
Hispanic National Bar Association (HNBA), the National Asian Pacific American Bar 
Association (NAPABA), and Society of American Law Teachers (SALT) in 1972, 1990, and 
1997 respectively (CLEO Annual Report, 1998). 
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CLEO was chartered on October 5, 1968, with the official backing of federal agencies 
and organizations as well as private bar associations.  In the beginning, the CLEO By-laws 
specifically outlined its purpose, which was:  
to expand and enhance the opportunity to study and practice law for members of 
disadvantaged groups – chiefly Negroes, American Indians, and Ibero-Americans – and 
thus help to remedy the present imbalance of these disadvantaged groups in the legal 
profession of the United States (Fulop, 1970). 
CLEO’s specific purpose was to give Blacks, American Indians, and Hispanics, who historically 
have been denied access to law school because of low LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs as 
well as attending substandard undergraduate institutions, an opportunity to prepare for law 
school studies, hopefully attend and graduate from law school, and enter the legal profession.  
The goal was to bring more than 300 minority lawyers into the profession by 1973, and the pre-
law summer institutes were the vehicle used to fulfill CLEO’s purpose and objective (Gellhorn, 
1968).  Given CLEO’s original intent to provide opportunities to minority persons, its very 
existence was married to the concept of affirmative action.  CLEO was not created to exclude 
potential law students on the basis of race and did not have a two-track system, one for minority 
group members and one for majority students, but an overwhelming number of CLEO 
participants were minority students (Slocum, 1979).  Ostensibly, CLEO became one of the first 
federal race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher education. 
During CLEO’s introductory year, the summer institutes operated for eight-week 
sessions, but it was cut back to six-week sessions in 1969 (O’Neil, 1970).  The six-week regional 
summer institutes were held at numerous law schools throughout the United States, and the 
students typically attended during the summer immediately preceding their entry into law school.  
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The summer institute concept mirrored the Upward Bound programs sponsored by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW – later the U.S. Department of Education), 
except CLEO was for potential law students and not potential undergraduate students.  The 
purpose of the regional subdivisions was to insure that CLEO served students around the 
country, and to give a cognizable, racial, or ethnic character to each institute.  For example, 
schools in the southwestern part of the United States would be most representative of Mexican 
Americans, and the northeast region would serve more Black students (Slocum, 1979).   
The summer institutes functioned both as skills enhancers and as recruitment programs 
for participating law schools (Cerminara, 1996).  CLEO’s summer institutes helped prepare 
qualified minority students for the rigors of law school by exposing the students to one or two 
substantive first-year law courses, such as torts, contracts, or property, and a legal research and 
writing course.  For the most part, the law faculty at each summer institute taught the same 
courses and used the same pedagogical methods that were typical in law school classes – usually 
the Socratic method of law teaching and the case method of legal analysis (Slocum, 1979).  At 
the end of the six weeks, the law faculty at each participating law school would evaluate the 
academic performance of the CLEO students.  The CLEO students who successfully completed 
the summer institutes were certified and deemed CLEO fellows.  The CLEO experience worked 
to strengthen the skills of the disadvantaged, minority students interested in attending law school, 
while also serving as a tool for assessing the abilities of students who appear not to be qualified 
for law school based on the usual predictors of LSAT score and undergraduate GPA (Cerminara, 
1996).  There was the hope that many students who were not accepted into a law school because 
of their mediocre LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs would be admitted after completing the 
CLEO summer institute and proving they could successfully matriculate through law school.  
  14
CLEO had developed, in conjunction with cooperating law schools, the “conditional admit” 
category in which students were conditionally admitted to law school pending the outcome of 
their CLEO evaluation (Slocum, 1979).   
Since finances were an issue for most minority students, CLEO students attended the 
summer institutes without charge and were provided living expenses and stipends during the 
summer (Rosen, 1970).  To help summer institute fellows who attended law school, CLEO 
provided financial assistance to its fellows throughout their three-year law school career.  Living 
stipends of $1,500 a year for three years were guaranteed to CLEO fellows completing the 1968 
summer program (Parker & Stebman, 1973).  Furthermore, the law schools admitting these 
CLEO fellows provided financial support for tuition and fees, usually by grants or waivers and 
occasionally through loans (Parker & Stebman, 1973).   During those early years, CLEO was 
funded primarily by OEO and other government agencies with some assistance from private 
foundations (Gellhorn, 1968).   
In 1968, CLEO had four regional summer institutes from the East Coast to the West 
Coast, which were hosted by elite law school institutions like Harvard; 161 students enrolled in 
the CLEO program, and 151 students actually completed the program to become fellows (CLEO 
Annual Reports, 1998; Slocum, 1979).  By 1969, the number of CLEO fellows and summer 
institutes, which included host institutions like Columbia, NYU, University of Virginia, Duke 
University, and University of California at Berkeley, almost tripled.  In 1969, CLEO had 10 
summer institutes, in which 448 students enrolled and 444 completed the program (CLEO 
Annual Reports, 1998; Slocum, 1979).  During the 1968-69 school year, the number of Blacks 
studying law had risen to approximately 1,254 (AALS Newsletter, 1968; Parker & Stebman, 
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1973).  In the 1969-70 academic year, the minority enrollment was 2,933 of which 20 percent 
were CLEO fellows (Burns, 1975).   
During its first three years, 722 CLEO fellows entered law school.  CLEO’s retention 
rates among its first-year law students have been approximately 80 percent since its inception 
(Burns, 1975).  From 1968 to 1970, the number of law students increased from 68,562 to 86,028 
(American Bar Foundation, 1972).  During the same time, the number of minority law students 
increased from 944 to 1,468 (LSAC, 1969, 1970).  Further, the number of  Black lawyers in the 
United States had reached about 4,000 in 1970 (Chambers, et al., 2005).  By 1973, the number of 
individuals admitted to the bar hit record numbers, with 30,075 people passing bar examinations 
and another 804 being admitted to the bar by diploma (American Bar News, 1974).  CLEO 
seemed to have fulfilled the goal of having 300 minority students enter the legal profession by 
1973.  Moreover, the number of students of color entering law school continued to increase in 
the 1970s, and by 1976 there were 9,500 students of color in law school (Moore, 2005).  From 
the time CLEO was founded in 1968, the legal profession started to change and, for the first 
time, started to reflect a more representative sample of an increasingly colorful society.  
 Despite CLEO’s success of increasing the number of minorities in the legal profession, it 
was beginning to face some serious difficulties in the 1970s.  Funding was one issue, but the 
biggest issue arose regarding CLEO’s identification and justification as a special admissions 
program for minority students.  While some researchers noted that there were several compelling 
reasons for developing special programs like CLEO, such as evaluation, preparation, and 
supplemental education, there were also innumerable difficulties with designing and operating 
them (Burns, 1975; Rosen, 1970).  Rosen (1970) explained several difficulties that were 
characteristic for the 1960s and 1970s that are still major obstacles in the 21st century, such as the 
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issues of educational merit, backlash, constitutionality, stigma, and economics.  In the 1970s, 
Robert O’Neil, former CLEO consultant and Chairman, responded to this quandary by 
expressing that 
Efforts to equalize access to higher learning for minority students exemplify the 
paradox of institutional racism …. Thus, educational institutions are caught in a  
constitutional trap – neutrality of response reinforces the effects of prior discrimination; 
positive efforts to redress the balance may flounder on the shores of questionable racial 
classifications and inequality of opportunity for those students of both majority and 
minority ethnic groups who are hampered by institutional denial of preferential 
treatments (O’Neil, 1970, p. 281).   
CLEO and its supporting law schools struggled with being two-faced for the sake of equality.  
One face could justify the attempt to right the wrong of past discrimination by giving an 
opportunity for subjugated minority groups to prove they could succeed in law school.  The other 
face could not help but to question the constitutional fairness of having special law school 
admissions programs specifically for certain racial minorities.  Slocum (1979) suggested that the 
real issue was not about constitutionality or meritocracy, but about whether United States 
citizens were prepared to recognize and meet the long outstanding socioeconomic debt owed to 
racial minorities of this country.  Specifically, he stated that “[T]he disposition of claims by 
Blacks and other minorities cannot be obscured by focusing attention upon the rights of the 
majority to remain in absolute control of one of the most highly-valued commodities one can 
obtain – an extremely marketable law degree…” (Slocum, 1979, p. 345).  In other words, Blacks 
and other disadvantaged minority groups were entitled to call in the unpaid debt taken out 
hundreds of years ago with no hopes of repayment.  CLEO was simply the debt collector that had 
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the resources to get some form of reimbursement, which was access to a prestigious and 
powerful legal education.   
 In the mid-1970s, the response to the CLEO program was just a reflection of what was 
going on in American society – attacks on race-sensitive affirmative action policies and 
programs.  Although more work needed to be done in leveling the playing field and creating 
equal opportunities for all citizens, the ongoing legal debates regarding race-conscious 
affirmative action policies in education and employment were beginning to take a toll on this 
country, including the legal profession.  The percentage of minority law students and lawyers 
started leveling off in the 1980s.  Although CLEO also may have felt the heat of the legal 
debates, the question remained what the legal controversy would mean to how CLEO fulfilled its 
original purpose, and whether racial minorities would continue to benefit from the summer 
institutes that were specifically created to increase the number of underrepresented minorities in 
American law schools and the legal profession.  
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK – CRITICAL RACE THEORY (CRT) 
The researcher uses the critical race theory constructs of interest convergence and whiteness as 
property to inform the research and analysis in this study.  The constructs are used in the analysis 
of the legal cases and anti-affirmative action policies in order to elucidate some reasons for the 
waning support for race-conscious affirmative action programs that help provide access to higher 
education institutions.  Critical race theory (CRT) is a legal studies movement that was started in 
the 1970s by legal scholars who were disenchanted with legal analysis and civil rights legislation 
as they related to race, racism, and power in American society.  Critical race theorists insisted on 
  18
“a complete reinterpretation of civil rights law with regard to its ineffectiveness in addressing 
racial injustices, particularly institutional racism and structural racism in the political economy” 
(Lynn & Adams, 2002 citing Parker & Lynn, 2002, p. 9).  These theorists needed society to 
understand that race and racism were fundamentally ingrained in American social structures and 
historical consciousness and hence shaped this country’s ideology, legal systems, and 
fundamental conceptions of law, property, and privilege (Bell, 1984; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, 
& Thomas, 1995).  Critical race theorists have developed several analytic constructs to 
illuminate the racial inequalities that occur in various aspects of society, and how the law and 
society has responded to the inequalities.  Interest convergence and whiteness as property are just 
two of the popular constructs, but they are the two utilized in this study. 
1.4.1 A CRT Construct - Interest Convergence  
When addressing those who say that racism no longer exists in today’s society, one of the CRT 
founding fathers, Derrick Bell, proposes the idea of “interest convergence” to explain the so-
called benefits that Blacks on a whole have reaped over the past 50 years (Bell, 1980; Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2001).  Bell (1980) defines interest convergence as the temporary alignment of the 
self-interest of elite Whites and the interests of Blacks.  The notion of interest convergence, also 
known as material determinism, sets forth the belief that racism benefits white elites materially 
and working-class people physically, which results in a society having no interest in eradicating 
racism (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).   
Specifically, litigation involving racial issues over the past four or five decades that 
appear to protect the basic rights of Blacks have been closely connected with the defense of 
interests that Whites in policymaking positions perceive as being important to them (Bell, 1980; 
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Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).   For instance, Derrick Bell (1980) claimed that the Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka decision in 1954 came down at a time when a distraction was needed 
from the United States’ business as usual – racial discrimination.  The landmark civil rights 
decision intentionally coincided with the United States’ struggles with the Cold War, which 
entangled the loyalties of individuals in Third World countries who were black, brown, and 
Asian, and could succumb to the power of Communism and threaten U.S. democracy (Bell, 
1980).  It was then, 1954, that the U.S. decided it could not politically afford to continue to carry 
stories of lynchings, racist sheriffs, murders, and blatant discrimination while battling 
communism (Bell, 1980; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  As Derrick Bell explained, “Self-interest 
has been described . . . as the most basic and important force underlying white policy and action 
vis-à-vis blacks . . . [which] more often than not serves the interests of the actors or is accounted 
for by an incorrect perception of objective interest” (Bell, 1980, p. 40).  The basic civil rights 
conferred in the Brown case converged with the self-interests of U.S. foreign policy and White 
policymakers (Bell, 1980; Dixson & Rousseau, 2005). 
1.4.2 Another CRT Construct – Whiteness as Property 
Whiteness as property is one of the few CRT constructs where the analysis involves a stronger 
and more cohesive relationship between race and class.  This analysis describes the interplay 
between democracy and capitalism as it relates to property rights in this country (Ladson-
Billings & Tate, 1995).  The origins of property rights in the United States are rooted in racial 
domination and oppression (Harris, 1993).  Blacks were subjugated as slaves and treated as 
property, and through slavery, race and economic domination were fused.  As a legal institution 
in the United States, slavery treated slaves as property that could be transferred, assigned, 
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inherited, or posted as collateral.  As property, slaves were not afforded the rights or privileges of 
other citizens.  Whites as citizens, however, wholly owned the right to possess property, such as 
land, businesses, and slaves (Harris, 1993). 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether slaves were citizens or 
property in the Dred Scott case.  The petitioner, Dred Scott, asked the Court to consider him a 
free man based on his temporary residence in the free territory in the state of Illinois.  The Court 
noted that Blacks were not included in the word “citizens” in the Constitution because they were 
property; therefore, Dred Scott could not claim any rights or privileges afforded to citizens in the 
Constitution (Dred Scott, 1857).  Whiteness was the characteristic, the attribute, and the property 
of the free human being.  Critical race theorists assert that the United States was and is a nation 
built on property rights.  One critical race theorist, in particular, insisted that the law has 
accorded “holders” of whiteness the same privileges and benefits accorded holders of other types 
of property (Harris, 1993).  The critical characteristics of this privilege are displayed by the fact 
that white people can use the law to establish and protect an actual property interest in whiteness, 
as illustrated in the legal legacy of slaves as property and the seizure of land from Native 
Americans (Harris, 1993).  Therefore, Harris (1993) proposed the “property functions of 
whiteness” to explicate the privileges and benefits that the law gives to white people, which are 
equivalent to the legal rights given to other property owners.  The property functions of 
whiteness are: (1) the right of disposition; (2) right to use and enjoyment; (3) reputation and 
status property; and (4) the right to exclude (Harris, 1993).  
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1.5 RESEARCHER’S ASSUMPTIONS 
The researcher selected law school and the legal profession as the unit of analysis because the 
researcher assumes that White Americans perceive a legal career to be a privileged profession 
that represents power; thus, access of certain groups must be limited.  Throughout history, many 
of the race-based legal cases, including the ones today, have pertained to law school admissions 
policies.  There are privileges and power that go along with a legal education, which ultimately 
become forms of white property.  This assumption is supported by the fact that most of the 
nation’s leaders have law degrees (see Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003), which will be discussed later in this study), many of whom are White.  Furthermore, a 
legal career is one of the few professions where individuals have an opportunity and the power to 
make sweeping social and legal changes.  For instance, Thurgood Marshall successfully 
represented his clients, achieved victory on their behalf, and made extraordinary changes to civil 
rights laws and education policies in the cases of University of Maryland v. Murray (1936), 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al. (1948), McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents for Higher Education, et al. (1950), Sweatt v. Painter (1950), and Brown, et al. v. 
Board of Education of Topeka (1954) just to name a few.  Of course, Thurgood Marshall later 
became a Supreme Court Justice in 1967.   
Thurgood Marshall used his legal training to become an agent for social change, and his 
legal opinions reflected his nature of being a vocal spokesperson for civil rights as well as his 
thirst for justice and equality for all.  Thus, the researcher asserts that White Americans believe 
that a legal education gives them the authority, privilege, and opportunity to make laws and 
enforce them to the benefit of Whites and to the detriment of Blacks.  Some White people would 
not want such power revealed or reversed to benefit Blacks or other racial minorities with an 
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influx of minority lawyers and justice-seekers like the late great Thurgood Marshall.  With this 
type of power to make and enforce the laws, the never-ending legal debates regarding race-
conscious affirmative action are expected.  Accordingly, the annihilation of policies and 
programs, such as the CLEO program that supports race-sensitive affirmative action and gives 
subjugated racial minorities an equal chance to compete, is probably inevitable.   
This study is an attempt to remind people of the United States’ history with race, and the 
use of the law to perpetuate white privilege, especially in higher education.  The researcher uses 
the term “playing field,” a term commonly used to describe minority groups’ access to certain 
venues like higher education institutions through affirmative action.  Because the United States is 
a country controlled by laws, the term “playing field” is being used traditionally as well as 
metaphorically to characterize the law – who has the right to attend law school, enter the legal 
profession, and make, interpret, and enforce the laws of this society.  The researcher asserts that 
the legal playing field is unlevel and unequal so long as the ongoing legal debates are employed 
to deny certain racial groups access to law schools and equal representation in the legal 
profession.  
1.6 RESEARCHER’S BACKGROUND 
To understand the researcher’s point of view on this topic, it is important to note that the 
researcher conducting this study is an African American attorney who has practiced law and has 
focused on issues in employment discrimination and civil rights litigation.  The researcher 
believes that some aspects of race-based affirmative action policies and programs are good and 
generally result in some positive outcomes for society.  Additionally, the researcher knew about 
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the CLEO program prior to this study and knows minority attorneys who have greatly benefited 
from the program.   
1.7 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation study was limited to analyzing the issues arising from race-conscious 
affirmative action legal cases and state anti-affirmative action policies directly related to higher 
education, not employment, minority contracts, or any other societal or political issues in 
affirmative action.  Additionally, this study focused on some changes that may have occurred in 
a specific federal race-conscious affirmative action program, the Council on Legal Education 
Opportunity (CLEO), which is a legal education program.  The examination of CLEO’s data 
mainly highlights the summer institutes, the admissions criteria for prospective law students 
participating in the summer institutes (e.g., race/ethnicity, GPAs and LSAT scores), and the 
program’s funding sources.  The data collection methods were limited to reviewing CLEO’s 
documents, archival records, and conducting interviews with key CLEO administrators and 
advisors.  The data analysis in this dissertation included many racial and ethnic minorities, 
namely Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians, and the analysis has been helpful in 
understanding the impact that the legal debates may have had on these particular racial and 
ethnic groups.  Nevertheless, the core of this study examined the racial and legal history between 
Blacks and Whites.  Additionally, the study examined whether the current race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debates may correlate to Black people’s access to the CLEO program, 
law school, and the legal profession.   
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1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The scope of this study was limited to researching one federal race-conscious affirmative action 
higher education program – CLEO, a legal education program.  Consequently, the findings may 
or may not be applicable to other affirmative action education programs, or similar programs that 
offer higher education preparatory programs for economically disadvantaged students and racial 
minorities.  Furthermore, the researcher experienced some problems with finding complete files 
at the CLEO program that contained all the necessary student and funding information.  
Accordingly, the researcher was limited to analyzing the data that were available.  The researcher 
assumes that CLEO’s archival records and documents contained accurate information. 
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2.0  SECOND CHAPTER 
2.1 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The United States of America is a country built on laws.  The United States Constitution is the 
baseline from which citizens’ rights are measured.  Most of the major legal cases in the United 
States’ history rely on the language outlined in constitutional amendments and legislation to 
support or oppose current race-conscious affirmative action policies.  Therefore, this literature 
review begins with a discussion of the outcomes and analyses of federal race-based legal cases 
and legislation from the mid-1800s through the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Part of this analysis includes the discussion of race-based legal cases that were directly related to 
racial minorities’ access to education.  The history of legal cases and legislation that discussed 
racial issues may shed some light on why race-conscious affirmative action policies were 
established as well as why legal debates regarding these policies in higher education have been 
continuous since the early 1970s.  Moreover, the earlier legal cases and legislation may give a 
clearer understanding of society’s current attitudes about race, race relations, and white privilege.   
Additionally, the review examines this country’s initial creation and purpose of 
affirmative action policies, and some of the common arguments for and against such policies.  
The review then explores a few federal affirmative action programs that were created after the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assist disadvantaged racial minorities in gaining access to higher 
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education.  Finally, the literature review discusses the theory that frames the study - critical race 
theory.  The review examines the origin of critical race theory and its tenets, some of the major 
criticisms that have abounded regarding the theory, and how critical race theory’s constructs 
have expanded into analyzing equity issues in education, including the legal debates surrounding 
race-based affirmative action. 
2.1.1 A History of Race-Based Legal Cases and Legislation 
In 1857, the United States Supreme Court decided one of the most crucial legal cases that even 
now impacts how society thinks about people’s race and color, particularly black and white.  
This case was Dred Scott v. Sanford.  The question was simple but the outcome is still profound:  
“Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a 
member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the 
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, 
guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen?” (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857).   In this case, the 
petitioner, Dred Scott, asked the Supreme Court to consider him a free man based on his 
temporary residence in the free territory within the state of Illinois.  The Supreme Court held that 
Scott was not a United States’ citizen, and his four-year residence in Illinois did not alter his 
slave status (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857).   
The Court based its decision upon the fact that the U.S. Constitution considered Black 
people as property, not human beings (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857).  In its analysis, the Court 
considered the Black race to be separate from the White race by indelible marks, and laws 
established this fact by thinking and speaking of Blacks as human property, while Whites were 
superior and entitled to all of the privileges granted in the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of 
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Independence.  Whiteness determined one’s legal status as a free person or a slave (Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 1857).   
In the Dred Scott case, the Supreme Court made two salient points regarding what the 
founders of this country thought of African American people, which has likely produced the 
chronic racial tension that exists today between Blacks and Whites: 
(1) We hold these truths to be self-evident:  that all men are created equal….The general 
words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family….But it is too 
clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and 
formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration…. 
(2) No one of that race [Black] had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily; all of 
them had been brought here as articles of merchandise.  The number that had been 
emancipated at that time were but few in comparison with those held in slavery; and 
they were identified in the public mind with the race to which they belonged, and 
regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free…. (Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 1857).   
These two statements intimate that Blacks were outsiders brought into the United States of 
America to be owned, used, bought, and sold like goods and services, with no rights or human 
consideration.  The Constitution treated a slave as property and equivalent to three-fifths of a 
person for purposes of apportioning representatives and taxes among the states (United States 
Constitution, Art. I, § 2, 1791).  Therefore, Blacks were property and an inferior race, so they 
were not accorded the personal rights and privileges that the Constitution extended to naturalized 
citizens, including freedom in a non-slave state (Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857).  The presumption 
of freedom arose from the color White, and the color Black raised the presumption of slavery 
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because Whites could not be held as slaves (Harris, 1993 citing Cobb, 1858).  Slavery was a 
legal institution in which Blacks were property that could be transferred, assigned, and inherited, 
whereas Whites were the owners of slaves and accorded all the privileges and protections the law 
provided (Harris, 1993).   
Slavery was abolished in 1863 after the Civil War ended.  The Thirteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, which forbade slavery, was ratified in 1865 (United States Constitution, 
1865).  The ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment along with other legislation came during a 
time known as the Reconstruction era – a time for America to rebuild itself and the lives of 
newly freed slaves following the Civil War.  During the Reconstruction era, Congress approved 
legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, and amended 
the U.S. Constitution by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment in order to help transition newly 
freed Black slaves into a life of freedom.  Some researchers proffer that today’s affirmative 
action debate started after slavery and during the Reconstruction era’s attempts to reconstruct 
American citizenship without regard to skin color (Rubio, 2001).   
In 1863, Congress created the Bureau of Freedmen’s Affairs to provide special assistance 
to Blacks (Schnapper, 1985).  One of the first pieces of Reconstruction legislation that Congress 
introduced was the Freedmen Bureau Act.  Initially, the Freedmen’s Bureau Act was proposed in 
1864 and was supposed to aid only persons of African descent, or such persons who were once 
slaves, with enforcing contracts and renting abandoned land that came into the possession of the 
United States in order for Blacks to become self-sustaining individuals (Cong. Globe, 38th Cong. 
1st session, 1864).  Nevertheless, many opponents of the first Bill disagreed with offering 
preferential treatment for Blacks.  Congressmen protested that under the original bill, taxes 
would be paid by Whites to assist only Blacks, so they suggested that a bureau of Irishmen’s 
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Affairs and Dutchmen’s Affairs, or one for those of Caucasian descent be created (Schnapper, 
1985).  Specifically, some members of Congress inquired about, “[w]hy the freedmen of African 
descent should become these marked objects of special legislation, to the detriment of the 
unfortunate whites…” (H.R.  Rep. No. 2, 38th Cong. 1st session, 2-4, 1864).  As such, the support 
for white privilege prevailed, and Congress revised the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1864 to 
include benefits for Whites.   
Congressman Schenck introduced a new bill that President Lincoln signed into law on 
March 3, 1865 (Schnapper, 1985).  The new legislation provided limited relief for Blacks and 
assistance for White refugees from the former confederate states (Cong. Globe, 38th Cong. 2nd 
session, 566, 1865). The Act of 1865 had three key provisions: 
(1) The Secretary of War was authorized to furnish provisions, clothing, and fuel 
for destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen; 
 
(2) The Commissioner of the Bureau was to lease, and ultimately to sell, up to 
forty acres of abandoned land to any refugee or freedman; 
 
(3) The Bureau was invested with the control of all subjects relating to refugees 
and freedmen (13 Stat. 507). 
 
The 1865 bill is now known mainly for its famous provision of “40 acres and a mule”, which 
were promised to former slaves (Moore, 2005).  Once the bill took effect, however, and the 
Bureau realized how much assistance was being provided to the Black freedmen, Congress 
issued a report (Schnapper, 1985).  The report revealed that freedmen were principally the only 
beneficiaries of programs such as education, labor regulations, Bureau farms, land distribution, 
and adjustments of real estate disputes, aid to orphans, and medical assistance (H.R. Exec. Doc. 
No. 11, 39th Cong., 1st session, 1865; Schnapper, 1985).  As the Freedmen’s Bureau’s budget ran 
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dry and some Congressmen complained of unfair treatments to Whites, General Howard pushed 
for a renewal of funding for the poor Black freedmen for educational purposes (Schnapper, 
1985).  General Howard observed that “[e]ducation is absolutely essential to the freedmen to fit 
them for their new duties and responsibilities….Yet I believe the majority of the White people to 
be utterly opposed to educating the negroes” (H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., 1st session 33, 
1865).  At that time, the final piece of freedmen’s legislation was proposed, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act of 1866 (Schnapper, 1985).  The defeat of the first 1864 Bill, and the subsequent 
passage of the amended 1865 and 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Acts that specifically included 
Whites illustrated the beginning of the legal and political debates over race-conscious affirmative 
action programs in American history.  The “40 acres and a mule” soon became only a familiar 
historical phrase and a distant memory. 
The 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act authorized Congress to appropriate funds for the 
purchase of school buildings to educate refugees and freedmen with a specific interest in 
educating Black children (Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Session 1866; Schnapper, 1985).  While 
opponents of the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Bill continued to vigorously debate the distinctions of 
the races and the special treatment for Blacks, the proponents of the Bill understood that millions 
of former slaves “who had received no education, who had been laboring from generation to 
generation for their white owners and masters, able to own nothing, to accomplish nothing, are 
thrown, without protection, without aid, upon the charities of the world, in communities hostile 
to them….” (statement of Sen. Fessenden, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Session 1866 at 365).  
Thus, Congress approved the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act with race-conscious affirmative 
action programs specifically for former Black slaves intact, namely education programs, so that 
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Blacks could become self-sustaining American citizens.  After 1866, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
educated approximately 100,000 students, and nearly all of them were Black (Schnapper, 1985). 
Concurrently, Congress implemented the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to abate the continued 
racism against former Black slaves (Cohen & Sterba, 2003).  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 stated 
“[A]ll…citizens of the United States…of every race and color…shall have the same right…to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property....” 
(Civil Rights Act, 1866).  The Act proposed making African Americans automatic citizens as 
well as providing schooling, land and housing for them (Civil Rights Act, 1866).  Despite the 
strong language in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Congress’s attempts build an egalitarian 
society through the programs under the Freedmen’s Bureau, racism still persisted.  President 
Johnson himself vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the basis that “[i]n all our history… no 
such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever before been proposed or 
adopted….the distinction of race and color is by the bill made to operate in favor of the colored 
and against the white race” (Five Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3610-11, 1866).  The 
Senate voted to override the President’s veto (Schnapper, 1985).  The legal and political debates 
regarding preferential treatment for the Black freedmen continued; thus, “[t]he principle of 
human equality needed the enforcement that could only be assured if incorporated into the U.S. 
Constitution” (Cohen & Sterba, 2003, p. 7).  Congress hoped the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution would be the answer to racism against the Black freedmen. 
Interestingly, members of Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment just weeks 
before the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act, even though it was not officially enacted until 1868.  
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in order to add constitutionality to race-conscious 
affirmative action programs and to ameliorate the condition of the freedmen (Cong. Globe, 39th 
  32
Cong. 1st Session 2459, 1866).  The Fourteenth Amendment (1868), which is always relied upon 
by those opposing race-conscious affirmative action, has several sections to it.  However, the 
critical part that most people remember states that all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States are citizens, and no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of such citizens or deny to any person the equal protection of the laws (United 
States Constitution, 1868).  The majority of Congressmen who supported the amendment was 
nearly identical to that which supported the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Schnapper, 1985).  
Scholars have posited that Congress proposed and passed the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure 
the constitutionality and to support legally race-conscious legislation for Blacks who were 
subjected to centuries of legal slavery, racism, and subjugation (Moore, 2005; Schnapper, 1985).  
Furthermore, former Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall stated, “Since the Congress that 
considered and rejected the objections to the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act concerning special 
relief to Negroes also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures” (Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, 1978, p. 398).  Despite the original intent, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is now the legal weapon of choice and the crux 
of all race-based arguments before the United States Supreme Court.  This is truly unfortunate 
especially since “[t]he objective of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to provide equity 
for newly freed slaves, an objective that has yet to be accomplished today” (Moore, 2005, p. 
101). 
Because the power of the Fourteenth Amendment did not hold its weight, Black people 
were not completely protected from racism and discrimination.  The case of Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896) depicted just how much the legal system continued to distinguish Blacks and Whites in 
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spite of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Mr. 
Plessy claimed that a railroad company violated his Fourteenth Amendment right of equal 
protection under the laws when it denied him seating in the railway car with White people.  
Plessy asserted that the reputation of belonging to the dominant White race was property, and his 
mixed race2 entitled him to assert this privilege and get assigned to the railway car for White 
people.  The United States Supreme Court wholly disagreed and explained that Mr. Plessy’s 
mixed race made him a colored man and, therefore, he was not lawfully entitled to the privileged 
reputation or the property rights of White men (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896).  The Court held that 
the policy and practice of separate but equal was constitutional and appropriate, and thus, Mr. 
Plessy was placed in the separate railway car for Blacks.  The Supreme Court set a tone for race 
relations and prejudices in American history when it stated that “[l]egislation is powerless to 
eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences…. If one race 
be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the 
same plane” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, p. 551-52).   
Plessy v. Ferguson introduced the legal sanctioning of the separate-but-equal doctrine.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court made a significant point when reaching its decision in the 
Plessy case, which was that the practice of race separation was common, particularly in the 
establishment of separate schools for White and colored children (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896).  
The Supreme Court was referring to a well-known 1849 Massachusetts case called Roberts v. 
City of Boston.  In this case, Benjamin Roberts, a Black man, sued the Boston school district on 
behalf of his five year old daughter who was denied access to a primary school because of her 
                                                 
2 Mr. Plessy was mixed with approximately seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood.  The court noted 
that although the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, it was enough to make him part of the colored 
race. 
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race (Roberts v. City of Boston, 1849).  Mr. Roberts claimed that his daughter was unlawfully 
excluded from the primary school that was closest to their home.  Mr. Roberts cited the 
Massachusetts Constitution and laws that emphasized “all persons without distinction of age or 
sex, birth or color, origin or condition, are equal before the law” (Roberts v. City of Boston, 
1849, p. 206).  The school district argued that the Roberts girl had access to a school, set apart 
for Black children, which was a part of the school committee’s regulation to keep White and 
Black children separate (Roberts v. City of Boston, 1849).  Therefore, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court had to ascertain the rights of individuals with regards to schools and whether the 
school regulations of providing separate schools violated Black children’s rights under the state 
laws and Constitution.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that Mr. Robert’s lawsuit could 
not stand because  
In the absence of special legislation on this subject [separating the races in schools], the 
law has vested the power in the [school] committee to regulate the system of distribution 
and classification….The committee, apparently upon great deliberation, have come to the 
conclusion, that the good of both classes of schools will be best promoted, by maintaining 
the separate primary schools for colored and for white children, and we can perceive no 
ground to doubt, that this is the honest result of their experience and judgment (Roberts v. 
City of Boston, 1849, p. 209). 
The Massachusetts court further noted that maintaining separate schools perpetuated the 
loathsome distinction of class, but these prejudices were not created by law and probably could 
not be changed by law (Roberts v. City of Boston, 1849).   
Although the Roberts case took place in an anti-slavery state, the Massachusetts courts 
and its society considered race and class to be one in the same.  Individuals in the colored race 
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were of a lower social class, and those individuals in the White race were of a higher class.  
Given their lower status, colored children were not to associate with White children, particularly 
in schools, and the courts upheld that practice.  The United States Supreme Court had an 
opportunity in Plessy v. Ferguson to deem the practice of race separation an illegal act, 
especially in light of the recent enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, but instead the 
Supreme Court chose to make the doctrine of separate-but-equal the law.  Accordingly, the long-
established practice of white supremacy now was immortalized with legal authority behind it, 
specifically in the field of education.   
2.1.2 Race-based Legal Cases in Education 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) ushered in a new era of discrimination with the racial segregation laws 
of separate-but-equal.  The separate-but-equal doctrine was prevalent in every segment of 
society, but there was a constant reverberation of the Supreme Court’s support for the doctrine 
when it came to education.  In 1899, the United States Supreme Court confronted the issue of 
whether a school district in Georgia could legally establish public high schools for the sole 
interest of White children and refuse to maintain a similar high school for the benefit of Black 
children, when the Black parents’ tax dollars were being used to maintain the high schools for 
White children (Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 1899)3.  The Black parents 
                                                 
3 There previously had been a separate building used to educate 60 Black high school children, but the Richmond 
County Board of Education claimed that for financial reasons they had to discontinue the high school in order to use 
the building to open four primary schools for younger Black children.  Apparently, 400 or more Black children were 
being turned away from the primary grades because there were not enough seats or teachers to accommodate that 
large number of students.  Since there was not enough money to open another high school building for Black 
students, the Board of Education made the decision to discontinue the high school education for Blacks in order to 
provide young Black children with the rudimentary education of learning the alphabet as well as reading and writing 
while at the same time maintaining high schools for White boys and girls.   
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complained that using the funds to maintain the high school without a similar school for Black 
children violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; the parents requested an 
injunction to compel the Board of Education to withhold all assistance from the high school for 
White children (Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 1899).   
The Court determined that the Board of Education in Georgia did not violate the equal 
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment because both races have similar 
facilities and privileges of attending separate public schools; thus, the injunction was denied.  
The Court specifically noted that the White children should not be denied the educational 
privileges enjoyed by them simply because the Board of Education did not have the economic 
resources to maintain a separate high school for 60 Black children (Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Education, 1899).  The Supreme Court would not consider permitting 60 Black 
children to attend a high school with the White children in furtherance of their education, 
because as the Court stated, “the rule as to the separation of races is enforced” (Cumming v. 
Richmond County Board of Education, 1899, p. 544).  White privilege in education was 
becoming another mainstay in American history. 
The racial segregation in education was also applicable to Chinese-Americans and other 
people of color.  In the case of Gong Lum, et al. v. Rice, et al. (1927), a young girl in Mississippi 
was excluded from attending a high school for White children solely on the ground that she was 
of Chinese descent and not a member of the Caucasian race.  The girl’s father, Gong Lum, 
petitioned the United States Supreme Court claiming that the school district violated his 
daughter’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by not admitting her to the school (Gong Lum, et al. v. 
Rice, et al., 1927).  Gong Lum averred that he was a county taxpayer contributing to the support 
of the high school, and since his daughter was not a member of the colored race or of mixed 
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blood, she was legally entitled to be admitted to the high school (Gong Lum, et al. v. Rice, et al., 
1927).   
Because the Supreme Court determined that the young girl was a member of the 
Mongolian, or yellow race, and there was a school in the county for colored children, the Court 
denied Gong Lum’s petition.  The Court held that the legality of the school district’s decision to 
exclude the young girl from the high school was in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Specifically, the Court found that the question in this case was not any different from other cases 
involving the separation of the White race from the colored races, including black, brown, and 
red, except this case involves a Chinese pupil instead of a Black pupil (Gong Lum, et al. v. Rice, 
et al., 1927).  Thus, the answer remained the same, the separation of the races shall be enforced 
by the States and is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.   
In 1936, the courts finally addressed the racial segregation issue in higher education in 
the case of University of Maryland v. Murray.  While only the state courts heard this case, the 
holding and analysis in the case was cited in subsequent federal higher education cases and 
became essential to how later race cases were handled.  Interestingly, the Murray case and three 
higher education race cases that soon followed specifically involved the separation of the races in 
law schools4.  
In the case of University of Maryland v. Murray (1936), a Black man sought admission to 
the University of Maryland Law School, but because there was not a separate law school for 
                                                 
4 Another law school case was Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1948), in which a United 
States Supreme Court found that the University of Oklahoma denied Ada Sipuel, an African American woman, a 
legal education based on her race and in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court held that the state had to provide a legal education substantially equal to the White students in conformity with 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court relied on its opinion in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938, 
which is discussed later in this paper.  Therefore, the opinion did not offer any different analysis.  Thus, with little to 
no additional insight or analysis, this researcher chose not to discuss the Sipuel case in detail. 
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Blacks, he was denied admission solely because of his race.  The University of Maryland argued 
that they provided adequate provisions to Negro students by offering scholarships to study in 
other states where colleges and professional schools were open to Negroes.  The state court 
found that the scholarships were limited to just a small number of Black students, particularly 
those students interested in attending professional schools like law school.   Furthermore, even if 
a law student received the small monetary scholarship, it was considerably more expensive for 
the students to travel to and attend these out-of-state schools than it was for White students who 
could stay in State (University of Maryland v. Murray, 1936).  Therefore, the Maryland state 
court ordered the University to admit the young Black man to the law school because the State, 
which undertook the function of education in law, made no adequate provisions to provide a 
substantially5 equal education to Black students (University of Maryland v. Murray, 1936) 
(emphasis added).  In other words, the States were not required to provide wholly equal 
treatment to Black and White students. 
In its analysis, however, the state court made it known that it supported the legality of the 
separate-but-equal doctrine and was in search of an alternate remedy, but in this case there was 
no other choice but to mingle the races in one school.  The court expressed that “In Maryland no 
officers or body of officers are authorized to establish a separate law school, there is no 
legislative declaration of a purpose to establish one, and the courts could not make the decision 
for the State….[t]herefore the erection of a separate school is not here an available remedy” 
(University of Maryland v. Murray, 1936, pg. 488).  Accordingly, the University of Maryland 
                                                 
5 It is important to note that the Courts interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as 
only requiring a state “to extend to its citizens of the two races substantially equal treatment in the facilities it 
provides from the public funds” (University of Maryland v. Murray, 1936, p. 484).   
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Law School begrudgingly had to admit the one Black student, but the separate-but-equal doctrine 
still remained the law of the land. 
A few years after the Murray case, another Black student faced the United States 
Supreme Court seeking admission to a White law school.  This time the law school was located 
in Missouri.  The Supreme Court relied on the holding and analysis in the Murray case (see 
University of Maryland v. Murray, 1936, supra) and held that the University of Missouri Law 
School had to admit the Black-Petitioner because the State did not provide a legal education for 
Negro students within the State as it did for White law students (Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 1938).  What is fascinating is that although the state of Missouri refused to establish a 
law school at Lincoln University, the state university for Black students, or at any other place in 
the State, the Supreme Court applauded the State for being a pioneer in the State of the Union by 
establishing a separate university for Black students that was almost on the same plane as the 
White university (Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 1938) (emphasis added).  
In two 1950 higher education cases, the United States Supreme Court simultaneously 
confronted the issue of whether Black students should be admitted to White universities to 
pursue advanced higher education degrees.  The Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled Black students to equivalent facilities and an equal 
education as White students6.  Specifically, in the case of Sweatt v. Painter (1950), a Black man 
was refused admission into the University of Texas Law School because of his race.  The United 
States Supreme Court concluded that under the Equal Protection Clause, the Black man was 
entitled to a legal education equivalent to that offered to White students; the separate law school 
                                                 
6The United States Supreme Court decided the case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 
et al. (1950) on the same day as Sweatt v. Painter (1950).  The McLaurin  case involved a Black man admitted into 
doctoral program at the University of Oklahoma who was forced to be in a separate classroom, library, and cafeteria 
from the White students. 
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created for blacks was not equal (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950).  The law school for Blacks had five 
full-time professors, 23 students, a library of 16,500 volumes, which according to the Supreme 
Court, did not compare to the University of Texas Law School’s 16 full-time and 3 part-time 
professors, 850 law students, a library of 65,000 volumes, and access to many distinguished 
alumni.   
In the holding, the Court acknowledged that the law is a highly learned profession, and a 
legal education requires the “interplay of ideas and the exchange of views,” which cannot occur 
in an academic vacuum or in isolation from individuals (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, p. 634).  The 
Court noted that the White majority, who were attending the University of Texas Law School 
that had the rich traditions, prestige, and history of excellence and opportunities, would not want 
to attend the newly created Black law school that was partially staffed with few resources and no 
reputation or privileges (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950).  Herein lie the inequality of the two law 
schools.  Regardless of these types of apparent inequalities that were still in place in 1950, the 
Supreme Court stated that there was no need to “reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. 
Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge respecting the purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects of racial segregation” (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, p. 
636).  Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the separate-but-equal doctrine. 
Shortly after the 1950 cases, however, the United States Supreme Court held that “In the 
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal” (Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 1954, p. 
495).  In Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al. (1954), four children from four 
different states, Kansas, Virginia, South Carolina, and Delaware, wanted an equal education in 
desegregated public schools in their respective states.  In Brown, the Supreme Court considered 
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the effect of racial segregation on public education, and whether separating youth of similar age 
and qualifications solely because of their race “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone” 
(Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 1954, p. 494).  The Supreme Court aptly 
noted that 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon 
the colored children . . . . For the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group.  A sense of inferiority affects the motivation 
of a child to learn (Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 1954, p. 494). 
Simply speaking, in the infamous Brown case, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged 
the negative effect that past racism and current racist views had had on society, and how it was 
affecting African Americans.  The Supreme Court finally understood the abysmal impact of 
segregation, inclusive of the inequitable resources, unfair treatment, and the feelings of 
inadequacy.  The fact remained that since slavery, Black children and White children were 
segregated by legal policy, practice, and educational opportunity.  Black people were made to 
feel inferior for hundreds of years, but specifically in education.  Therefore, in 1954, new 
questions began to surface regarding race and legal policy.  Could years of intentional racism, 
discrimination, and segregation against Blacks and other people of color be overturned by the 
Brown decision and could equality truly be achieved? 
Although it appeared from the Brown decision that the Supreme Court comprehended the 
detrimental effects of racial discrimination, it still took another ten years before the creation of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the total demise of the separate-but-equal doctrine.  In general, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer or organization from discriminating against 
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individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin (42 USCS 2000 et seq., 
1964).  Title IV permits the United States Attorney General to investigate school districts and 
university systems that may be engaging in racial segregation.  Additionally, Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 specifically prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin 
in any program, activity, or institution receiving Federal financial assistance (42 USCS 2000d et 
seq., 1964).  Title VI is applicable to all public schools and colleges, and most private 
educational institutions, such as Harvard and Stanford.  For political reasons, higher education 
institutions were exempted from Title VI enforcement until 1972 when the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare issued guidelines pursuant to the 1972 Higher Education 
Amendments (Graham, 1994; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).   
Prior to the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several southern senators 
opposed the Act claiming that the federal government was overstepping its authority by denying 
American citizens their basic economic, personal, and property rights for the sole benefit of the 
Black population.  Representatives from Louisiana, Georgia, Virginia, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, and Mississippi argued that the rights of employers to hire and fire, the rights of unions 
to choose members, the rights of postsecondary and professional schools to choose students, and 
seniority rights in employment would be severely impaired by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Greene, 1989; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  In spite of this opposition, Congress voted to enact the 
Civil Rights Act and even went a step further.  Because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
years of discrimination, Congress also implemented affirmative action policies to place primacy 
on group rights rather than on individual rights, and the protected class minorities, such as 
African Americans, held priority claims (Graham, 1994).  Understandably, to many people, these 
affirmative action policies sounded like unjust discriminatory actions were being taken against 
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blameless Whites.  Predictably, Title VI, like the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, became additional weaponry in the armory fighting against race-conscious 
affirmative action policies in higher education. 
The road to race-based affirmative action and the pursuit for equality has been long and 
complicated.  America’s legal history with race and maintaining white dominance undoubtedly 
adds to the complexity of the creation of race-sensitive policies.  This country’s legal 
background offers some understanding of why the federal legislature found it necessary to 
implement race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs in the 1960s.  The following 
table is a brief recap and chronology of key legal cases and legislation that may have laid the 
foundation for current race-conscious affirmative action policies in higher education.  (Table 1). 
Table 1: Chronology of Key Legal Cases and Legislation Leading to Affirmative Action 
LEGAL 
CASES/LEGISLATION LEGAL ISSUES/PURPOSE FINDINGS RATIONALE 
Roberts v. City of Boston 
(1849) 
A school district denied a Black child 
access to a primary school because of 
her race, so the child’s father sued 
the school district for illegally 
excluding the Black child. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
held the lawsuit could not stand 
against the City of Boston School 
District. 
In the absence of special legislation, the school 
committee could regulate the school system 
including separating the races.  While maintaining 
separate schools perpetuates the distinction of class, 
these prejudices are not created by law and cannot 
be changed by law. 
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857) 
A slave living in the free state of 
Illinois wanted to become a citizen in 
that state and be entitled to all the 
rights, privileges, and immunities, 
guaranteed by U.S. Constitution. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Mr. Scott was not a U.S. citizen, and 
his residence in Illinois did not 
change his slave status. 
Blacks were property, inferior, and equal to 3/5 of a 
person, so they were not accorded the rights and 
privileges that the U.S. Constitution extended to 
naturalized citizens. 
Freedmen’s Bureau Acts of 
1864, 1865, and 1866 
Legislation established appropriate 
programs to aid persons of African 
descent or former slaves with 
enforcing contracts and renting 
abandoned land in order to help 
blacks become self-sustaining 
individuals. 
Original provisions provided blacks 
with education, land distribution, 
medical assistance and more.  The 
1866 Act included white refugees 
and provided only enough funding 
for blacks to receive some 
education. 
The change in legislation was due to Congressmen 
debating the distinction of the races, and not 
wanting to give special treatment to blacks. 
13th Amendment of U.S. 
Constitution (1865) The legality of slavery. Abolished and forbade slavery. To promote human rights. 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 
To provide equal rights and benefits 
for all citizens of every race and 
color, including blacks being 
considered citizens and provided 
them with schooling, land, and 
housing. 
The President vetoed the original 
bill because it provided too much to 
blacks over whites.  Congress 
enacted part of the bill and 
considered all blacks, including 
former slaves, to be U.S. citizens 
entitled to equal rights. 
To alleviate the racism and discrimination against 
the newly freed slaves. 
14th Amendment of U.S. 
Constitution (1868) 
Amendment required equal civil 
rights for all U.S. citizens, 
specifically Black freedmen (former 
slaves). 
Formally and legally provided equal 
protection, privileges, and rights to 
all Black freedmen like that of 
White men. 
To alleviate the racism and discrimination against 
the newly freed slaves and support special relief 
and programs for blacks. 
  45
 LEGAL 
CASES/LEGISLATION LEGAL ISSUES/PURPOSE FINDINGS RATIONALE 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 
A railroad company denied Mr. 
Plessy, a man of mixed race, seating 
in the railway car for whites in 
violation of the equal protection 
clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the policy and practice of separate-
but-equal was constitutional and 
appropriate, so Mr. Plessy was 
properly seated in the railway car 
for blacks instead of whites. The 
doctrine of separate-but-equal was 
born. 
Mr. Plessy’s mixed race of 1/8 African blood and 
7/8 Caucasian made him a colored man, so Plessy 
was not entitled to the privileged reputation or the 
property right of white men. Thus, he had to sit in 
the railway car for blacks. 
Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Education 
(1899) 
Using taxpayers’ money to maintain 
a high school for White children 
without a similar school for Black 
children violated the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 
the parents requested an injunction to 
compel the Board of Education to 
withhold all assistance from the high 
school for White children. 
The U.S. Supreme Court determined 
that the Board of Education did not 
violate the equal protection clause of 
the 14th Amendment; injunction 
denied. 
Both races had similar facilities and privileges of 
attending separate public schools.  The White 
children should not be denied educational benefits 
enjoyed by them simply because the Board of 
Education did not have enough money also to 
maintain a separate high school for Black children. 
Gong Lum, et al. v. Rice, et al. 
(1927) 
A school district denied a Chinese 
citizen, who was not colored or of 
mixed race, from attending a White 
school in violation of her 14th 
Amendment rights. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the legality of the school district’s 
decision to exclude the Chinese 
citizen from a public school for 
White children was in accordance 
with the 14th Amendment. 
The child was a member of the Mongolian, or 
yellow race.  The separation of the White race from 
colored races, included black, brown, red, and 
yellow. 
University of Maryland v. 
Murray (1936) 
There was no separate law school for 
blacks, and the University of 
Maryland denied a Black man 
admission to the law school solely 
based on race and in violation of the 
14th Amendment. 
Maryland state court ordered the 
University to admit the Black man 
in accordance with the 14th 
Amendment’s equal protection 
clause. 
The University made no adequate provisions to 
provide a substantially equal education for Black 
students, and sending the students to an out-of-state 
law school at the students’ expense was 
unreasonable and unfair. 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada (1938) 
There was no separate law school for 
blacks, and the University of 
Missouri denied a Black man 
admission to the law school solely 
based on race and in violation of the 
14th Amendment 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
under the 14th Amendment, the 
University had to admit the Black 
man because Missouri did not 
provide a legal education for blacks 
within the State. 
The University made no adequate provisions to 
provide a substantially equal education to Black 
students, and sending the students to an out-of-state 
law school was unreasonable and unfair. 
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LEGAL 
CASES/LEGISLATION LEGAL ISSUES/PURPOSE FINDINGS RATIONALE 
Sipuel v. Board of Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma, et 
al. (1948) 
There was no separate law school for 
blacks, and the University of 
Oklahoma denied a concededly 
qualified Black woman admission to 
the law school solely based on race 
and in violation of the 14th 
Amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the State must provide a legal 
education for a Black woman in 
conformity with the equal protection 
clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The University of Oklahoma was the only 
institution for legal education supported and 
maintained by taxpayers, so Black citizens were 
entitled to secure a legal education afforded by the 
State. 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education 
(1950) 
Whether Black students should be 
admitted to White universities to 
pursue advanced degrees. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment entitled Black 
students to equivalent facilities and 
an equal education as White 
students. 
A Black man admitted to a doctoral program in 
Oklahoma has a right to learn with White students.  
He should not be forced to be in a separate 
classroom, library, and cafeteria from White 
students solely because of race. 
Sweatt v. Painter (1950) 
Whether Black students should be 
admitted to White universities to 
pursue advanced degrees. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment entitled Black 
students to equivalent facilities and 
an equal education as White 
students. 
Law is a highly learned profession, and a legal 
education requires the interplay of ideas and 
exchange of views, which cannot occur in an 
academic vacuum or in isolation from individuals.  
Thus, Black students should learn and exchange 
ideas with White students and be exposed to the 
same academic resources, rich traditions, and 
opportunities that the University of Texas Law 
School offered to its White students. 
Brown, et al. v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, et al. 
(1954) 
Whether racially segregated public 
schools are unequal in violation of 
the equal protection of the laws under 
the 14th Amendment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that in 
the field of public education the 
doctrine of separate-but-equal has 
no place; separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal. 
The segregation of White and Black children in 
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the 
Black child, and a sense of inferiority affects the 
motivation of a child to learn. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
To eradicate discrimination and 
segregation against blacks and other 
subjugated minorities as well as to 
eliminate economic and social 
oppression against minority groups. 
Generally, the Act prohibits an 
employer or organization from 
discriminating against individuals 
because of their race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.  Also, 
provides legal remedies for those 
discriminated against. 
To provide equal opportunities in employment, 
education, housing, etc. for all U.S. citizens. 
  
2.1.3 What is Affirmative Action - The Pros and Cons 
Although there is no clear-cut definition for affirmative action, the concept of affirmative action 
originally came from an old English legal concept of equity, or the administration of justice 
according to what was fair in a particular situation (Skrentny, 1996).  During the Reconstruction 
era, the word “affirmative” was used often to describe actions taken to protect Blacks’ civil 
rights and challenge white privilege (Rubio, 2001).  More than half a century later, the phrase 
“affirmative action” actually appeared as part of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, and 
declared that employers that discriminated against union members affirmatively had to act to 
place the victims where they would have been without the discrimination (Skrentny, 1996).  
President Franklin Roosevelt was known for taking affirmative action in 1941 when he issued 
Executive Order 8802 and several subsequent bills, which proposed that specific victims of 
discrimination be made whole and put in the position he or she would have held were it not for 
discriminatory acts (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  However, it was during the 1960s, the height of 
the Civil Rights Movement, when the term “affirmative action” took on a more racialized and 
discordant meaning.   
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy coined the phrase “affirmative action,” which is 
found in Executive Order 10952, when he established the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and directed contractors on projects funded with federal money to “take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated during their 
employment, without regard to the race, creed, color, or national origin” (3 C.F.R. 448, 450).  It 
was this order that initiated the United States’ commitment to affirmative action and taking 
serious steps to eliminate racism (Cohen & Sterba, 2003).  President Kennedy stressed that the 
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issue was not merely eradicating discrimination, but eradicating as well the oppressive economic 
and social burdens imposed on Blacks by racial discrimination; thus, the expansion of 
educational and employment opportunities was necessary (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  On the 
heals of this Executive Order in 1961, the University of Georgia was court ordered to admit 
Black students after over 175 years of racial discrimination; the university admitted only two 
students (Moore, 2005).  President Kennedy wanted more action, more movement than the 
University of Georgia and other universities and agencies were willing to give.  The President 
then proposed legislation to implement a civil rights act to ensure appropriate measures would be 
taken to create a level playing field where equal opportunity would prevail (Cohen & Sterba, 
2003). 
Three years later, five days after President Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon Johnson 
and some members of Congress arduously worked to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Unfortunately, about 16 days after the act was passed, riots broke out in several cities, including 
Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Jersey City, and the Watts section of Los Angeles in opposition of the 
Act and its potential ramifications (Cohen & Sterba, 2003).  This reaction to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 prompted President Johnson to issue Executive Order 11246 in 1965 to address the racist 
practices of the federal government and its private contractors, which stated: 
It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in 
federal government for all persons, to prohibit discrimination to employment for all 
persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because or race, creed, color, or 
national origin, and to promote the full realization of equal opportunity through a 
positive, continuing program in each executive department or agency (Executive Order 
11246, 1965, part 1, § 101).    
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The enforceable mandate of nondiscrimination extended both then and now to every aspect of 
employment and higher education admissions (Cohen & Sterba, 2003, emphasis added).  
Discriminatory practices in the United States were to be decimated and legal remedies were to be 
implemented for those discriminated against.  Accordingly, the federal guidelines required that 
policies and practices be created to break the racist effects of segregation; affirmative action was 
the law of the land for the good and equality of society.  Cohen and Sterba (2003) remarked that 
“… [A]ffirmative action was morally right, as honorable as public policy can be….Affirmative 
action was to be the instrument with which we would expose and uproot unequal treatment of 
every kind, covert and overt, deliberate or inadvertent.  Affirmative action…spoke then, and it 
speaks now, to our condition.  It deserved its good name” (p. 14).    
The United States Commission on Civil Rights stated that affirmative action 
encompasses “any measure, beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to 
correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from 
recurring in the future” (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Oct. 1977, p. 2).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary (1991) defined affirmative action as employment programs required by federal 
statutes and regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in hiring minority group 
members.  Given the battles over and evolution of affirmative action in American society, one 
researcher offered a comprehensive explanation for the purpose of affirmative action by stating: 
[A]ffirmative action sums up the story of the United States: the struggle for justice, 
equality, and self-determination and whether African Americans will or even should be 
able to enjoy chosen labor and increased life chances.  It represents the history of white 
supremacy, privilege, and guilt versus black protest, militance, and demands for 
compensation and reparations; black reality against white denial; formal equality versus 
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remedial “preferential” treatment; and the debate over integration, assimilation, 
segregation, and separation.  The black-led struggle against discrimination has been the 
primary impetus for people of color, women, and other oppressed groups also to demand 
political and social equality . . . . [Affirmative action] has become an amorphous category 
that also includes . . . debates over quotas, statistics, and ideas of what constitutes merit.  
In fact, “affirmative action” has now become part of American folklore - and its main 
focus has been on what is called “race” (Rubio, 2001, p. 3). 
Simply put, affirmative action is now a nebulous racial term that invokes division between 
Blacks and Whites in almost every meaningful part of life, such as decisions made regarding 
schooling, working, and voting. 
The debates over race-conscious affirmative action have led to supporters offering many 
reasons why affirmative action is necessary, with critics opposing most of those reasons.  
Nevertheless, there have been some commonalities between the supporters and critics in defense 
of some forms of affirmative action.  The three most common defenses of affirmative action, 
which are briefly discussed below, have been termed the: (1) outreach; (2) remedial; and (3) 
diversity defenses (Cohen & Sterba, 2003).   
 Outreach affirmative action is a weaker form of affirmative action, and it includes the 
“widespread advertisement to groups not previously represented in certain privileged positions” 
(Cohen & Sterba, 2003, p. 204 citing Pojman, 1998, pp. 169-80).  After all, racial discrimination 
is one of those areas in society that cannot be cured by ceasing and desisting because employers 
and college institutions have engaged in racial discrimination for so many years (Sowell, 1975).  
Outreach affirmative action permits organizations to take some affirmative steps, so that White 
employers will not continue to hire their current employees’ friends and relatives through word 
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of mouth referrals, and elite institutions will not continue selectively to recruit White students 
from privileged backgrounds and wealthy alumni (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Sowell, 1975).  The 
primary requirement for outreach affirmative action is that “[a]ll reasonable steps must be taken 
to ensure that qualified minority and women candidates have available to them the same 
educational and job opportunities that are available to non-minority or male candidates” (Cohen 
& Sterba, 2003, p. 205). 
 Remedial action is another defensible type of affirmative action, but is probably one of 
the most controversial types of affirmative action.  Remedial affirmative action suggests that 
certain minority groups should be compensated for past or present discrimination (Cohen & 
Sterba, 2003; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  The United States Supreme Court has held that it is 
permissible for institutions to engage in remedial affirmative action as compensation for 
identifiable acts of purposeful discrimination committed by that institution (Local 28 of the Sheet 
metal Workers Union v EEOC, 1986).  Individuals can make a case for remedial affirmative 
action when they can show evidence of statistical disparities in an institution.  For example, in 
the Local 28 case, the injured parties showed that there were no minority members in the Local 
28 Union in New York City, but the relevant labor pool was comprised of 29 percent minorities 
(Local 28 of the Sheet metal Workers Union v EEOC, 1986).  However, it is important to know 
that using race-based affirmative action to remedy unproven discrimination, which is also known 
as societal discrimination, is legally unacceptable because societal discrimination cannot be 
attributed to just one particular institution (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
1978).  Furthermore, a race-based affirmative action policy or program must stand up to the 
Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny standard, which simply means that the policy or program must be 
carefully written and customized (narrowly tailored) to meet a compelling governmental interest, 
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such as the benefits of sharing or gaining specific knowledge in an educational institution (Gratz 
v. Bollinger, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
1978). 
 The final defensible type of affirmative action and perhaps the most common is known as 
the diversity rationale.  Diversity may be an acceptable form of affirmative action if the objective 
supports the notion of gaining educational benefits or creating a more effective work force, such 
as policing or community relations (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  Higher education institutions often have 
used diversity as an argument for race-based affirmative action policies.  In fact, educational 
diversity is the primary reason why institutions of higher education want to maintain the use of 
race in the admissions process (Moore, 2005).  The president of Tufts University stated that 
“affirmative action has taken us beyond the passivity of ‘equal opportunity’ and engaged us in 
the active and creative seeking of qualified, underrepresented candidates” (Moore, 2005, p. 9 
citing John Dibiaggio, 2003).  Some higher education institutions have been successful in 
recruiting qualified candidates with their use of diversity, but there are some limitations.  For 
instance, in the Bakke case, the Supreme Court concluded that race could be considered a “plus” 
factor during a college admissions process to achieve educational diversity, so long as the 
individual qualities of each applicant were considered during the admissions process (Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  Similarly, in the Grutter case, the Supreme Court 
held that the University of Michigan’s Law School’s policy of seeking to enroll a critical mass of 
minority students did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act since it engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of 
each applicant’s file (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  Nevertheless, these acceptable forms of 
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affirmative action policies cannot appear to include or promote a quota system, where a certain 
number of minorities is trying to be reached or certain individuals receive extra points for being 
part of a minority group.  The Supreme Court has held that these types of quota systems are 
illegal, even when trying to achieve diversity.   
 Overall, there have been five key definitions given for affirmative action over the past 40 
years.  First, affirmative action is a set a policies designed to advertise all openings as widely as 
possible as well as to monitor job appointments and promotions to ensure that the process is fair 
and non-discriminatory (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  Second, affirmative 
action consists of policies or programs ordered by the court to rectify proven cases of individual 
discrimination, in which there are numerical objectives for an institution to achieve a more 
equitable number of minorities during a specific period (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Mosley & 
Capaldi, 1996).  Third, affirmative action is congressionally mandated rules concerning federal 
contracts and involving a specific percentage of contracts to be set aside for minority contractors 
(Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Moore, 2005; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  Fourth, affirmative action is a 
policy designed to redress alleged cases of past discrimination, in which the injured members of 
the discriminated group are placed in the position they would have been in but for the 
discriminatory actions (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  Finally, affirmative 
action is any policy that is not based on a causal claim of discrimination, but is meant to produce 
a social goal by invoking quotas to achieve group representation (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Moore, 
2005; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996). 
 Although the original purposes for, and definitions of, affirmative action policies appear 
to represent what is good for maintaining a fair and just society, there have been numerous 
reasons given for why affirmative action should be eliminated.  Probably the most obvious 
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criticism regarding affirmative action is that it is illegal.  According to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, no state can deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  When people oppose affirmative action policies, 
they typically cite the equal protection clause to bolster the idea that the amendment protects 
individual rights, not group rights (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  Similarly, Titles VI and VII of the 
Civil Rights Act set forth that federally funded institutions and employers in the private or public 
sector are forbidden from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 601 of Title VI; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 703 
of Title VII). Critics argue that these specific sections of the Civil Rights Act make race-
conscious affirmative action policies and programs illegal. 
 Another sharp attack against affirmative action is that it is immoral.  Cohen & Sterba 
(2003) opined that affirmative action violates the basic equality principle – some receiving a 
public benefit that others do not receive is clearly unequal treatment.  Critics continue to believe 
that affirmative action is synonymous with preferential treatment (Moore, 2005).  Additionally, 
critics argue that affirmative action was meant to be a temporary fix in an effort to strive for a 
color-blind society that recognizes individuals, not to adopt race consciousness as a norm for 
groups of minorities (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  In the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 
Justice Harlan strongly argued the point that the U.S. Constitution is color-blind and does not 
recognize groups, just individuals.  In opposition to the separate-but-equal doctrine, Justice 
Harlan warned against making race classifications because “the destinies of the two races, in this 
country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common 
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law” 
(Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, p. 559).   
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Affirmative action is seen as wrong because it has all of the ingredients for the making of 
immorality because it repeats an American history that began with racism and discrimination.  
Cohen & Sterba (2003) illustrated this sentiment quite well when they stated 
The most gruesome chapters in human history – the abomination of black slavery, the 
wholesale slaughter of the Jews – remind us that racial categories must never be allowed 
to serve as the foundation for official differentiation.  Nations in which racial distinctions 
were once embedded in public law are forever shamed.  Our own history is by such 
racism ineradicably stained.  The lesson is this:  Never again.  Never, ever again. What is 
loosely called “affirmative action” sticks in our craw because it fails to respect that plain 
lesson (p. 25).   
Researchers have agreed that the United States history of racial oppression hovers over all the 
arguments for or against affirmative action – making distinctions based on race can have good 
effects given American history of oppression and bad effects given the future of America striving 
to be a color-blind society (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Moore, 2005; Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).   
 Two other common arguments have been waged against race-based affirmative action: 
(1) Black people and other disadvantaged racial minorities are stigmatized for being recipients of 
affirmative action, rather than qualified individuals, and (2) the playing field has been leveled 
between racial minorities and Whites.  Specifically, some critics say that affirmative action 
reinforces the idea that blacks and other racial minorities can only succeed if held to lower or 
different standards (Mosley & Capaldi, 1996).  In other words, affirmative action makes racial 
minorities feel inferior and not worthy of what they have received because of their racial or 
ethnic background.  Furthermore, those in opposition often claim that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and affirmative action policies have been in effect for more than 40 years, so that has been 
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more than enough time to level the playing field (Cohen & Sterba, 2003; Moore, 2005).  More 
blacks and racial minorities go to college and have well-paying professional careers; therefore, 
there is no longer a need for preferential racial policies like affirmative action (Moore, 2005).  
Many researchers, such as Bowen & Bok (1998), have studied these arguments in their quest to 
understand the controversy surrounding race-sensitive policies at institutions of higher education. 
 In 1998, Bowen and Bok published a book entitled The Shape of the River.  The book is a 
study that chronicles different sets of White and Black student cohorts entering 28 academically 
selective colleges and universities7.  Bowen and Bok (1998) used the College and Beyond (C & 
B) database created by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation from 1994 through 1997.  Bowen and 
Bok (1998) studied the records of 80,000 undergraduate students attending these 28 selective 
higher education institutions in the fall of 1951, fall of 1976, and fall of 1989.  The purpose of 
the study was to investigate the use of race and the debate surrounding race-sensitive admission 
programs in elite and selective institutions of higher education (Bowen & Bok, 1998).  
Not surprisingly, in their study, Bowen & Bok (1998) discovered that minority students 
enter these selective colleges and universities with test scores and high school grades that are 
significantly lower than White students’ scores and grades.  In spite of these academic 
qualifications, 75 percent of the Black students who matriculated in 1989 at the 28 selective 
institutions graduated from the first college they entered, as compared to the 40 percent of Black 
students or 59 percent of White students graduating from NCAA Division I schools (Bowen & 
Bok, 1998).  Furthermore, Bowen & Bok (1998) found that despite their lower test scores and 
                                                 
7 The 28 colleges and universities in Bowen and Bok’s study were: Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Denson 
University, Hamilton College, Kenyon College, Oberlin College, Smith College, Columbia University, Duke 
University, Emory University, Miami University (Ohio), Northwestern University, Pennsylvania State University, 
Princeton University, Swarthmore College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, Williams College, Rice 
University, Stanford University, Tufts University, Tulane University, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt University, Washington 
University, and Yale University. 
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grades, Black C & B graduates were more likely than White C & B graduates to earn degrees in 
law and medicine.  About 90 percent of Black students attending leading professional schools of 
law, business, and medicine successfully completed their studies (Bowen & Bok, 1998).   
In their study, Bowen & Bok (1998) did not find too many negative effects on racial 
minorities who benefited from race-conscious admissions policies; rather they found more 
positive outcomes, such as minority students’ motivation and desire to achieve, once given an 
opportunity.  The desire of these students to move forward in their studies is in congruence with 
the hope of the higher education institutions to enroll qualified, deserving minority students who 
are overlooked because of lower test scores and grades.  Bowen and Bok (1998) acknowledged 
that, “The increased numbers of Black and Hispanic holders of law degrees, medical degrees, 
business degrees, and PhDs can be credited to the joint efforts of students of high ambition, 
strong undergraduate programs, and graduate institutions that have worked hard to enroll larger 
numbers of talented minority students” (p. 103).  Bowen & Bok’s study of race-sensitive 
affirmative action policies at the 28 selective universities does not support the argument that 
racial minorities are stigmatized by the policies, but rather minorities are fortified.  Bowen & 
Bok’s study also established the need for such policies to help continue leveling the playing field 
between Whites, Blacks, and other disadvantaged racial minorities. 
While there is no obvious definition for affirmative action and its purpose, there has been 
unquestionable opposition as well as support for affirmative action policies.  On one hand, 
affirmative action policies are known for providing opportunity to excluded individuals, 
increasing diversity in society, and eliminating discriminatory activity within companies and 
organizations.  At the same time, however, affirmative action policies are known for being 
immoral, illegal, and unfair.  A commonality between the critics and supporters is that they both 
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rely on past and present legislation, legal cases, and in some cases, actual statistics to augment 
their reasons for why affirmative action is good, bad, or unnecessary, as evidenced by Bowen & 
Bok’s 1998 study in The Shape of the River.  Despite on which side of the affirmative action 
fence one stands on, the one thing that is certain is that the United States has a treacherous 
history with race and race relations, especially when it comes to Blacks and Whites.  The current 
affirmative action debates are now another cultural chasm that separates society. 
2.1.4 Federal Affirmative Action Education Programs 
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 took effect, the need for affirmative action became a national 
priority with regards to achieving educational and economic parity among all American citizens.  
Various civil rights and national watchdog organizations, such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Urban League, the American Bar 
Association (ABA), and the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) just to name a few, began 
to investigate the low numbers of women and minorities in certain careers and in institutions of 
higher education.  They pushed for affirmative steps to be taken immediately.  Before the mid-
1960s and the beginning of affirmative action programs, minority enrollments in higher 
education institutions were low and either stable or declining (O’Neil, 1970).   
Following the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, selective universities 
sought to open their large White male classes to previously excluded minorities and women 
(Fullinwider & Lichtenberg, 2004).  The question, however, was whether these once excluded 
students were prepared for the demands of higher education.  Preferential programs and policies 
were proposed to help insure that the incoming disadvantaged minority and female students 
would be equipped for the arduous tasks of higher education curricula.  Several universities 
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initiated preparatory programs for poor and minority students to help make a smoother entrance 
into the world and expectations of higher education.  The federal government supported 
initiatives as well; however, the federally funded programs were aimed at low-income students, 
rather than racial minorities.  The researcher found one federally funded program that was 
specifically established for disadvantaged students and racial minorities – the Council on Legal 
Education Program (CLEO), which is the focal point of this dissertation study.  Perhaps with the 
political outcry of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proposed affirmative action policies, the 
federal government was hesitant about supporting programs specifically created for racial 
minorities.  Regardless of the reasons, the more germane issue today is that it appears that all 
federally funded programs that primarily benefit racial minorities, even if the programs did not 
originally intend to, are in jeopardy of losing funding.  Therefore, in this portion of the paper, the 
researcher concentrates on two other federal education initiatives, besides the CLEO program, 
that have benefited many disadvantaged students and racial minorities.  The TRIO Programs and 
GEAR UP are federal education programs that are also under attack. 
2.1.4.1  TRIO Programs and GEAR UP 
During the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson and the federal government responded to the 
societal request of providing financial resources and encouraging poor, minority students to 
pursue higher education.  In 1964, President Johnson signed into law the Economic Opportunity 
Act, which gave rise to the Office of Economic Opportunity, as part of the War on Poverty plan 
(Fields, 2001).  The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) implemented the Special Programs 
for Students from Disadvantaged Backgrounds, which later became known as the TRIO 
Programs (McElroy & Armesto, 1998).  TRIO is now a set of educational initiatives directed 
largely at youth from families of four or more earning under $24,000 a year (Fullinwider & 
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Lichtenberg, 2004).  In 1964, the OEO presented the first federal program called Upward Bound.  
The Economic Opportunity Act authorized the launching of 18 pilot Upward Bound programs 
(Blake, 1998).  Upward Bound instructs high school students in math, literature, composition, 
and science on Saturdays during the school year and on a college campus for five weeks during 
the summer (Fullinwider & Lichtenberg, 2004).   
In 1965, the Higher Education Act (HEA) introduced another program, Talent Search, 
which began operating in 1967 (Cahalan, et al. 2004).  Both Upward Bound and Talent Search 
were designed to increase college access among low-income youth, many of whom were 
minority students having parents that did not graduate from college.  After the reauthorization of 
HEA in 1968, OEO established the Student Support Services program.  At that time, the new 
Student Support Services program, Upward Bound, and Talent Search assumed the moniker of 
the TRIO Programs (Fields, 2001).  In 1968, TRIO Programs were transferred from the OEO to 
the Office of Higher Education Programs.  TRIO Programs are now under the authority of the 
Office of Federal TRIO Programs in the U.S. Department of Education (McElroy & Armesto, 
1998).  Over the next twenty years, several additional TRIO Programs were created, such as 
Educational Opportunity Centers (EOC) and the Ronald E. McNair Post-Baccalaureate 
Achievement Program.   
By 1998, over 1,900 TRIO Programs had provided services to 780,000 Americans, in 
which almost all of them were from minority or low-income backgrounds (Blake, 1998; Fields, 
2001).  Approximately, two million TRIO participants have graduated from college since the 
pilot programs for Upward Bound were introduced in 1964 (Blake, 1998).  About 35 percent of 
TRIO Program participants are African American, and most of the students are first-generation 
college students (Fields, 2001).  As more TRIO Programs came into existence and more students 
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benefited from the programs, controversy arose.  Some of the controversy regarded the 
definitions of “educational disadvantaged” and determining who were eligible for TRIO 
Programs (McElroy & Armesto, 1998).  Kendrick & Thomas (1970), the first group to evaluate 
the Upward Bound program, defined “educationally disadvantaged” as those who are members 
of groups that historically have been underrepresented in higher education and that are below 
national averages on educational indices.  Additionally, Levin (1986) described the 
“educationally disadvantaged” as students lacking the home and community resources that 
enable them to succeed in conventional educational settings due to poverty, racial/ethnic and 
cultural distinctions, or linguistic abilities.  The TRIO programs responded to the overwhelming 
need to prepare educationally disadvantaged students, who would typically not go to college but 
would assume low-skilled occupations, for higher education (McElroy & Armesto, 1998).  
Without TRIO, many of these students might have continued a familial cycle of unemployment 
and low status on the socioeconomic ladder.  It is estimated that by 2010, almost 50 percent of all 
occupations in the United States will require higher levels of knowledge and skills that were 
once held for only the elite and highly educated (Darling-Hammond, 1997; McElroy & Armesto, 
1998).  Over the past 40 years, the TRIO Programs have helped to open the educational and 
economic doors so that disadvantaged and minority students may compete with the elite and the 
highly educated for these high-level positions.   
Today, there are six TRIO outreach and support programs that prepare disadvantaged 
students in grades 6 through 12 as well as adults: 
(1) Upward Bound – 772 programs around the country prep about 57,000 youth 
between the ages of 13 and 19 years old (grades 9 through 12) for college.  
Upward Bound provides instruction in literature, composition, math, and 
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science through a five- to eight-week, full-time residential summer program at 
a college or university. 
(2) Talent Search – 361 programs serving over 300,000 students seek to identify 
individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds and provide students with 
academic, career, and financial counseling to help them graduate from high 
school and enroll in college.  This program also serves high school dropouts 
by encouraging them to re-enter the educational system, finish high school, 
and pursue a post-secondary education. 
(3) Student Support Services (SSS) – serves approximately 177,000 low-income 
students at about 800 colleges and universities by providing tutoring, 
counseling, and remedial instruction to help them receive their bachelor’s 
degree. 
(4) Educational Opportunity Centers (EOC) – 82 centers serve about 160,000 
individuals who are displaced or underemployed workers with counseling and 
information on college admissions and financial aid.  EOC tries to help these 
adults successfully negotiate the college application process and complete 
degree programs. 
(5) Upward Bound Math/Science Program – 123 programs specialize in 
strengthening the math and science skills of about 6,000 TRIO eligible high 
school students.  This program also helps students learn computer technology, 
English, foreign language, and study skills. 
(6) Ronald E. McNair Post-Baccalaureate Achievement – 156 programs 
serving about 3,700 students encourage low-income and minority 
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undergraduates who have demonstrated strong academic potential, to consider 
pursuing doctoral studies and the professoriate.  This program provides faculty 
mentoring, internship, research opportunities, and scholarly activities 
(Cahalan, et al., 2004; Fields, 2001; McElroy & Armesto, 1998). 
Approximately two-thirds of TRIO students are racial/ethnic minorities (Cahalan, et al., 2004).  
Some other key facts about the TRIO Programs are: (1) over 1,200 colleges and universities, 
community colleges, and agencies offer TRIO Programs; (2) Upward Bound students are four 
times as likely to earn an undergraduate degree than those in similar backgrounds that are not in 
the TRIO Programs; (3) Student Support Services students are more than twice as likely to 
remain in college than students from similar backgrounds not in TRIO; and (4) the lack of 
federal funding permits fewer than five percent of eligible youth and adults to be served through 
TRIO (in 2001, 11 million needed TRIO) (Fields, 2001, as compiled from TRIO).  TRIO 
Programs are still reaching only a small portion of the students that need their services and 
programs. 
In the 1998 Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, President William Clinton 
endorsed another preparatory program similar to TRIO, which is called Gaining Early 
Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Programs (GEAR UP).  GEAR UP is also an early 
intervention program designed to improve the pre-college preparation and college success rate of 
low-income students.  The program is under the auspices of the Office of Postsecondary 
Education at the U.S. Department of Education.  GEAR UP’s mission “is to significantly 
increase the number of low-income students who are prepared to enter and succeed in 
postsecondary education (Fullinwider & Lichtenberg, 2004, p. 198 citing U.S. Department of 
Education, www.ed.gov/programs/gearup). 
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The program starts when eligible students are in middle school (7th grade) and follows 
them through high school graduation.  GEAR UP has two components: (1) a public/private 
partnership grant program, and (2) a state grant program, which includes college scholarships for 
eligible students.  GEAR UP offers six-year grants to states and partnerships to provide services 
to high-poverty middle schools and high schools around the country (U.S. Department of 
Education, www.ed.gov/programs/gearup).  Institutions of higher education (IHEs), local 
education agencies (LEAs), and state education agencies (SEAs) may apply for the grants.  In 
addition, partnerships should consist of at least one college or university, at least one low-income 
middle school, and at least two other partners, such as community organizations, businesses, 
religious groups, student organizations, SEAs, LEAs, and parent groups (U.S. Department of 
Education, www.ed.gov/programs/gearup).  Sarah Flanagan, a representative of the National 
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU), mentioned that usually 
federally funded scholarships become the anchor piece of a student’s financial aid package and 
are then supplemented by other state, private, and institutional funding (Fields, 2001).  GEAR 
UP scholarships, however, are last-dollar awards, meaning they can only be tapped into after 
other available sources have been used (Fields, 2001).  Thus, the GEAR UP scholarships can be 
restrictive and less beneficial to students who can use all the money they can get for college. 
Since GEAR UP began in 1991, well over one million students have been served by the 
program in almost every state in the union.  Many people in the post-secondary and pre-college 
communities celebrated GEAR UP as the missing piece to the federal government’s efforts to 
provide educational opportunities to low-income students – the comprehensive middle school 
piece (Fields, 2001).  Today, given the current political and legal climate, both GEAR UP and 
TRIO are struggling for funding and are reaching a point of trying to coexist.  While TRIO 
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Programs primarily serve high school students and college undergraduates and GEAR UP serves 
middle school students, some Congressmen on Capitol Hill along with members of the Bush 
administration have inquired about whether the country needs both programs (Fields, 2001).  
Some say that “The question isn’t whether TRIO and GEAR UP can coexist at the practical 
level:  The evidence of that is ubiquitous.  The bigger question is whether GEAR UP can be 
made into something that the higher education community can embrace without jeopardizing 
other programs” (Fields, 2001 quoting Becky Timmons of the American Council on Education).  
Perhaps, an even bigger question is whether the federal government would want TRIO and 
GEAR UP to coexist.  Since the federal funding for TRIO and GEAR UP are up for grabs, Fields 
(2001) found that the government is now exploring the idea of cutting one or two of the TRIO 
Programs and cutting funding for GEAR UP.   
In 2000, the six TRIO Programs received a total of approximately $630 million in federal 
funding, and GEAR UP, in its second year, received $200 million in federal funding for seventy-
three partnerships in seven states (U.S. Department of Education, 
www.ed.gov/programs/gearup).  In 2006, TRIO Programs and GEAR UP were not appropriated 
any monies and were going to be eliminated (Council for Opportunity in Education, 2006).  
After several Congressmen stepped in to defend the programs, the House of Representatives 
passed HR 3010 and helped TRIO maintain its 2005 funding of $836.5 million (Council for 
Opportunity in Education, 2006).  GEAR UP received over $303 million and funded 175 new 
partnerships and 40 states (U.S. Department of Education, 2006).   
Thus far, TRIO and GEAR UP generally on a whole have been spared over the past few 
years, but Upward Bound and Talent Search, which are individual TRIO programs, apparently 
remain targets for elimination.  According to the proposed 2007 budget, Upward Bound and 
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Talent Search will lose over $454 million in federal funding (Council for Opportunity in 
Education, 2006).  The majority of the states that will lose the most funding and where the most 
projects will be affected are in places that have high populations of low-income and minority 
residents.  For instance, some of the states losing the most Upward Bound and Talent Search 
funding are California, Texas, Alabama, Illinois, New York, which are slated to lose 
$44,758,527, $31,794,633, $19,879,817, $17,762,184, and $15,063,692, respectively (Council 
for Opportunity in Education, 2006).  The District of Columbia, the nation’s capital, is one of the 
top 15 areas where the largest number of students will be impacted by cutting programs (Council 
for Opportunity in Education, 2006).  Coincidentally, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that  the 
District of Columbia, Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, and Oklahoma are among the top 15 states 
with the highest percentages of children under the age of 18 living below the poverty level (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2005) (see Table 2).  Additionally, the Census Bureau’s records indicate that 
California, Texas, New York, Illinois also are among the top 15 states in the country to have the 
largest populations of Latino and multi-racial populations, while the District of Columbia, 
Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama, are among the top 15 states to have the largest number of 
African Americans (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).  The best opportunity of attending college and 
beyond for most of the students from the above-referenced states may come only from the 
services that Upward Bound and Talent Search have provided for so many years.   
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Table 2: Top 15 States Impacted by Upward Bound and Talent Search Budget Cuts 
 
Ranking of 15 States Where Most
Students are Affected by Funding Loss
States with Highest % States with Highest % States with Highest %
of Children Below Poverty of Blacks of Some Other Race*
California X
Texas X X
Alabama X X
Illinois X X
New York X X
District of Columbia X X X
Pennsylvania
Oklahoma X
Georgia X X
Ohio
North Carolina X
Louisiana X X
Florida X
South Carolina X
Kentucky X
* The United States Census Bureau defines "Some Other Race" as those individuals who categorize themselves as being of Hispanic or Latino 
descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban, or as bi-racial or multi-racial.
 
  
Historically, Upward Bound has received the most federal funding out of all the TRIO 
Programs.  For instance, in 2000, when the TRIO Programs received $630 million in federal 
funding, $249.7 million went to Upward Bound programs.  Upward Bound itself has been on the 
chopping block for the two successive budget years of 2005 and 2006 (Council for Opportunity 
in Education, 2006).  Upward Bound still may be eliminated.  At minimum, some serious 
changes regarding how Upward Bound is run and the students’ eligibility requirements may 
harm the program.   
Recent newsletters issued by the Council for Opportunity in Education (2006) indicated 
that eligibility requirements now would include emphasis on state assessment tests when 
accepting students for the program and limited eligibility for students entering the ninth grade.  
Specifically, as of October 23, 2006, Upward Bound grantees are responsible for recruiting twice 
the number of students - half will be assigned to Upward Bound programs and the other half will 
be assigned to a control group that will not receive any services (Dervarics, 2006).  The 
Department of Education claims that since Upward Bound now has a very limited budget this is 
the best way to evaluate the program’s effectiveness and service the students who need it the 
most (Dervarics, 2006).  Therefore, in another change, all potential Upward Bound students need 
to be low-income.  Moreover, at least 30 percent of the students must qualify as academically at-
risk, which means they have not scored a proficient rate on math and language arts assessments 
in eighth grade, or they have below a 2.5 GPA and have not taken rigorous math courses by 
eighth or ninth grade (Dervarics, 2006).  Organizations and people in opposition argue that the 
changes to Upward Bound will overwhelmingly take away the rights and privileges from which 
most of the eligible students, who are predominantly students of color, have benefited 
(Dervarics, 2006).  For example, the academically successful students who still have barriers to 
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attending college, are still financially needy, or are first-generation students will suffer for 
making good grades or not being poor enough (Dervarics, 2006).  The U.S. Department of 
Education also will limit Upward Bound enrollment to academically at-risk ninth-grade students 
and some new tenth-grade students; new juniors and seniors will no longer be able to enter the 
Upward Bound program (Dervarics, 2006).  What will happen to the juniors and seniors who just 
need that extra academic support or drive to attend college, but have not heard of or been 
exposed to Upward Bound’s services? 
Given all this information, it seems like the U.S. Department of Education does not 
understand the devastating impact that these changes will have on Upward Bound and the 
students it serves.  More than 91 percent of Upward Bound students who graduate high school 
immediately enter a post-secondary education program (Council for Opportunity in Education, 
2006).  Furthermore, 95 percent of Upward Bound students come from families with income 
levels below 150 percent of the poverty level; the remaining students are selected from families 
where neither parent has a college degree (Council for Opportunity in Education, 2006).   
Upward Bound, the other TRIO Programs, GEAR UP, and the CLEO program may not 
be the only federal initiatives that have experienced many trials, tribulations, and changes 
throughout the years that seem likely to continue.  At minimum, these programs’ original intent 
and their potential reach to students are being diluted.  Perhaps it is not a mistake that the states 
losing the most funding for TRIO Programs are the same states with the highest numbers of poor 
minorities in this country.  It appears as though the people who are in need are the people being 
cut out of America’s pie of educational and economic opportunity because they are too needy.  
The programs that started out fighting the war on poverty may be the same programs that result 
in war against the impoverished people of color.  In the United States, individuals over the age of 
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16 who have not earned a high school degree on average earn more than three times less than a 
person with a graduate or professional degree (i.e. $18,435 v. $57,785) (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2005).  There seems to be a correlation between race and social class in society, and education 
seems to be the only mechanism that may close the racial and socioeconomic gaps in this 
country.  If programs like TRIO, GEAR UP, and CLEO are annihilated, the gaps will continue to 
widen.  America - the land of democracy and freedom will increasingly become America - the 
land of the haves and have nots. 
2.1.5 The Origins and Development of Critical Race Theory 
Critical race theory (CRT) is a legal studies movement that was started in the 1970s by legal 
scholars who were disenchanted with legal analysis and civil rights legislation as they related to 
race, racism, and power in American society.  CRT is an outgrowth of, and separate entity from, 
an early leftist movement called critical legal studies (CLS), which challenged the traditional 
legal scholarship that focused on doctrinal and policy analysis in favor of a form of law that 
spoke to the specificity of individuals and groups in social and cultural contexts (Ladson-
Billings, 1998).  CRT scholars challenged the CLS movement and its limitations in addressing 
specific issues of race and the law (Tate, 1997).  One of the biggest limitations for the CRT 
founders was that the CLS theorists assumed that racism was analogous to other forms of class-
based oppression, which was largely a function of a hierarchal social structure.  The CRT 
founders believed that racism should be associated with the substantive rights that people of 
color had been denied throughout history because of race (Bell, 1984; Crenshaw, 1988; Delgado, 
1987; Tate, 1997).   
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New approaches were needed to deal with the color-blind, subtle, or institutional forms of 
racism that were developing and an American public that seemed tired of hearing about race 
(Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  Thus, the 1970s gave birth to the critical race theory movement 
through the initial founders - Derrick Bell and Alan Freeman (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  In 
the early 1980s, several law professors and students joined the CRT struggle of addressing race 
and the law, namely Richard Delgado, Lani Guiner, Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Patricia 
Williams, and Kimberlé Crenshaw (Tate, 1997).  Critical race theorists insisted on “a complete 
reinterpretation of civil rights law with regard to its ineffectiveness in addressing racial 
injustices, particularly institutional racism and structural racism in the political economy” (Lynn 
& Adams, 2002 citing Parker & Lynn, 2002, p. 9).  These theorists needed society to understand 
that race and racism were fundamentally ingrained in American social structures and historical 
consciousness and hence shaped this country’s ideology, legal systems, and fundamental 
conceptions of law, property, and privilege (Bell, 1984; Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 
1995).   
CRT analyzed and challenged race and racism in the law and society while also 
recognizing the socially constructed nature of race (Lynn & Adams, 2002).  Critical race 
theorists questioned liberalism and liberal theory as another way to maintain the status quo.  
According to Lawrence (2001), liberal theory focused on protecting the liberty of an 
autonomous, disconnected human being, in which freedom, rather than equality is treated as the 
highest political value.  The liberal legal theorist believes that racism consists of isolated 
discriminatory practices in an otherwise non-discriminatory world.  CRT criticizes liberal theory 
and offers another way to think about promoting equality and human dignity, one that reflects the 
perspective of the subordinated (Lawrence, 2001).   CRT brings race to the forefront of law, 
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politics, and society by talking about racial oppression and white dominance.  As one legal 
scholar aptly noted, “[t]o break the interlocking patterns of racial hierarchy, there is no other way 
but to focus on, talk about, and put into effect constructive policies explicitly engaged with race” 
(Lopez, 2006). 
For the original founders of the CRT school of thought known as the “racial realists,” 
racism is a means by which our society allocates privilege, status, and wealth (Delgado, 2003).  
CRT focuses on the persistence of conditions created by and traditionally associated with racist 
practices, such as discriminatory exclusions from employment, from “white” neighborhoods, 
from politics, from government contracts, and from universities like Texas, Michigan, and 
Berkeley (Lawrence, 2001).   Racial realists also examine the role of international relations and 
competition, the interests of elite groups, and the changing demands of the labor market in hopes 
of understanding the racial hierarchy, including the part the legal system plays in that history 
(Delgado, 2003).  In more recent years, the idealist approach and discourse analysis have also 
become part of the CRT analysis (Delgado, 2003; Tate, 1997).  Idealist thinkers believe that race 
is a social construction created out of words, symbols, stereotypes, and categories (Delgado, 
2003; Tate, 1997).  As such, CRT idealists believe that society may purge itself of discrimination 
by ridding itself of texts, narratives, ideas and meanings that give rise to attitudes that certain 
racial groups are lazy, unworthy and dangerous (Delgado, 2003).   
Given that civil rights encompass some diverse issues and situations, the CRT movement 
has spread beyond law into many other disciplines and ethnic movements (Delgado & Stefancic, 
2001).  Scholars in the field of education have embraced the CRT movement when trying to 
understand issues regarding race-sensitive affirmative action in higher education admissions as 
well as issues in Kindergarten through 12th grade, such as school discipline and hierarchy, 
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tracking, controversies over curriculum and history, and IQ and achievement tests (Delgado & 
Stefancic, 2001; Ladson-Billings, 1998).  Ethnic and American studies courses in colleges and 
universities have incorporated material developed by critical race theorists, such as critical white 
studies (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  Furthermore, political scientists ponder the issues of 
voting strategies and voting re-districting (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  Since the 1980s and 
1990s, critical race theory has splintered to address the specific needs of other groups that have 
been disadvantaged or discriminated against.  There is now a broader connection between CRT 
and feminist theory in understanding gender inequality as well as the development of the Latino-
critical (LatCrit) movement, the Asian American movement, and the queer-crit movement, which 
address issues facing gays and lesbians in society (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).   
Despite the multiple factions and various approaches, the critical race theorist generally 
addresses similar issues.  Activists and scholars of CRT consider many of the same issues of 
conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses; however, CRT scholars place them in a 
broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, as well as 
feelings and the unconscious (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  Unlike traditional civil rights that 
embraces incremental or step-by-step progress, critical race theory questions “the very 
foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, enlightenment 
rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 3).  
Moreover, CRT follows six unifying themes that define the movement: 
1. CRT recognizes that racism is endemic to American life; 
2. CRT expresses skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, 
colorblindness, and meritocracy; 
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3. CRT challenges a historicism and insists on a contextual/historical analysis of the 
law.  CRT presumes that racism has contributed to all contemporary manifestations of 
group advantage and disadvantage; 
 
4. CRT insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color and our 
communities of origin in analyzing law and society; 
 
5. CRT is interdisciplinary; and 
 
6. CRT works toward the end of eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal 
of ending all forms of oppression. 
 
(Matsuda, et al., 1993, p. 6).   CRT starts with the basic tenet that racism is ordinary, not 
aberrational, and a common, everyday experience of most people of color in this country.  The 
ordinariness of racism as described by critical race theorists means that it is difficult to cure or 
address (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).  This primary tenet is a consequence of the belief that 
racism is likely permanent, and periods of progress are often followed by periods of resistance 
and backlash as social forces reassert white dominance (Bell, 1980).   
Another common theme is the CRT skepticism of liberalist ideals such as colorblindness, 
which disfavors any use or consideration of race in an American society that allegedly offers 
equal opportunity without regard to race.  As Justice Scalia stated in a 1995 race-conscious 
affirmative action case, “In the eyes of government, we are just one race here.  It is American.”  
CRT scholars, however, problematize the construction of colorblindness and the legal arguments 
made in support of a colorblind society.  Delgado & Stefancic (2001) argued that the color-blind 
approach for equality is expressed in rules that insist on treatment that is the same across the 
board, but can only remedy the most blatant forms of discrimination, such as refusing to hire a 
Black person with a Ph.D. or mortgage redlining, rather than those instances that do not stand out 
or attract our attention – covert racism.  Crenshaw et al. (1995) believed that colorblindness 
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serves as part of an ideological strategy by which the Supreme Court obscures its active role in 
sustaining hierarchies of racial power.  Gotanda (1991) asserted that the colorblind ideal in the 
law perpetuates racial subordination, and the colorblind analysis of the law uses race to mean 
formal-race.  Formal-race is connected to social realities, but fails to recognize connections 
between the race of an individual and the real social conditions underlying litigation or other 
constitutional dispute (Gotanda, 1991).  Specifically, Gotanda (1991) stated that “[f]ormal-race is 
unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.  Moreover, formal-race categories are 
unconnected to social attributes such as culture, education, wealth, or language.  This 
unconnectedness is the defining characteristic of formal-race” (p. 4).  Similarly, Lopez (2006) 
proffered that colorblindness continues to retard racial progress because it focuses on the surface 
and on racial classification, rather than looking down into the nature of social practices.   
Despite the opposition to the colorblind approach to law and policy, Lopez (2006) 
contended that in the face of continued racial hierarchy, it is essential that society understands 
the colorblind ideology that remains at issue, particularly in the school cases before the Supreme 
Court.  Contemporary colorblindness is a set of understandings, buttressed by the law and courts, 
which reinforces racial patterns of white dominance and defines how people comprehend, 
rationalize, and act on race (Lopez, 2006).  Contemporary colorblindness loudly proclaims its 
antiracist pretensions, but colorblindness does nothing to respond to racial inequalities in society; 
it just avoids all reference to race and racism altogether (Lopez, 2006).  Therefore, critical race 
theorists and responsible citizens of society are expected to discuss and respond to the racial 
inequalities.  As such, critical race theorists have developed several analytic concepts to 
illuminate the racial inequalities and how the law and society has not responded to the 
inequalities. 
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Interest convergence and whiteness as property, which have been previously mentioned, 
are among the more popular concepts that are often used to analyze the six common CRT 
themes.  However, another hallmark of CRT is the idea of storytelling.  The idea of using 
storytelling in an effort to offer a unique voice to color is a departure from mainstream legal 
scholarship (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; Ladson-Billings, 1998).  Historically, storytelling has 
been a medicine to heal the wounds caused by years of racial oppression and domination 
(Ladson-Billings, 1998).  Storytelling gives an opportunity for critical race theorists to integrate 
their experiential knowledge, which is drawn from a shared history of being “other” and the 
continuous struggles to transform a world falling prey to the shackles of racial hegemony 
(Ladson-Billings, 1998).  Furthermore, the process of giving voice to the reality of subordinated 
people interrupts the power of the dominant group to name reality for others, the minorities 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).   
The use of voice or “naming your reality” is a way that CRT links form and substance of 
scholarship through parables, chronicles, stories, counter-stories, poetry, fiction, and revisionist 
histories to illustrate the false necessity of much of the current civil rights doctrine (Ladson-
Billings, 1998, p. 13).  Delgado (1987) offered three key reasons for naming one’s own reality in 
legal discourse: (1) much of reality is socially constructed; (2) stories provide members of out- 
groups a vehicle for psychic self-preservation; and (3) the exchange of stories from teller to 
listener can help overcome ethnocentrism and the dysconscious drive to view the world in one 
way.  The social construction thesis is probably the most compelling reason for naming one’s 
own reality because of how the United States defines race and forces racial designations for its 
citizens.  Delgado & Stefancic (2001) averred that races are products of social thought and 
relations that have nothing to do with biology or genetics; rather, races are categories that society 
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invents, manipulates, or retires when convenient.  Racial categories of the U.S. census have 
varied over time; however, two categories have remained constant – Black and White (Ladson-
Billings, 1998).   
2.1.5.1 Major Criticisms of CRT  
Despite the popularity and support for critical race theory, there is a strong faction, specifically 
legal scholars, who criticize critical race theory.  For example, CRT has been criticized for its 
failure to define liberalism, especially since liberals have been typically active supporters of 
minority rights (McMorris, 1999 citing Litowitz, 1997).  The use of storytelling is often critiqued 
for insisting on privileging minority voices over majority voices, which should have an equal 
right to be heard.  Legal critics are concerned that narrative through storytelling may replace 
legal doctrine in a domain that values the abstract and formal reasoning, rather than empathy and 
context (Kennedy, 1995).  According to some legal critics, attorneys are to look beyond stories 
and find the issues affecting doctrine, policy, and argument (Litowitz, 1997).  CRT is accused of 
failing to establish policy on a doctrinal level, which is evidenced by the fact that while many 
Black scholars oppose racism, they also oppose affirmative action (McMorris, 1999).  In other 
words, what good is CRT in informing the law and society about racism, but not proposing legal 
policies to address the alleged racial practices? 
One legal scholar disapproves of CRT analysis because CRT claims that race is so 
ingrained in our society that it fails to see the individual motivations and characteristics of both 
laws and persons (Egan, 1999).  Egan argued that CRT seeks a system that mirrors Plessy v. 
Ferguson’s separate but equal doctrine; thus, critical race theorists want to maintain differences 
by finding racial issues in laws and legal precedents that have already been eliminated or in laws 
that have nothing to do with race (e.g. probate codes are not racist in terms of keeping blacks 
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from inheriting, but they are capitalist which is an economic issue not racist) (Egan, 1999).  Egan 
agreed with critical race theorists that racism is embedded within American culture, but he 
believes that speech or meritocracy is not at fault, rather, the failure for Americans to see each 
other, Whites and Blacks alike, as individuals (Egan, 1999).   
Another legal scholar criticized critical race theorists for attacking the foundation of 
liberal legal order, legal reasoning, and the neutral principles of constitutional law, yet critical 
race theorists do nothing to help disadvantaged minorities (Pyle, 1999).  Pyle (1999) mentioned 
that race-crits describe race and racism in America and how the liberal legal system perpetuates 
racial subordination, but does not arrive at this conclusion empirically.  Moreover, race-crits do 
not acknowledge alternative explanations for the disadvantaged, such as low wages, job 
insecurity, limited inheritances, and access to quality education.  Instead, Pyle (1999) argued that 
the dominant theme of CRT is that “. . . American society and law are controlled by an 
overarching, all-controlling white racism that ensures the continued oppression of racial 
minorities, even as the law officially rejects racial classifications” (p. 803).  In short, this legal 
scholar believes that CRT fails because it is all critique but unconstructive, rather than more 
constructive like liberalism.  According to Pyle (1999), CRT “will eventually dissipate into the 
ether from which it came . . . .It has always been irrelevant outside of academia and is now 
feeling the stress of factionalism within its ranks . . . .” (p. 826). 
2.1.5.2  CRT and Education 
CRT analysis has been a recurring theme in school/civil rights litigation when debating equal 
opportunity for minority groups.  CRT consists of basic insights, perspectives, methods, and 
pedagogies that seek to analyze and transform the structural and cultural aspects of education 
that maintain, dominate, and subordinate racial positions in and out of the classroom (Matsuda, 
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et al., 1993; Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).  There have been connections made between CRT 
analysis and education with regards to curriculum, instruction, assessment, and school funding 
(Delgado, 2003; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  Critical race theorists 
also believe that the CRT education movement needs to examine high-stakes testing, school 
accountability and exams, and voucher and charter school alternatives (Delgado, 2003).  A few 
of the education issues that have been analyzed in a CRT context have been segregation, or more 
recently, the re-segregation of minority groups since the Brown v. Board of Education decision.  
Furthermore, education researchers have adopted some of the concepts of critical race theory in 
their analysis of hotly debated topics, like tracking and affirmative action in higher education.  In 
many instances, these myriad education issues are analyzed or interpreted under CRT concepts, 
such as interest-convergence and whiteness as property.  Ladson-Billings warns, however, that 
CRT in the hands of education researchers is likely to become the “darling” of the radical left in 
scholarly papers and debates, rather than penetrate the classroom because of the dangers and 
discomfort of talking about racism in education (Ladson-Billings 1998).   She advises that 
“[a]dopting and adapting CRT as a framework for educational equity means that we will have to 
make bold and sometimes unpopular solutions for addressing it” (Ladson-Billings, 1998, p. 22).   
Some critical race theorists have taken some bold moves by proposing models for 
analyzing CRT in education and access to advanced placement (AP) courses.  Specifically, 
several theorists have put forth five elements of a basic model for analysis, which are: (1) the 
centrality of race and racism and their intersectionality with other forms of subordination in 
education; (2) the challenge to dominant ideology around school failure; (3) the commitment to 
social justice in education; (4) the centrality of experiential knowledge; and (5) the 
transdisciplinary perspective (Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004; Solorzano, 1997; Solorzano & 
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Delgado Bernal, 2001).  These theorists claim that using critical race theory in education is 
different from other frameworks because it simultaneously: (1) foregrounds race and racism in 
the research; (2) challenges the traditional paradigms, methods, and texts, and separates 
discourse on race, gender, and class by showing how these social constructs intersect to impact 
students of color; (3) helps us focus on the racialized, gendered, and classed experiences of 
students of color; (4) offers a liberatory and transformative method when examining racial, 
gender, and class discrimination; and (5) utilizes the transdisciplinary knowledge and 
methodological base of ethnic studies, women’s studies, sociology, history, and the law to better 
understand the various forms of discrimination (Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004; Solorzano, 1997).   
Solorzano & Ornelas (2004) conducted a study in California schools using the five basic 
elements in the model to analyze CRT in education.  Specifically, the researchers examined all of 
California’s high schools that had a minimum of 500 students enrolled (780 high schools) to 
determine which schools had AP course offerings and which schools did not (Solorzano & 
Ornelas, 2004).   The study revealed three definite patterns:  (1) Latino and African American 
students are disproportionately underrepresented in AP enrollment in the top AP high schools in 
the state and the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD); (2) schools that serve urban, 
low-income Latino and African American communities have low student enrollment in AP 
courses; and (3) even when African American and Latino students attended high schools with 
high numbers of students enrolled in AP courses, they are not proportionately represented in AP 
enrollment (Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).  This study is a good example of using a critical race 
theory framework to allow researchers to specifically place race and racism at the center of the 
analysis and focus on those educational inequalities that impact African American and Latino 
students inside and outside schools (Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004). 
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Yosso (2002) also suggested establishing a critical race curriculum that acknowledges the 
central intersecting roles of racism, sexism, classism, and the other forms of subordination that 
maintains inequality in curricular structures, processes, and discourses.  Yosso (2002) mentioned 
that curricula in U.S. schools have processes designed to place students in certain classes where 
different students receive different types of knowledge.  These structures are in place so that 
some students have access to certain knowledge, curriculum, and discourses (Yosso, 2002).  The 
access to knowledge is often displayed in the form of ability-grouping or tracking, in which those 
students in honor programs and AP courses receive different knowledge through a more 
challenging curricula and preparation for higher education.  Tracking remains an education issue 
heavily debated by critical race theorists and education researchers.  Opponents of tracking argue 
that a differentiated curriculum maintains inequality in educational opportunity, especially for 
African Americans and Latinos (Oakes, 1985b; Braddock & Dawkins, 1993; Hallinan, 1987; 
Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).   
Furthermore, Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) used a critical race theory framework to 
address racial inequities in the context of school resources for students in the Kindergarten 
through 12th grade environment.  They expanded Cheryl Harris’ (1993) idea of the property 
functions of whiteness to include the analysis of inequality in primary and secondary schools.  
These researchers brought out the issue of property and how some students are denied access to 
certain types of learning and educational experiences because they are poor and minority 
students.  Since most school districts fund their schools with the property taxes of home owners, 
the schools located in the more affluent neighborhoods usually yield a higher tax base and more 
educational resources.  Unfortunately, many affluent communities that are usually subjected to 
higher property values and higher tax assessments resent paying for a public system that 
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primarily educates poor and minority children (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  This resentment 
is in spite of the fact that most affluent communities around the country spend more than twice 
the amount per pupil than many urban schools that serve minority and disadvantaged children 
(Kozol, 1991).  Critical race theorists posit that the school curriculum is a form of intellectual 
property, and the quantity and quality of curriculum in schools is based on actual property values 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  In these cases, curriculum represents a form of intellectual 
property undergirded by the ownership of real property:  state-of-the-art technologies, well-
prepared teachers, AP curricula, weighted AP grades, gifted or other sorts of honors programs all 
leading to admission to more elite colleges and better jobs (Lynn & Adams, 2002).    
For example, one young boy was planning to attend school in an upper-middle-class 
White community, while his Black friend planned to attend school in an urban, largely African 
American district.  The boy attending the predominantly White, upper-middle-class school had 
course offerings that included a variety of math, science, and foreign language classes.  The 
upper-middle-class school offered algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, statistics, general 
math, and business math.  The science courses offered were biology, chemistry, physics, 
geology, science in society, biochemistry, and general science.  Furthermore, the foreign 
languages offered were Spanish, French, German, Latin, Greek, Italian, Chinese, and Japanese 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995). 
The African American child, on the other hand, had a very different curriculum with far 
fewer choices for classes in the various academic disciplines.  The Black child had the following 
class choices: (1) foreign languages - Spanish and French; (2) math - general math, business 
math, and algebra; and (3) science – general science, life science, biology, and physical science 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  There was also a vast difference in the elective courses offered 
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at each school.  The upper-middle-class school offered Film as Literature, Asian Studies, 
computer programming, and journalism, while the urban school had very few elective courses 
and no band, orchestra, or school newspaper.  This story depicts how intellectual property can be 
transformed into the “real” property of science labs, computers, and other state-of-the-art 
technologies as well as certified and well-prepared teachers (Ladson-Billings, 1995).  Kozol 
(1991) illustrated that many urban schools that predominantly educate minorities do not have 
access to the real property resources, which negatively affects their ability to meet mandated 
educational standards.  Therefore, the property values and racial demographics of the community 
impacted the intellectual property gained, or the opportunity to learn, at each school (Ladson-
Billings & Tate, 1995).   
In response to these educational disparities, researchers Ladson-Billings and Tate, have 
created a critical race theoretical approach to education that examines the intersection of race and 
social class, since according to them, society is based on class, which translates into property 
rights rather than human rights (1995).  They rely on Cheryl Harris’ (1993) arguments regarding 
whiteness as property, which are listed earlier in this paper, to support the construct of how 
property rights relate to educational inequality and inequity.  First, there is the right to 
disposition, which analyzes property rights as alienable or transferable (Harris, 1993; Ladson-
Billings & Tate, 1995).  Whiteness can be conferred as property in educational settings when 
students conform to “white norms” through certain cultural practices (e.g., dress, speech patterns, 
and unauthorized conceptions of knowledge) (Harris, 1993; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  This 
white property is alienable for White students, but may be inalienable to Black children who do 
not want to or know how to conform. 
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Second, Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) discuss White people’s right to use and enjoy 
the social, cultural and economic privileges of whiteness.  In school, whiteness allows for 
extensive use of what certain schools have to offer like the size of the student population and 
curriculum (Kozol, 1991; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  For instance, one school serves 825 
White children from Kindergarten to sixth grade, while another elementary school is 
overpopulated with 1,550 Black children in a building with a capacity of only 1,000 (Kozol, 
1991).   
Third, Whites possess reputation and status property, in which to damage their reputation 
is to damage some aspect of their personal property (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  Foreign 
language learning is considered prestigious in the White community; however, bilingual 
education as practiced in the United States as a nonwhite form of second language learning 
carries a lower status.  Similarly, urban schools are associated with “black” and lack the status 
and reputation of suburban White schools.  When urban students are bused to or move into 
suburban schools these schools lose their reputation (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  Thus, 
whiteness as property is to maintain separate lives and schools from people, things and places 
associated with non-whiteness. 
The final aspect of this construct is the notion of the absolute right to exclude (Ladson-
Billings & Tate, 1995).  Whiteness in this society is constructed by the complete absence of any 
contaminating influence of blackness, such as one drop of Black blood (Bell, 1980; Ladson-
Billings & Tate, 1995).  In the schooling environment, the absolute right to exclude was initially 
demonstrated by denying Blacks access to any school.  Later, the right to exclude reared itself 
when Jim Crow laws created the maintenance of separate schools for Whites and Black children. 
Recently, it has been demonstrated by White flight, the growing insistence of school vouchers, 
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public funding of private schools and charter schools, and schools of choice.  Within schools, 
Blacks are excluded from honors and advance placement programs and re-segregated into lower 
tracked courses, and in colleges and universities, they are perceived as intruders or undeserved 
beneficiaries of affirmative action (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  Critical race theorists have 
analyzed the attack on affirmative action policies and programs as a way to maintain white 
dominance and perpetuate the absolute right to exclude minority groups. 
2.1.5.3  CRT and Affirmative Action 
The words ‘merit,’ ‘equality,’ and ‘colorblind’ are buzz words that often initiate lively 
discussions regarding affirmative action and minority students’ access to higher education 
institutions.  Affirmative action admission policies have been greatly disputed for 40 years 
because of the alleged unfair benefits to racial minorities, particularly to Blacks.  These policies 
have been demonized for trying to right so many unnecessary but intentional racial wrongs that 
benefited White Americans (Bell, 2004).  Under Bell’s interest-convergence theory, racial 
remedies for Blacks historically have represented policies tending to provide benefit or 
advantage to Whites (2004).  For example, based on statistical analysis, affirmative action has 
been more beneficial to Whites in general and White women particularly with hiring policies in 
employment and admissions in higher education (Bell, 2004; Ladson-Billings, 1998).  Some 
Whites do not oppose affirmative action because of the loss of job opportunities or college 
admissions, but because of the fear that remedial assistance to Blacks may threaten the 
traditional social and economical hierarchy between the two groups, with Blacks at the bottom 
and subordinate to all Whites – rich and poor.  Therefore, Blacks can progress in the society only 
when that progress is perceived by the white majority as a clear benefit to all Whites, or at least 
not a serious risk.  Furthermore, opponents of affirmative action will continue to resist and 
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scrutinize policies and programs that survive judicial review because they represent penalties for 
racial wrongs that today’s citizens did not themselves commit (Bell, 2004).   
CRT scholars also assert that the colorblind or race-neutral approach to college 
admissions is really code for acting in the best interests for and operation of white privilege 
(Gotanda, 1991; Crenshaw, et al., 1995).  According to Cheryl Harris (1993), the protection of 
the property interest of whiteness in affirmative action cases is accomplished by arguing for the 
colorblind norm.  More specifically, Charles Lawrence, one of the founding members of CRT, 
argued that the colorblind post-affirmative action admissions process at the University of 
California –Berkeley, other state schools in California, as well as other states, has resurrected the 
old preferences of sons and daughters of privilege (Lawrence, 2001).  Specifically, Lawrence 
(2001) states that 
With the end of affirmative action [in the state of California], it is more apparent than 
ever that the old-time preferences for folks who are privileged by race and class have 
never died….First, it gives bonus points to high school students who are enrolled in 
advanced placement courses; and second, it relies in a determinative and exclusionary 
way on insignificant differences in the standardized test scores (p. 943-44). 
 
Lawrence (2001) further expressed that advanced placement courses are not available in every 
school in California or in other states for that matter.  As many as 25 percent of California’s high 
schools offered no AP courses, while 4 percent offered 21 or more AP courses – the higher the 
number of Blacks, Latinos, and Filipinos in the schools, the fewer number of AP courses offered.  
Blacks, Latinos, and Filipinos with 4.0 GPAs from poorer neighborhoods are not admitted into 
college in favor of White students from Beverly Hills or Palo Alto with 5.0 GPAs that have been 
augmented by access to AP courses (Lawrence, 2001).   
 Taylor (2000) conveyed a similar response to Washington State’s opposition to 
affirmative action policies.  Specifically, he maintained that the insistence on race-neutral 
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language in university policies negates the social and historical context and does not challenge 
the privileged, oppressive position of whiteness (Taylor, 2000).  Bell (2004) has questioned why 
upwardly mobile Whites dispute the minuscule number of seats set aside for minorities to rectify 
past discrimination, but do not challenge the overwhelming number of seats reserved for the 
well-to-do White applicants.  Preferential treatment for minority applicants is minute in 
comparison to the special treatment for White applicants whose parents are faculty members, 
alumni, or major contributors, but there is no legal protection against these preferences.  He 
averred that working-class Whites’ often heated and violent reaction to affirmative action 
programs, which is directed toward Blacks who have allegedly benefited from the programs, are 
really manifestation of the working-class Whites’ concern that they have been betrayed by 
upper-class Whites.  In other words, the adoption of race-conscious admissions programs in 
colleges and professional schools has posed a serious barrier and threat to lower-class Whites 
that have had a problem being admitted under regular admissions requirements (Bell, 2004).   
A notable example was in the Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) case, where the Court found that 
giving 20 points to underrepresented minorities during the admissions process was equivalent to 
a quota system and illegal, yet the Court did not consider the points that other potential 
undergraduate students received.  For instance, an applicant could be awarded points for the 
following: (1) up to 16 points for being a Michigan resident and living in a county that was 
underrepresented in the university, usually the northern part of the state that has a large lower 
economic class of Whites; (2) 4 points if an applicant’s parents graduated from the university; 
(3) up to 8 points for the difficulty of the high school curriculum and whether the student took 
AP courses, and (4) up to 10 points based on the quality of a potential student’s high school 
(Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).  All potential undergraduate students are capable of receiving 
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these points if they qualify, but the research has shown that typically White students benefit from 
this point system and gain entrance to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program 
(Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).  In other words, special admissions criteria have typically 
advantaged more well-to-do Whites, but given the recent legal debates those advantages have 
accrued to encompass disadvantaged White applicants (Bell, 2004).   
Affirmative action lawsuits are based on the premise that an expectation of white 
privilege is valid, and that the legal protection of that expectation is warranted (Harris, 1993).  
This premise legitimates prior assumptions of White people’s right to ongoing racialized 
privilege and is another manifestation of whiteness as property (Harris, 1993).  Some critical race 
theorists believe that white privilege is a state of mind and a way of life planted in the roots of 
history and flourishing even today (Bell, 2004; Harris, 1993; Lawrence, 2001).  Under cognitive 
theory, one critical race theorist opined that the backlash against affirmative action is rooted in 
history because when Blacks begin to achieve marginal success in mainstream society, the legal 
obstacles to that success are resurrected.  Given the backlash, affirmative action can be a useful 
tool in changing attitudes because it does not rely on an individual’s ability to make an 
independent assessment of others.  Affirmative action attacks racism head on by putting qualified 
minorities in positions that they may not have access to because of pre-judgments, prevailing 
stereotypes, and prejudicial inferences that history has helped solidify in the mind of Whites 
(McMorris, 1999).    
Critical race theorists would like the courts to understand that affirmative action is based 
on principles of anti-subordination, not principles of black supremacy.  Affirmative action 
creates a property interest in true equal opportunity, where opportunity and means are equalized 
(Harris, 1993).  Whiteness as property, Harris (1993) contended, continues to perpetuate racial 
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subordination through the courts’ doctrine on and hostility toward affirmative action.  The use of 
affirmative action policies places in tension the settled expectations of Whites, based on both the 
ideology of white supremacy and the structure of the U.S. economy that have operated to 
subordinate - the ‘other’ (Harris, 1993).  “The court’s hostility toward affirmative action is that 
‘it seeks to de-legitimate the assumptions surrounding existing equality.’  It exposes the illusion 
that the original or current distribution of power, property, and resources is the result of ‘right’ 
and ‘merit’” (Harris, 1993, p. 1778).   
Although the courts appear to support diversity as a legally acceptable reason for race-
conscious affirmative action policies, critical race theorists disagree with the use of the diversity 
rationale.  Moses and Chang (2006) proffered that the courts’ use of the diversity rationale skews 
the debate over race-conscious policies in a direction away from discrimination, inequality, and 
social justice.  Analyses of diversity should be integrated with considerations of equality and 
social justice, which is more appropriate for framing issues to inform the public about race-
conscious education policies (Moses & Chang, 2006).  Lawrence (2001) reasoned that the liberal 
defense of affirmative action justifies diversity as a way to help privileged Whites better 
understand people of color in a nation that may soon have a non-white majority.  Rather, he 
argued that diversity should be a necessary way to insure equal opportunity in a world where a 
variety of social structures, institutional practices, and racist beliefs conspire to deny minority 
groups equal access to education and employment.  Affirmative action begins the work of 
rethinking rights, equality, race, property, and power from the perspective of the minority groups 
who have been limited by oppression (Harris, 1993).  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court and 
legislatures may do well to consider equality and social justice first and maintaining white 
privilege second before ending affirmative action. 
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3.0  THIRD CHAPTER 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
To this point, the researcher has established the context for this study.  Specifically, the 
researcher has briefly examined the findings and analyses in some historical race-based legal 
cases and legislation that may have shaped the implementation of race-conscious affirmative 
action policies during the 1960s as well as programs that were a result of the policies, including 
the CLEO program.  Additionally, the researcher has introduced critical race theory as a 
framework for analyzing race and the law as well as race and education issues, including the 
debate surrounding race-conscious affirmative action in higher education.   
The critical race theory framework in education is often used to elucidate why certain 
inequities occur in the educational arena.  This dissertation study goes a step further by using the 
critical race theory framework to explain the progression of the race-conscious legal debate in 
higher education for more than 30 years, and examine how the evolution of and analysis within 
the legal cases may be related to changes in an actual race-conscious affirmative action program 
in higher education.  The researcher also uses two critical race theory constructs, instead of one, 
to do this analysis.  Through the critical race theory analysis, this study offers an explanation for 
the waning support for race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs that help provide 
access to higher education institutions.  Furthermore, the researcher explicates how the constant 
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legal debates may be related to the United States’ legal history with race and maintaining white 
privilege in higher education, specifically in law school and the legal profession.   
This chapter identifies the research design and methods used to conduct the study.  In 
addition, the researcher discusses data collection methods, sources, and analyses.  Furthermore, 
in this chapter, the researcher delineates how two specific critical race theory constructs are used 
to analyze the evolution of race-based affirmative action legal cases in higher education since 
1964.  The research methodology being utilized in this study answers the following questions:   
(1) How have the federal race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher 
education and state anti-affirmative action policies evolved since 1964? 
(2) How, if at all, do the ongoing legal debates in higher education reflect the support for, 
or maintenance of, white privilege as defined by the interest convergence and whiteness as 
property constructs of critical race theory? 
(3) How, if at all, is the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate in higher education 
related to the original intent, current operations (i.e., the admissions criteria and demographic 
profiles for CLEO fellows and associates, the number of summer institutes, funding, and new 
programs), and the future viability of the CLEO program? 
(4) Given the legal debates, what are the future implications for race-based affirmative 
action policies and programs, and the admittance of racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, to law schools and the legal profession? 
3.1.1 Research Design – The Case Study 
The researcher undertakes a case study approach to this study.  Robert Yin (1981) has defined 
the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
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phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.  Case study is 
often used as a research strategy to contribute to our knowledge of an individual, group, 
organizational, social, political, and related phenomena (Yin, 2003b).  Accordingly, in this 
dissertation study, the researcher examines the contemporary phenomenon of the continual legal 
debates regarding race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher education within the 
real-life context of a race-based affirmative action legal program, the CLEO program.  
Case study research may be quite descriptive because it is often grounded in deep and 
varied sources of information, such as quotes from key participants, prose comprised from 
interviews, anecdotes, and documented information that may create mental images that bring the 
data to life (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). Case studies can also be a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence and need not always include direct, detailed observations as a source of 
evidence.  A case study’s unique strength is its ability to handle a variety of evidence, such as 
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations (Yin, 2003b).  
In most situations, case studies are the preferred research strategy when questions of 
“how” or “why” are being asked in the study.  In a case study, “how” or “why” is typically being 
asked about a contemporary set of events of which the researcher has little or no control.  While 
case study as a research design can be exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, or a combination of 
all three, the questions of “how” and “why” generally have a more explanatory nature.  
Explanatory questions “deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than 
mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2003b, p.6).  The main purpose of an explanatory study is 
to determine how events occur and which ones may influence particular outcomes (Hancock & 
Algozzine, 2006).  Exploratory case studies usually ask the research question of “what,” which 
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can be in the form of how many or how much, and these studies inquire into what may be 
learned or what outcome may occur because of an event (Yin, 2003b).  The research questions in 
this dissertation study ask the questions of “how” and “what” in order to trace the development 
of the race-based affirmative action legal debate in higher education.  The researcher hopes to 
investigate how the legal debates may be related to the CLEO program, and what these debates 
may mean for the future of programs like CLEO and the admittance of racial minorities in higher 
education, particularly law school. 
Case study also can be found in various research orientations, such as ethnographical, 
psychological, historical, or sociological (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Merriam, 2001).  
Ethnographic case studies are often used to explore learned patterns, customs, and behaviors of a 
culture-sharing group, while psychological case studies typically focus on the human behaviors 
of an individual.  Historical case studies usually include descriptions of events, programs, or 
organizations as the have evolved over time (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).  A historical case 
study produces “more than a chronological listing of events; it results in a researcher’s 
descriptive interpretation of factors that both cause and result from the events” (Hancock & 
Algozzine, 2006, p. 31).  Sociological case study research focuses on society and social 
institutions (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).  Case studies with sociological orientations include 
topics involving families, religion, politics, demographics, and issues related to age, gender, race, 
and status (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Yin, 2003a). 
This case study research can be characterized as socio-historical.  The researcher uses the 
history of race in the United States as well as the analysis in previous race-based legal cases to 
inform the examination of the current race-based affirmative action legal debate.  Furthermore, 
the researcher explores how the legal cases and anti-affirmative action policies have progressed 
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since 1964, and whether they are related to the evolution of the CLEO program, a race-based 
program.  Specifically, the researcher studies the original intent of CLEO, its funding, summer 
institutes, particularly the demographic profiles of prospective law students (i.e. race/ethnicity, 
LSAT scores and GPAs), and the creation of new CLEO programs.  The researcher uses the 
critical race theory constructs of interest convergence and whiteness as property as a template in 
which to analyze the legal cases, anti-affirmative action policies, and their possible correlation to 
the evolution of the CLEO program.  
3.1.2 Setting and Data Sources 
The researcher conducted fieldwork by visiting the CLEO offices located in the American Bar 
Association building in Washington, D.C., on numerous occasions.  After receiving IRB 
approval in May 2006, the researcher began collecting data.  To gain a better understanding of 
CLEO and its operations over the past 38 years, the researcher analyzed multiple sources of 
evidence inclusive of both qualitative and quantitative data.  The researcher gathered relevant 
documents and conducted interviews with key CLEO informants.  The documents were used as 
the primary source of data, and they included information on CLEO’s purpose, programs, 
funding, as well as students’ demographic information, namely their race/ethnicity, 
undergraduate GPAs, and LSAT scores.  In addition, as a secondary source of data, the 
researcher conducted interviews of key CLEO informants for clarification on CLEO’s purpose, 
funding, and programs.  The interviews also shed light on whether the facts and opinions in the 
race-based affirmative action legal cases may be related to the past, present, and potential future 
of CLEO.  These kinds of data collection strategies are consistent with field-based research in 
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education, particularly when the goal is an increased understanding of educational programs and 
their objectives (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). 
3.1.2.1 Document and Archival Records 
Documentary information is typically relevant to every case study topic and should be the object 
of explicit data collection plans (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Yin, 2003b).  Similarly, archival 
records are essential in case study research and may take the form of computer files and various 
records (Yin, 2003b).  In this study, the researcher analyzed annual reports, corporate By-laws, 
Board of Director meeting minutes as well as archival records that contained demographic 
information on students attending CLEO programs.  Student records for the years of 2001 to 
2006 were in the form of computer files.  Because the researcher did not have direct access to 
board members or individuals who worked for CLEO at its inception in 1968 and in the 1970s, 
the researcher also read and referred to articles written on the CLEO program during the 1970s to 
supplement and support some of the information found in documents.  The documents and 
archival records helped the researcher understand the purpose of CLEO, how the program has 
operated generally over the past 38 years, and how the summer institutes and other programs 
have functioned specifically in terms of funding and the types of students that have been 
accepted into these programs in light of legal cases and anti-affirmative action policies. 
Most of the archival records that contained student and funding information were 
incomplete.  Some records were missing entirely, particularly during the years of 1985 to 1989 
and 1992 to 1997.  Apparently, the missing and incomplete records are a result of the 
combination of poor recordkeeping due to cut backs in federal funding and records being 
misplaced over the years.  CLEO changed Executive Directors numerous times throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, and moved from its original office building in the mid-1980s into office space 
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provided in the American Bar Association’s building, which contributed to the loss of files.  
Besides data found in previous grant applications, the annual reports, which were not produced 
for the first time until 1998, were the primary records that contained detailed funding 
information.  The information on funding sources and levels also were gathered from interviews 
with the key CLEO informants.  
The researcher selected a sample of records that had significant student data, such as 
undergraduate institution attended, LSAT scores and GPAs, race/ethnicity, and law school 
attended, from various years.  Although some of the student records were incomplete, the 
researcher selected a sample of CLEO students from the first two years of the CLEO program for 
data analysis in order to become familiar with the number and types of students who initially 
benefited from the CLEO summer institutes.  The other years of records chosen for examination 
had to meet the following criteria to be included in the sample for data analysis:  (1) the archival 
records were one or two years after a federal race-conscious affirmative action legal decision or 
federal/state policies in higher education, or following some political action by the federal 
government with regards to race-based affirmative action; and (2) the archival records contained 
a significant amount of student information necessary for analysis (i.e., data on over 50 percent 
of the students who attended the CLEO summer institutes and Attitude is Essential program).  
The researcher also chose to analyze all of the student records for CLEO’s summer institutes 
from 1998 to 2006 as well as the student records for the Attitude Is Essential (AIE) program 
from 2002 to 2006.  The researcher made the decision to analyze these particular years due to the 
level of intensity of the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate during those years and the 
completeness of the files and the accessibility of the computerized records from 2001 to 2006. 
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3.1.2.2 Interview Sample Selection 
The researcher conducted three focused interviews with key CLEO personnel, and one informal 
interview with a representative of the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC).  Interviews are 
an important source of case study information, and in a focused interview, the researcher pursues 
a consistent line of inquiry but in a fluid, conversational manner (Yin, 2003b).  The interviews 
helped the researcher gain an understanding of why CLEO was initially created, the purpose of 
the summer institutes, how CLEO is currently functioning amidst the on-going legal debates, and 
whether CLEO has a viable future as a race-conscious affirmative action program.  
Three interviews were done with the following CLEO administration: (1) Chairman of 
the Board of Directors; (2) Executive Director; and (3) Associate Director (The interview 
protocol can be found in Appendix A).  These individuals were selected based on their position 
with the organization and individual and collective knowledge of CLEO’s purpose and any 
changes that have occurred in programs, funding, and operations.  CLEO’s Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and the Executive Director have served in their positions since about 1995.  
CLEO’s Chairman has served on the Board of the Directors since about 1993.  Both the 
Chairman of the Board and Executive Director are well-versed on CLEO’s history, purpose, the 
various funding sources, as well as any effects that organization may have experienced due to the 
race-conscious affirmative action legal debates.   
The Associate Director has been with the organization since 2002.  He served as the Law 
School Academic Coordinator until 2005, when he assumed the current position as Associate 
Director.  The Associate Director is knowledgeable of CLEO’s purpose, how the summer 
institute functions, the academic requirements for CLEO fellows and other students, and the 
development of new programs under the CLEO umbrella.  The researcher also conducted an 
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informal interview with a LSAC representative who has worked with and has advised the CLEO 
program for approximately 20 years.  LSAC is one of the founding organizations of CLEO and 
still remains a constituent organization with decision-making authority.  The LSAC 
representative who was interviewed is familiar with CLEO’s history, purpose, and the changes 
that have occurred since the 1980’s, particularly with regards to the general operations and 
funding sources.    
3.1.2.3 Federal Legal Cases and State Anti-Affirmative Action Policies 
The researcher analyzed several pivotal race-based affirmative action legal cases, anti-
affirmative action policies, and executive orders directly affecting higher education programs.  
While the researcher mentioned the existence and purpose of state anti-affirmative action 
policies that directly affected race-conscious affirmative action, the primary focus in this study 
was the development and analyses of federal legal cases, namely United States Supreme Court 
cases, that may have impacted higher education admissions policies and programs.   
The federal legal cases that were carefully examined as part of this study are DeFunis, et 
al. v. Odegaard, et al. (1974), Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), 
Podberesky v. Kirwan (1994), Hopwood v. Texas (1996), Smith, et al. v. University of 
Washington Law School (2000), Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia 
(2001), Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).  The state anti-affirmative 
action policies that were discussed are the California Civil Rights Initiative Proposition 209 
(1996), Texas Ten Percent Plan (1997), Washington State’s Civil Rights Initiative 200 (1998), 
and One Florida Initiative (1999). 
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3.1.3 Data Analysis 
The researcher used a mixed methods approach, inclusive of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, when doing the data analysis.  The analyses in this study comprised several different 
data sources, including document review, interviews, and statistical analyses of multiple 
variables.  The statistical analyses included a comparison of three demographic variables of 
former CLEO fellows who completed the summer institutes programs in 1968, 1969, 1975, 
1980, 1991, and 1998 through 2006 as well as the AIE associates from 2002 to 2006.  The three 
demographic variables were: race/ethnicity, LSAT percentile scores, and undergraduate GPAs of 
the students.  The researcher compared the race/ethnicity of the former fellows by coding the 
students according to the following categories:  Black, Hispanic/Latino, Native American, 
White, Asian, and Other.8  Chi-square statistics were used to examine the changes in the 
race/ethnicity of CLEO fellows and associates completing the summer institutes during the 
above-referenced periods of 1968 to 2006 (N = 1,304) and completing AIE programs during the 
periods of 2002 to 2006 (N = 1,075), respectively.   
Similarly, the researcher analyzed the changes in LSAT percentile scores (N = 1,279) and 
undergraduate GPAs (N = 1,269) for CLEO fellows who attended the summer institutes from 
1968 to 2006.  The researcher also analyzed the LSAT percentile scores (N = 880) and 
undergraduate GPAs (N = 902) for AIE associates who attended seminars from 2002 to 2006.  
LSAT percentile scores and undergraduate GPAs were examined using ANOVA statistical 
                                                 
8 These racial designations were based on how students identified themselves on their CLEO summer institute 
applications.  The racial categories are broken down as follows: Black includes African, Haitian, and Caribbean 
Americans; Hispanic/Latino includes Mexican, Spanish, Puerto Rican, Cuban American as well as South American 
and all other descendants of Hispanic/Latino countries; Native American also includes Native Alaskans, and Asian 
includes Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, Filipino, Korean, Cambodian, Asian Indian, and all other 
descendants of Asian countries.  The category entitled “Other” includes the few individuals that identified 
themselves as bi-racial or multi-racial as well as those individuals that CLEO identified as “Other.” 
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analysis.  Further, the researcher compared the LSAT percentiles and GPA scores of CLEO 
fellows and AIE associates over several years’ time from the program’s inception in 1968 to 
2006.  The actual LSAT scores were not used when doing the analysis because the LSAT test 
itself was changed three times between 1968 and 2006.  For a fair and more accurate 
comparison, the researcher converted the students’ actual LSAT scores into LSAT percentiles 
using a comprehensive list of LSAT percentiles from tests given between 1958 and 2006.  This 
comprehensive list of LSAT percentiles was acquired from the LSAC in order to do the analysis 
for this study.  
The researcher combined certain years of data for comparison and analysis purposes.  
Years of data were combined based on the time periods when federal race-conscious affirmative 
action legal decisions arose in higher education.  For example, the researcher combined the data 
from the following years: (1) 1968 and 1969, (2) 1998 to 2000, (3) 2001 to 2003, and (4) 2004 to 
2006; student data during the years of 1975, 1980, and 1991 were independently analyzed and 
compared to the other years.  Furthermore, the researcher analyzed the three demographic 
variables (i.e. race/ethnicity, LSAT percentiles, and undergraduate GPAs) for summer institute 
fellows in 2002 through 2006 and compared them to the same variables of the AIE students 
during those years.   
 The researcher also attempted to tell the story of CLEO’s creation as well as the past and 
present functions of its well-known summer institutes.  The researcher tells the story of the 
CLEO program through the use of qualitative analysis.  This analysis explained how the number 
of summer institutes has changed from 1968 compared to 2006 as well as how CLEO’s funding 
level and funding sources have changed during these years.  The qualitative information was 
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gathered from existing CLEO documents, such as annual reports and Board of Director meeting 
minutes, and interviews with key CLEO informants. (See Table 3).
Table 3: Research Questions, Analysis, and Respective Data Sources 
Research Questions Analysis Data Sources 
Q1. How have the federal race-conscious 
affirmative action legal cases in higher 
education and state anti-affirmative action 
policies evolved since 1964? 
Q1.1. The researcher discusses facts, issues, 
findings, and analysis within specific race-based 
legal cases from 1964 to 2006, and whether there 
have been any changes in how the Courts have 
dealt with affirmative action in higher education.  
Also, the researcher briefly discusses and 
analyzes some policies that have passed since the 
1970s that may have affected the legality of race-
conscious affirmative action policies or programs 
on a federal or state-level. 
Q1.1 Federal legal cases and state anti-
affirmative action policies, referenda, and 
executive orders. 
Q2. How, if at all, does the ongoing legal 
debate in higher education reflect the support 
for, or maintenance of, white privilege as 
defined by the interest convergence and 
property functions of whiteness constructs of 
critical race theory? 
Q 2.1 The researcher analyzes each of the federal 
legal cases and some policies and whether they 
support the second rule of interest convergence, 
which is that a remedy like race-sensitive 
affirmative action is being eliminated because of 
its threat to whites.  Also, the research examines 
the analysis in the legal cases and policies under 
the four property functions of whiteness, and 
whether the analysis reflects or supports any of 
the four functions. 
Q2.1 Federal legal cases and state anti-
affirmative action policies, referenda, and 
executive orders. 
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Research Questions Analysis Data Sources 
Q3.1 The researcher uses chi-square statistics to 
examine changes in race/ethnicity of CLEO 
fellows and associates. 
Q3.1 CLEO’s archived student records from 1968, 
1969, 1975, 1980, 1991, and 1998 through 2006. 
Q3.2 The researcher uses ANOVA statistics to 
analyze changes in the LSAT percentile scores for 
fellows and associates. 
Q3.2 LSAT percentile scores list from Law 
School Admissions Council and CLEO’s archival 
student records from 1968, 1969, 1975, 1980, 
1991, and 1998 through 2006. 
Q3.3 The researcher uses ANOVA statistics to 
analyze changes in undergraduate GPA scores for 
fellows and associates. 
Q3.3 CLEO’s archived student records from 1968, 
1969, 1975, 1980, 1991, and 1998 through 2006. 
Q3. How, if at all, is the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate in higher 
education related to the original intent, 
current operations, and future viability of the 
CLEO Program? 
Q3.4 The researcher analyzes CLEO’s original 
purpose, funding levels and funding sources, and 
whether the organization has a future. 
Q3.4 Interviews of key CLEO informants, 
CLEO’s archived records, and public records and 
documents (e.g., annual reports, articles, corporate 
by-laws, grant applications) from 1968 to 2006. 
Q4.1 The researcher reviews current numbers of 
racial minorities in the legal profession and in law 
school (2003 to 2006). 
Q4.1 Data from the American Bar Association, 
Law School Admission Council, and the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
Q4. Given the legal debates, what are the 
future implications for race-based affirmative 
action programs and the admittance of racial 
minorities, particularly African Americans, to 
law schools and the legal profession? Q4.2 The researcher discusses the facts and 
arguments in the most recent legal cases and 
policies (2005 to 2006). 
Q4.2 Legal cases and policies (e.g., Proposal 2 in 
Michigan, the pending U.S. Supreme Court cases 
of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District as well as Meredith v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education) 
  
 
3.1.4 Use of CRT Constructs  
The researcher used constructs of critical race theory (CRT) to guide this study in the 
examination and analysis of federal race-conscious legal cases in higher education and state anti-
affirmative action policies.  The CRT constructs are interest convergence and whiteness as 
property.  The researcher considered these two constructs together to understand the continuous 
race-based affirmative action legal debates in higher education, and to examine whether the 
analyses in the legal cases support white privilege.  The researcher pulled ideas from both 
constructs to explain the evolutionary process of the legal debates. 
This researcher proposed that Derrick Bell’s first rule of the interest convergence theory 
was in operation during the 1960s, when the United States was anxious to promote equality and 
unity amongst its citizens.  In the 1960s, United States citizens were focused on human rights of 
this country given the fiery deliberations over the morality and efficacy of war in Vietnam.  Part 
of the worries over the Vietnam War spilled over into concern over the plight of Blacks caught in 
the constant cycle of racial discrimination that began at birth and was not subsiding in spite of 
the recent push for affirmative action (Slocum, 1979).  As Blacks struggled for equal job 
opportunities in the mid-1960s, there were few minority lawyers available or willing to offer 
legal assistance to help Blacks gain these opportunities.  This lack of legal help created a high 
demand and a dire need for minority groups’ equal access to the justice system as well as access 
to the decision-making process that ultimately guides the plan for our lives – the law (Slocum, 
1979). 
With the controversy and picketing opposing the Vietnam War, the assassinations of 
beloved, respected leaders who fought for equality and civil rights in the 1960s - President John 
F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the ensuing racial riots, 
  105
the country needed a positive distraction like the Brown decision provided in 1954.  The federal 
government’s support for civil rights, including affirmative action policies and programs like 
CLEO, offered a reprieve from the chaos as well as educational opportunities and jobs to the 
disenfranchised.  According to Bell’s interest convergence theory, race-sensitive affirmative 
action policies were only meant to be the temporary alignment of the self-interest of elite Whites 
and the interests of Blacks (1980).  Thus, as race-sensitive affirmative action policies and 
programs have benefited more and more racial minorities, particularly Blacks, and began to level 
the playing field over the past 40 years, the second rule of the interest convergence theory took 
effect in the form of the legal cases as well as anti-affirmative action policies and referenda.  The 
second rule states that “even when the interest-convergence results in an effective racial remedy, 
that remedy will be abrogated at the point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is 
threatening the superior societal status of whites” (Bell, 2004, p. 69). 
This researcher further posited that Bell’s second rule of interest convergence theory was 
triggered in the 1970s, specifically during the initiation of the Bakke case in 1978.  It was at that 
time that the property functions of whiteness came into play and fueled what are now ongoing 
legal debates in order to maintain white privilege in the United States.  The property functions of 
whiteness include (1) the right of disposition; (2) right to use and enjoyment; (3) reputation and 
status property; and (4) the right to exclude (Harris, 1993).  The “property functions of 
whiteness” explicate the privileges and benefits that the law gives to White people, which are 
equivalent to the legal rights given to other property owners (Harris, 1993).  The critical 
characteristics of this privilege are displayed by the fact that White people can use the law to 
establish and protect an actual property interest in whiteness.  Cheryl Harris (1993) averred that 
property rights could be exhibited in citizenship, voting, knowledge, career and educational 
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opportunities, and land ownership among other exclusionary rights in this country, which give 
White people power.  This researcher added to the list an actual property right and entitlement 
that White Americans claim in order to gain admission to higher education institutions, or law 
schools, of their choice over qualified Blacks.   
Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995) utilized the property functions of whiteness to address 
racial inequities in the context of school resources for students in the Kindergarten through 12th 
grade environment.  These researchers brought out the issue of property and how some students 
are denied access to certain types of learning and educational experiences because they are poor 
and minority students.  This researcher, however, argued that the property functions of whiteness 
also perpetuate the racial inequities in higher education.  Thus, this study attempted to develop 
further Ladson-Billings and Tate’s use of the property functions of whiteness to address the 
inequities in accessing institutions of higher education, specifically law school, and how the legal 
process may be employed to sustain the inequities and maintain white privilege in higher 
education.   
In a case study, the appropriately developed theory is at the level in which generalization 
of the case study results will occur.  Under some circumstances, analytic generalization can be 
used in a single-case study (Yin, 2003a).   According to Yin (2003a), a rationale for a single case 
is that it represents the critical case in testing a well-formulated theory.  The researcher proposed 
that this case study of CLEO is a critical case given CLEO’s salient purpose from its inception in 
the 1960s and now, its longevity and overall success as a program.  Critical race theory, in 
particular the interest convergence and whiteness as property constructs, has been well-
established, but further testing is necessary.  This case study provided an optimal testing ground 
“to confirm, challenge, or extend the theory….” (Yin, 2003a, p. 40).  Specifically, using these 
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two critical race theory constructs to analyze the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate 
in the context of how the continual debates correlated to changes in the CLEO program provided 
an optimal testing ground to confirm the basic tenets of critical race theory. 
3.1.5 Format of Addressing the Research Questions 
The researcher addresses the four research questions in three different chapters.  Specifically, the 
first and second research questions are answered in Chapter Four, the third research question is 
addressed in Chapter Five, and the fourth research question is addressed in Chapter Six.  The 
questions are segregated intentionally in order to clearly delineate the distinct points in the 
researcher’s general argument without causing confusion to the reader.  The fourth research 
question serves as a summary to the research findings and brings all the separate points together 
in the conclusion.   
The first two research questions are answered together in Chapter Four because they 
speak to the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate.  These two questions particularly 
explicate the evolution of the race-conscious legal debate and whether the legal decisions, 
analyses, and anti-affirmative action policies support the maintenance of white privilege.  The 
examination of the legal debate is done through the theoretical lens of critical race theory.   
The third research question deals with the growth and the changes in the CLEO program, 
a race-based legal program, over the past 38 years and during the periods of the legal debate.  In 
the fourth summative question, the researcher outlines the current number of minority law 
students and lawyers, and where society is positioned legally and politically on the issue of race-
conscious affirmative action.  Further, the researcher draws conclusions on the future of the race-
based affirmative action legal debate as well as affirmative action policies and programs.   
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4.0  FOURTH CHAPTER 
4.1 THE EVOLUTION OF AN ENDURING LEGAL DEBATE 
This research study concentrates on the evolution of race-based affirmative action legal cases in 
higher education, with an emphasis on legal education and the legal profession, and anti-
affirmative action policies.  This chapter critically examines the decisions and analyses in 
specific federal legal cases affecting higher education policies since the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Additionally, the researcher discusses the intent of specific state policies and executive orders 
that abolished race-based affirmative action or offered race-neutral alternatives.  The exploration 
of the legal cases and policies in this chapter answers the first research question, which is:  how 
have the federal race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher education and anti-
affirmative action policies evolved since 1964? 
Moreover, this study investigates how the constant legal debates may be related to the 
United States’ legal history with race and maintaining white privilege in higher education, 
specifically in law school and the legal profession.  In this chapter, the researcher analyzes some 
of the legal holdings and the courts’ rationale when reaching these opinions using the theoretical 
framework of critical race theory.  Therefore, Chapter Four also speaks to the second research 
question in this study, which is:  how, if at all, do the on-going legal debates in higher education 
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reflect the support for, or maintenance of, white privilege as defined by the interest convergence 
and whiteness as property constructs of critical race theory? 
4.1.1 The 1970s – The First Wave of Federal Legal Cases 
DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al.  (1974) 
The first case of interest to reach the United States Supreme Court was the 1974 law school 
admissions case of DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al.  In DeFunis (1974), a white male sued the 
University of Washington alleging that he was not accepted into the law school in 1971 due to 
less qualified minority students being admitted solely based on race and in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Mr. DeFunis brought the reverse discrimination lawsuit on behalf of 
himself, his parents, and his wife, but not as a representative of a class of similarly situated 
students (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).  Prior to reaching the United States Supreme 
Court, the trial court agreed with Mr. DeFunis that the University of Washington Law School 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and issued a mandatory injunction that required the 
University of Washington Law School to admit Mr. DeFunis.  The Washington State Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court’s decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Law School’s 
admissions policy (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).   
When the case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. DeFunis was in his last year 
of law school at the University of Washington.  Thus, the Court did not address the merits of the 
case because the majority of the Supreme Court considered the issues to be moot since there 
were no longer any constitutional issues to be decided (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).  
Nevertheless, there was some division amongst the Supreme Court Justices that resulted in 
separate dissenting opinions relating to the mootness issue.  The primary issue was whether the 
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DeFunis case presented a constitutional question that was “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review” (DeFunis, 1974, pp. 318-19).  Given the conflict over the constitutional issue in the case 
as well as the fact that this is the first race-based affirmative action admissions case, it is 
important to discuss many of the facts of this case and the analysis within the main dissenting 
opinion.  The facts and analysis in the DeFunis case may have set the stage for later cases and 
influenced the ongoing race-conscious affirmative action legal debate that haunts society today; 
therefore, this case is discussed in slightly more detail than some of the other legal cases. 
In 1971, the University of Washington Law School received over 1,600 applications, and 
the Law School offered admission to 275 applicants in order to achieve a first-year class of 150 
students.  The admissions process was based primarily on determining an average index called 
the Predicted First Year Average, which was calculated through a formula measuring each 
applicant’s LSAT score and grades from the last two years of college.  The highest average in 
1971 was 81, so many students with an average index of 77 to 81 were considered outstanding 
applicants.  The outstanding candidates had their applications immediately reviewed by the 
Admissions Committee, which consisted of faculty, administration, and students, for a 
recommendation.  Many of the students with averages in the 77 to 81 range were admitted.  The 
Chairman of the Admissions Committee reviewed the applications with scores below 74.5, and 
he had the authority to reject them summarily without further consideration, of which many were 
rejected, or to hold some applications that showed greater promise for review by the entire 
Committee.  Mr. DeFunis’ average index of 76.23 fell within the mid-range, so he was initially 
waitlisted with many other applicants in the middle group for further review by the entire 
Committee.  After further review with the other competing waitlist applicants, Mr. DeFunis fell 
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within the bottom quarter, so he was denied admission to the University of Washington Law 
School (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974). 
Applicants who indicated on their applications that they were in an underrepresented 
minority group, such as Black, Hispanic, American Indian, or Filipino, did not have their 
applications reviewed by the Chairman regardless of their average index score; rather, minority 
group applications were separated out.  Specifically, two members of the Admissions Committee 
reviewed the applications of Black applicants.  The two committee members were: a first-year 
Black law student and a professor who served as the Director of the CLEO program, which was 
held at the University of Washington Law School in 1970.  The Assistant Dean of the Law 
School, who also served on the Admissions Committee, evaluated the applications of the 
students from the other three minority groups.  All minority applicants were considered 
competitively against each other, but not against non-minority applicants (DeFunis, et al. v. 
Odegaard, et al., 1974).   
The University of Washington Law School publicly distributed its Guide to Applicants, 
which indicated that “an applicant’s racial and ethnic background was considered as one factor 
in our general attempt to convert formal credentials into realistic predictions” (DeFunis, et al. v. 
Odegaard, et al., 1974, p. 324) (emphasis added).  Additionally, the Law School publicly 
acknowledged that it considered other factors for admissions other than the index scores for most 
students who showed academic potential but did not have the highest scores.  For example, the 
Law School pondered the rigor of the applicants’ undergraduate curriculum track, the attainment 
of an advanced degree and the nature of the degree, the written portion of the LSAT, the quality 
and strength of letters of recommendation, and the number of years the applicant had been out of 
college prior to taking the LSAT.  Out of the 270 applicants offered admissions to the law 
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school, 37 of them were minority students who went through the separate review process.  
Thirty-six of the minority students had average index scores lower than Mr. DeFunis’ average.  
Moreover, there were 48 non-minorities admitted with lower averages than Mr. DeFunis, of 
which 23 were returning military veterans (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).  Mr. 
DeFunis contended that the racial minority applicants would not have been admitted into the 
Law School if they were considered under the same general procedures of admissions. 
In Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion (in which Justice Brennan joined), he agreed with 
the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion that the Law School’s selection process was racially 
neutral, based on the record, but Justice Douglas suggested remanding the case back to the lower 
court for a new trial, rather than considering the issue moot (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 
1974).  Before explaining his reasoning, Justice Douglas first noted that a university’s 
admissions procedures are ordinarily not a subject for judicial oversight.  Nevertheless, the 
University of Washington Law School had presented a special situation because it had two sets 
of criteria for considering applicants – one for minority students and one for other students – in 
order to achieve a “reasonable representation” of minority groups in the Law School.  Justice 
Douglas opined that the Equal Protection Clause did not enact a requirement that law schools 
employ as the sole criterion for admissions.  He mentioned that it might be acceptable for a law 
school to select a Black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto and attended junior 
college over a son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard (DeFunis, et al. v. 
Odegaard, et al., 1974).  Simply stated, the Black student demonstrated a high level of 
motivation, perseverance, and ability, which are outstanding qualities for a law student and 
lawyer, of which the Harvard graduate may have been lacking.   
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Justice Douglas maintained in his opinion that a formula for LSATs and undergraduate 
GPAs were not necessarily the best criterion, especially since the LSAT tended to be racially and 
culturally biased and did a disservice to minorities (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).  In 
fact, prior to the LSAT’s implementation in 1948, all students were accepted into law school and 
the first-year of law studies determined if a person had the makings to be a competent lawyer.  
Justice Douglas noted: 
[m]y reaction is that the presence of an LSAT is sufficient warrant for a school to put 
racial minorities into a separate class in order to better probe their capacities and 
potentials.  This does not mean that a separate LSAT must be designed for racial minority 
racial groups….The reason for the separate treatment of minorities as a class is to make 
more certain that racial factors do not militate against an applicant or on his behalf 
(DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al. 1974, p. 336).   
This brought the Supreme Court Justice to his next point, which was that:  
[t]here is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred.  The years of slavery did 
more than retard the progress of blacks.  Even a greater wrong was done [to] the whites 
by creating arrogance instead of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of 
a superior race.  There is no superior person by constitutional standards.  A DeFunis who 
is white is entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any 
disability no matter what his race or color (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974, p. 
336-37).   
Therefore, Justice Douglas concluded that the University of Washington Law School did not 
discriminate against Mr. DeFunis in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He did, however, 
recommend that the United States Supreme Court vacate the Washington Supreme Court 
  114
decision and remand to the lower court for a trial so that the parties could present additional 
evidence and facts regarding Mr. DeFunis and the constitutionality of the Law School’s 
admissions procedures.  Justice Douglas summed up his decision in this final and fundamental 
thought, which was that: 
[t]he problem tendered by this case is important and crucial to the operation of our 
constitutional system; and educators must be given leeway.  It may well be that a whole 
congeries of applicants in the marginal group defy known methods of selection.  
Conceivably, an admissions committee might conclude that a selection by lot of, say the 
last 20 seats, is the only fair solution.  Courts are not educators; their expertise is limited; 
and our task ends with the inquiry whether, judged by the main purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause – the protection against racial discrimination – there has been an 
“invidious” discrimination.  We would have a different case if the suit were one to 
displace the applicant who was chosen in lieu of DeFunis.  What the record would show 
concerning his potentials would have to be considered and weighed.  The educational 
decision, provided proper guidelines were used, would reflect an expertise that courts 
should honor.  The problem is not tendered here because the physical facilities were 
apparently adequate to take DeFunis in addition to the others.  My view is only that I 
cannot say by the tests used and applied he was invidiously discriminated against because 
of his race (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974, p. 344).   
 The DeFunis case did not hold legal precedence as it pertained to race-based affirmative 
action cases and admissions practices.  Nevertheless, the facts in this case and Justice Douglas’ 
dissenting opinion set forth some vital points that should not be ignored, such as the political and 
social milieu with regards to the attitude towards racial minorities as law school applicants and 
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the decision-making authority of higher education institutions.  First, Mr. DeFunis brought a 
reverse discrimination lawsuit based on race when there were 48 non-minorities with lower 
averages than DeFunis offered admission into the University of Washington Law School, as 
compared to the 36 racial minorities with lower averages.  Some of the 48 non-minorities were 
likely women, but Mr. DeFunis opted to pursue a legal fight to the United States Supreme Court 
that was based on a racial discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than a gender discrimination lawsuit that was also illegal under 
the newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964.  This point did not escape the seasoned wisdom of 
Justice Douglas who found it necessary to inform Mr. DeFunis and others that despite society’s 
belief, Whites are not the superior race with entitlements over racial minorities, namely Blacks 
who wore the inferior label as slaves for so many years.  In other words, Blacks have an equal 
right to compete, be seriously considered, and accepted into a law school of their choice just like 
Whites.   
Second, Justice Douglas averred that it was perfectly acceptable to consider other factors 
when deciding a law school applicant’s ability to be an outstanding law student and lawyer, 
especially when it comes to racial minorities.  The Supreme Court Justice went as far as to say 
that the LSATs may not be the best predictor for determining the future success or failure of 
racial minorities in the legal profession because the test is inherently racially and culturally 
biased and a barrier to most minority applicants.  In fact, the Justice suggested that racial 
minorities be given different treatment in admission situations so that the negative racial effects 
of the LSAT do not stand in the way of fair consideration as a law school candidate.  Finally, 
Justice Douglas argued for colleges’ right to autonomy and flexibility in making its own 
admission decisions.  After all, colleges have expertise as educators and experience with judging 
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the academic potential of applicants.  Courts should honor universities’ admissions decisions and 
how the institution reaches its decisions unless there is invidious discrimination afoot, which was 
not present in the DeFunis case according to Justice Douglas. 
Justice Douglas opined that invidious discrimination did not appear to be present in the 
DeFunis case, yet several years later the Supreme Court was again confronted with a very similar 
constitutional issue of racial discrimination.  This time the issue arose in a reverse discrimination 
lawsuit against a medical school, and like the DeFunis case, it involved a White male 
questioning the constitutionality of a university’s admissions procedures.  This lawsuit was the 
1978 United States Supreme Court case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.  The 
historical Bakke case represents the first time the United States Supreme Court fully addressed 
the merits of race-conscious affirmative action and reviewed the legality of race-based 
admissions policies in higher education.  Bakke maintains legal precedence in this country with 
regards to race-sensitive affirmative action in higher education. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), Allan Bakke, a White male, 
was denied admissions to the University of California at Davis Medical School for two 
consecutive years – 1973 and 1974.  Mr. Bakke claimed that minimally qualified racial and 
ethnic minorities could compete for and fill 16 special admission seats (i.e., Blacks, Latinos, and 
Asians) out of 100 in the Medical School’s first year class, while more qualified White 
applicants like Bakke could compete only for 84 seats under the general admissions program.  
Bakke argued that the reserved seats for minorities and the special admissions program 
amounted to racial and ethnic quotas, which was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   Mr. Bakke brought the 
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lawsuit on behalf of himself and sought injunctive relief against the Regents of the University of 
California demanding that the Medical School admit him. 
In Bakke (1978), the United States Supreme Court determined that the special admissions 
policy utilized by the University of California at Davis Medical School violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because it reserved a specified number of places for minorities to the exclusion of 
Whites.  Additionally, the Supreme Court agreed that Mr. Bakke should be admitted into the 
Medical School.  The Supreme Court Justices, however, could not agree on the reasoning for the 
decision, so the Justices wrote several different opinions.  Justice Powell wrote the main opinion 
that explained that the University of California at Davis Medical School’s admissions policy 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, because the use of explicit racial classifications in the 
policy disregarded individual rights.  What is troubling about the high Court’s decision is that a 
majority of the Justices invalidated the admissions policy because it denied future White 
applicants the opportunity to compete for all the seats in the medical school class (Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  The Court did not find it important that the policy 
afforded the opportunity for a few disadvantaged minority groups to be admitted into the 
Medical School who had been excluded previously from the entire higher education process. 
The Supreme Court Justice writing the opinion for the Court, however, concluded that 
race could be considered a “plus” factor during the college admissions process to achieve 
educational diversity, so long as the individual qualities of each applicant were considered during 
the admissions process.  Justice Powell explained that a university sets out to admit different 
students who can create an environment where there is a robust exchange of ideas (Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  In the opinion, Justice Powell did not clearly address 
whether there was a private cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in this case.  
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Nevertheless, Justice Powell recognized that the purpose of Title VI was to give fellow Black 
citizens the same rights and opportunities that White people have taken for granted for so many 
years but would not concede that race-conscious admissions programs were needed to help 
remedy the effects of the past societal discrimination.  Justice Powell also acknowledged that 
racial classifications are subject to the strict scrutiny level of judicial review (Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  While Justice Powell asserted that educational 
diversity was compelling state interest that met the strict scrutiny standard and supplied 
sufficient justification for considering race in an admissions process, he also specifically stated 
that remedying societal discrimination and providing role models were never appropriate 
justifications for using racial classifications in admissions.   
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred with the judgment of the Court that a university 
may consider race a “plus” factor in its admission process, but he strongly admonished the Court 
for not permitting a class-based remedy for discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
since Blacks as a group were discriminated against for several hundred years, not as individuals, 
and solely because of the color of their skin (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
1978).  Justice Marshall further noted that the Congress that voted for special relief for the Negro 
race under the 1866 Freedmen’s Bureau Act was the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment; thus, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit 
all race-conscious relief measures (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978).  This 
was Justice Marshall’s argument for race-based affirmative action programs in light of the 
United States’ history of purposeful societal discrimination against Black people as an inferior 
group, not as individuals, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s support for the programs. 
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Because Justice Powell did not clearly explain the meaning of diversity, and no other 
Supreme Court Justice joined his opinion on the diversity rationale, the viability of race-
conscious affirmative action programs became more vulnerable for attack to the detriment of 
Blacks.  Without any lucid direction in Bakke and no consensus among the Justices as to the 
legality of affirmative action programs, it became more difficult to justify the ongoing need for 
race-conscious affirmative action policies, especially since the Supreme Court struck down 
societal discrimination as a valid justification for such policies and programs.  Coincidentally, 
the Bakke decision was announced around the same time that the U.S. Department of Education 
brought enforcement actions under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against 19 states in 
the south that were racially segregated and refusing admission to Blacks.  When President 
Reagan took office in the 1980s, he fought against civil rights enforcement and suspended most 
of the Title VI actions before the discriminatory acts had completely ceased and equality at the 
southern schools had been achieved (Williams, 1997).  
Simultaneously with the cessation of the Title VI enforcements in the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s, the United States Supreme Court experienced a shift to a slightly more conservative 
bench that included Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas.  As 
such, the Supreme Court was hearing more reverse discrimination legal cases that were 
commenced in order to end affirmative action.  In the affirmative action cases in the 1980s and 
1990s, the Supreme Court unabashedly and strongly enforced a high standard for race-based 
affirmative action policies.  The Court decided that racial categories in affirmative action policies 
are always suspect classifications.  The Supreme Court still utilized strict scrutiny as the legal 
standard to review the use of racial classifications but extremely restricted the circumstances 
under which race could be considered.  Thus, racial classifications could be used if the policies 
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met the strict scrutiny standard of being narrowly tailored and are necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest, but only an organization’s need to rectify existing discrimination, not 
to achieve diversity, met this constitutional standard (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995; 
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 1989). 
This constraining type of strict scrutiny, which limited the use of racial classifications to 
eliminate current discriminatory activities, was initially adopted and applied to employment 
affirmative action policies and programs that were challenged during the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Corporations and organizations could satisfy the strict scrutiny requirements only if they proved 
that the race-conscious measures were necessary to remedy the “present effects” of past 
discrimination, not the current societal or past discrimination.  Diversity was not acknowledged 
as an acceptable justification to meet the strict scrutiny standard for using racial classifications. 
Given the difficulty of meeting such a high burden of proof, the strict scrutiny standard also 
became the springboard to challenge Bakke’s diversity holding as well as race being considered 
as a “plus” factor in an effort to eliminate all race-sensitive affirmative action programs and 
policies in higher education.  Moreover, in December 1990, Michael Williams, the Assistant 
Secretary of Education for Civil Rights under the first Bush administration, issued an opinion 
that stated that scholarship set-asides for racial and ethnic minority students violated the civil 
rights laws.  Accordingly, the 1990s ushered in a firestorm of higher education cases and policies 
that blatantly ignored and opposed the Bakke holding and any use for affirmative action policies 
and programs. 
4.1.2 The 1990s – The Legal Debate Gains Momentum 
Podberesky v. Kirwan (1994) 
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Because of Michael Williams’ opinion regarding race-conscious scholarships, it may have been 
expected that one of the first reverse discrimination higher education cases of the 1990s would 
be based on a scholarship program.  The University of Maryland lawsuit of Podberesky v. 
Kirwan (1994) was a higher education case that did not reach the United States Supreme Court, 
but it made it to the federal appellate court in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.  The Fourth Circuit insisted on the rigid enforcement of the strict scrutiny standard that 
was specifically adopted in the City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson (1989) case, while also striking 
down the University of Maryland’s assertions for remedying the present effects of past 
discrimination.  In addition, the Podberesky court made no reference to the Bakke holding or the 
use of the diversity rationale in higher education cases.   
The issue in the Podberesky case dealt with whether the University of Maryland at 
College Park (UMCP) could maintain a separate merit-based scholarship program for which only 
African Americans were eligible.  Daniel Podberesky, the plaintiff-appellant, contested UMCP’s 
Banneker scholarship program for African Americans because as a Hispanic, Podberesky was 
not eligible.  Although Mr. Podberesky met the academic qualifications for the Banneker 
scholarship, he was eligible only for the Francis Scott Key scholarship program for all other 
students.  In the lower district court, UMCP argued that the purpose of the program was to 
counter the four present effects of past discrimination that existed at UMCP, which were that: (1) 
the University had a poor reputation within the African American community; (2) African 
Americans were underrepresented in the student population; (3) African American students who 
enroll at the University have low retention and graduation rates; and (4) the atmosphere on 
campus was perceived as being hostile to African American students.  UMCP maintained that 
the pool from which eligible students were drawn was high-achieving African American high 
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school students in Maryland.  The University intended to have the racial composition of its 
student body reflect the racial composition of qualified college eligible high school graduates in 
Maryland (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).   
The district court agreed with the University of Maryland and concluded that the 
Banneker program was narrowly tailored to remedy the four present effects of past 
discrimination, and it was constitutionally permissible (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).  After all, 
the University had a known history of discriminating against Black people in the past.  
Therefore, the district court approved of the Banneker program to admit African American 
students solely on the basis of race until the composition of African Americans on the UMCP 
campus reflected the percentage of African American Maryland high school graduates who may 
attend the University of Maryland at College Park (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).  The district 
court supported its decision by stating: 
[I]n our earlier opinions both I and the Fourth Circuit may have construed too rigid a 
framework of analysis…I have come to believe that (1) precedents involving 
employment disputes provide imperfect analogies for determining the constitutionality of 
an affirmative action program in an education context, and (2) focusing solely upon past 
discrimination in education cases blurs vision and obstructs understanding (Podberesky, 
1994, p. 153 citing Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1097).   
In other words, the lower court considered the strict scrutiny requirements of proving the present 
effects of past discrimination, which had been utilized in employment cases like Croson, was an 
improper standard for higher education cases.  The Fourth Circuit wholly disagreed with the 
district court’s holding and analysis.   
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The Fourth Circuit reiterated the necessity of using the Croson strict scrutiny standard as 
the relevant framework for analysis for the Podberesky case and all other cases in its jurisdiction 
(Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).  Given that UMCP’s Banneker program was based on remedying 
past discrimination through achieving a present composition of Black students that was 
equivalent to the percentage of Blacks graduating Maryland high schools, the program did not 
pass constitutional muster.  Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that UMCP’s Banneker program 
resembled outright racial balancing through a quota system, which is unconstitutional, rather 
than a narrowly tailored program to remedy the present effects of past discrimination.  In its 
analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the University’s examples of four present effects of past 
discrimination were insufficient to meet the burden of establishing a race-based scholarship 
program because UMCP failed to supply the necessary evidence (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).  
Additionally, UMCP failed to pursue race-neutral alternatives.   
The Fourth Circuit criticized UMCP because it could not support the definition for a 
“high-achieving African American,” and clearly establish how the University determined the 
African American applicant pool.  Specifically, the University:  (1) did not establish an effective 
minimum criteria for admission, such as the combination of SAT scores, high school curriculum 
requirements, and GPAs; (2) did not consider the eligibility of all Maryland high school 
graduates; and (3) included out of state Black students in the pool, even though the Banneker 
program was to remedy past discrimination against students who lived in the state of Maryland 
(Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994).  The Fourth Circuit expressed that “There is no doubt that racial 
tensions still exist in American society, including the campuses of our institutions of higher 
learning.  However, these tensions and attitudes are not a sufficient ground for employing a race-
conscious remedy at the University of Maryland” (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994, p. 155).  The 
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choice of a race-based merit scholarship program to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination could not be sustained.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit required UMCP to re-
examine Mr. Podberesky’s admission to the Banneker program and enjoined the University from 
enforcing the African American racial requirement when considering Podberesky’s 
qualifications (Podberesky v. Kirwan, 1994). 
The Podberesky holding and analysis does not have legal precedence in today’s national 
race-conscious legal debate.  In fact, the Bakke case along with the 2003 United States Supreme 
Court cases of Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, which will be discussed later, 
maintain that honor.  What is very intriguing, however, is that the Fourth Circuit chose to follow 
the stringent analysis and requirements in showing the present effects of past discrimination to 
support race-conscious measures, which was utilized in the affirmative action cases in an 
employment context.  While the Bakke Court took a disjointed approach in its decision-making 
process and reasoning, the conclusion still had legal primacy in the U.S. federal courts.  There is 
no indication in the opinion that the Podberesky court assessed whether Banneker scholarship 
candidates and other applicants were reviewed on their individual merits, and race was simply 
the “plus” factor to offer the advantages of educational diversity, which is explained in the Bakke 
analysis.  Simply put, the Podberesky appellate court had a great opportunity to attempt to make 
sense of the Bakke holding.  At least in making a questionable attempt, the Podberesky court 
could have left an opening for a return trip to the United States Supreme Court in order to 
address the issue of the legality of race-conscious affirmative action programs in higher 
education.  That return trip may have resulted in a clearer definition of “diversity” and “using 
race as a plus factor” in a higher education context.   
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Another peculiar factual issue in Podberesky v. Kirwan (1994) was that the case involved 
a member of a racial minority group, a Hispanic student, who had been historically 
underrepresented in institutions of higher education.  The Banneker scholarship program was 
exclusively for an identified disenfranchised racial minority group, African Americans, and Mr. 
Podberesky was a part of another disenfranchised minority group.  The Fourth Circuit could have 
required UMCP to reconsider Podberesky’s application on its individual merits along with other 
applicants in order to support a diverse student body.  This would have eliminated the exclusivity 
of the scholarship program.  Instead, the Podberesky court chose to label the Banneker program 
as utterly unconstitutional without giving UMCP the chance to rework the qualification portion 
of the program.  It appears that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would 
not have been opposed to a race-conscious affirmative action program to benefit racial 
minorities, so long as the program did not exclusively benefit Black students.  Of course, the 
legal debate did not end with the Podberesky court’s interpretation of a race-conscious 
affirmative action program in higher education.  More was to come. 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996) 
Hopwood v. Texas (1996) was another law school admissions case that set forth some 
interesting facts and analysis as it pertains to race-based affirmative action policies.  Similar to 
Podberesky v. Kirwan (1994), this case did not make it to the United States Supreme Court, even 
though the state of Texas petitioned the Court but the writ of certiorari was denied.  
Nevertheless, the Hopwood case had a significant impact on how Bakke was viewed as legal 
precedence and on the potential of more legal challenges regarding race-conscious admissions 
policies in the near future.   
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Hopwood (1996) was argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit and involved four individual White plaintiff-appellees, in which Cheryl Hopwood was 
the lead plaintiff-appellee in the lawsuit and the only woman of the four.  It is important to note 
that the University of Texas School of Law (hereinafter “Texas Law School”) is one of the most 
competitive law schools as it is regarded as one of the top 20 law schools in this country, 
according U.S. News and World Report.  Over 4,000 people apply to the Texas Law School each 
year, but only 900 applicants are accepted in order to obtain a first-year class of 500 students 
(Hopwood, 1996).   
Ms. Hopwood and the other appellees averred that the Texas Law School had a special 
admissions program that gave Blacks and Mexican Americans preferential treatment in 
admissions, in which they could be admitted with lower test scores (i.e., LSAT and GPA) than 
White and non-preferred minority applicants.9  The plaintiff-appellees sued several parties, 
including the state of Texas and the University of Texas Board of Regents under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
statutory violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, which are based on illegal government 
action.  Unlike other reverse discrimination legal cases, the Hopwood plaintiff-appellees sought 
injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.  The Texas Law School claimed 
to have different standards for selected minority groups with hopes of admitting a class 
consisting of 10 percent Mexican Americans and 5 percent Blacks, which were the proportions 
roughly comparable to the percentages of those races graduating from Texas colleges.  The 
Texas Law School reasoned that the race-based admissions procedures were necessary to help 
rectify the present effect of the past discriminatory practices of the Texas school system. 
                                                 
9 Non-preferred minorities were categorized as all other minority groups besides Black Americans and Mexican 
Americans, such as Asians, Native Africans, and Americans from El Salvador and Cuba. 
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The Hopwood (1996) court held that the University of Texas School of Law’s admissions 
policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment since it placed Black and Mexican-American 
applicants in separate admissions categories than White applicants, and there were no 
identifiable present effects of past discrimination in the law school.  The Fifth Circuit rejected 
the Texas Law School’s contentions that evidence of discrimination in primary and secondary 
schools led to the present effects of discrimination in the state of Texas’ universities, including 
the Law School.10  The Hopwood court determined that only the present effects of past 
discrimination at the law school was acceptable evidence in this case.   
In its analysis, the appellate court determined that Bakke was not a binding precedent 
since no other Justices joined the decision.  The Hopwood (1996) court seemed to understand the 
Law School’s need to increase the enrollment of minority students, but since the court did not 
know the meaning of diversity, it refused to consider diversity to be a compelling state interest.  
Thus, the affirmative action policy was terminated.  The Fifth Circuit relied on what it 
considered a more logical and cohesive legal reasoning, which was set forth in Croson and other 
employment affirmative action cases to define a narrowly tailored policy and a compelling state 
interest.  The Fifth Circuit did not find that the Texas Law School offered sufficient evidence to 
support its assertions that the special admissions program remedied the present effects of past 
discrimination in the law school.  The Hopwood court reversed the district court’s decision in 
favor of the state of Texas and other defendant-appellants and remanded the case to the district 
court with specific instructions based on the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion, which was: 
                                                 
10 The Texas Constitution required segregated schools until 1954, and the Texas Law School had scholarships for 
Whites only until 1969 (Holley & Spencer, 1999; Horn & Flores, 2003).  Additionally, the federal Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) admonished the state of Texas for failing to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation and for 
maintaining a racially dual system of public higher education.  The OCR approved several federally monitored plans 
from 1983 to 2000 to increase enrollment and retention of Black and Latino students in Texas’ public universities 
(Horn & Flores, 2003).   
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In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a 
factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student body, to 
combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate the 
law school’s poor reputation in the minority community, or to eliminate any present 
effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law school.  Because the law school 
has proffered these justifications for its use of race in admissions, the plaintiffs have 
satisfied their burden of showing that they were scrutinized under an unconstitutional 
admissions system.  The plaintiffs are entitled to reapply under an admissions system that 
invokes none of these serious constitutional infirmities.  We also direct the district court 
to reconsider the question of damages… (Hopwood, 1996, p. 962).11   
 The Hopwood court clearly stated its denunciation of the Bakke holding and analysis, and 
the use of race-sensitive admissions in higher education.  Although the University of Texas Law 
School had a long history of racial segregation and discrimination (see Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, 
infra), the appellate court did not address the lack of diversity that still existed in the Texas Law 
School.  A miniscule number of Blacks and Mexican Americans were being accepted to and 
attending the Law School.  In fact, it is fascinating that four White students, including a woman 
who is often labeled a member of a minority group and the largest beneficiary of affirmative 
action, were fighting against diversity and using Bakke as legal precedence.   
The Fifth Circuit was very specific with instructing the district court on how to reach its 
decision and what evidence the district court should evaluate on remand, including awarding 
                                                 
11 In 1997, after the Hopwood case, the OCR found that racial disparities still existed in Texas universities due to 
traces of de jure segregation (Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2000).  In response to the OCR, Texas 
introduced a new “Texas Commitment” that included the goal of improving the recruitment, retention, and 
participation rates of Black and Latino students at historically White institutions in Texas (Horn & Flores 2003; 
Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, 2000). 
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damages to Hopwood and the other plaintiff-appellees.  What is even more curious is that the 
court entertained and was seemingly willing to award compensatory and punitive damages to the 
plaintiff-appellees.  Punitive damages are typically given in civil cases that involve malicious, 
wanton, and wicked conduct by a party (see Black’s Law Dictionary, 1991) and may often 
amount to millions of dollars in damages.  Punitive or exemplary damages are meant to make an 
example out of the wrongdoer by punishing the party for his evil behavior.  This possible award 
of punitive damages to the Hopwood plaintiff-appellees begs an important question, particularly 
since the United States permitted hundreds of years of slavery, segregation, and discrimination to 
occur without being punished or forced to apologize or pay any type of damages.  How can an 
institution in the United States, which tried to remedy its past discriminatory acts by 
implementing a policy to admit the underrepresented racial minority groups that had been 
intentionally excluded for so many years, be considered evil, egregious, and reckless?   
4.1.2.1 Anti-Affirmative Action Policies and Executive Orders 
California’s Referendum (1996) 
In addition to the influx of reverse discrimination legal cases, there came the arrival of anti-
affirmative action policies and race-neutral alternatives in several states during the late 1990s.  
Perhaps the most well-known of the state anti-affirmative action policies is that which was 
introduced in California.  On November 5, 1996, the State of California passed the Proposition 
209 referendum under the California Civil Rights Initiative.  Proposition 209 states in relevant 
part: 
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
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origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting; 
(b) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide 
qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting; 
(c) For the purposes of this section, “state” shall include, but not necessarily be 
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, city and county, public university 
system, including the University of California, community college district, 
school district, special district, or any other political subdivision or 
governmental instrumentality of or within the state (California Civil Right 
Initiative, Proposition 209, November 1996).   
After the State of California voted on Proposition 209, the Los Angeles Times released 
the demographic profiles of the voters.  First, 54 percent of the voters were in favor of 
Proposition 209 while 46 percent were against it.  Sixty-one percent of those who voted “yes” for 
Proposition 209 were males; 48 percent were female voters.  Additionally, 63 percent of the 
voters in favor of Proposition 209 were White, 39 percent were Asian, 26 percent were Black, 
and 24 percent were Latino.  The two largest income brackets that were in favor of Proposition 
209 were in the $60,000 to $74,999 (65%) and the $75,000 or more (59%) income brackets.  
Lastly, the California residents who voted “yes” for Proposition 209 categorized themselves in 
the following ways in terms of political ideology:  (1) 77 percent were conservative; 52 percent 
were moderate; and 27 percent were liberal.  The following voters categorized themselves in the 
following ways in terms of political party affiliation: (1) 80 percent were Republicans; (2) 59 
percent were Independents; and (3) 31 percent were Democrats (Los Angeles Times, 1996).   
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In 1999, the newly elected Governor, Gray Davis, proposed that each public and private 
high school senior who graduated in the top four percent of his class receive guaranteed 
admission to the University of California system (Horn & Flores, 2003).  There was plenty of 
opposition to Governor Davis’ plan because of Proposition 209, but the University of California 
(U.C.) chose to act in support of the four percent plan because of the limitations placed upon 
public institutions under Proposition 209 (Horn & Flores, 2003).  U.C. responded to Proposition 
209’s elimination of race-based affirmative action policies and programs by implementing a 
complex admissions process.   
Currently, there are three ways that students may be admitted to U.C.’s system.  First, 
students can be admitted through Eligibility in the Statewide Context, which has three elements: 
(1) the subject requirement – a student must complete 15 specified high school classes; (2) the 
scholarship requirement – a student must have a grade point average and standardized test score 
that fit within a sliding scale known as the eligibility index; and (3) the examination requirement 
– a student must have a sufficient standardized test score (U.S. Department of Education, Office 
for Civil Rights, 2003).  Second, students may be admitted to U.C. through Eligibility in the 
Local Context, which is commonly known as the “4 percent plan.”  The 4 percent plan enables 
students in the top four percent of seniors from each California high school’s graduating class to 
be designated “U.C.-eligible,” but they must also complete 11 specific units of college 
preparatory coursework by the end of the junior year (U.S. Department of Education, Office for 
Civil Rights, 2003).  Under the third element, students are admitted to the U.C. system solely 
because of an extraordinarily high standardized test score (U.S. Department of Education, Office 
for Civil Rights, 2003).  Once students are admitted to the U.C. system under one of the three 
paths, each U.C. campus then evaluates each student to determine which school the student will 
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attend.  The students are evaluated based on criteria, such as GPA in U.C.-required courses, 
standardized test scores, number of and performance in AP and honor courses, and quality of the 
senior year program.  After the criteria is considered, the administrators at each U.C. campus 
further deliberate on the applicant’s secondary school and residence in order to provide for 
geographical diversity in the student population (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil 
Rights, 2003). 
The University of California at Los Angeles School of Law (UCLA Law School) also 
responded to Proposition 209 with an academic program that would attract highly competitive 
potential law students, including minorities.  This was probably in response to the falling number 
of racial minorities in the University of California law schools.  After the passage of Proposition 
209 in 1996, the University of California reported that the number of minority law students in 
1997 decreased from 43 Black students to 16, from 89 Latino students to 16, and from 10 Native 
American students to 4 (University of California, 2003).  Thus, in the 1997-1998 school year, the 
UCLA Law School commenced the Law Fellows Program, which provides early academic 
outreach to high-potential undergraduate and graduate students with at least a 3.0 GPA.  The 
Law Fellows Program is very similar to CLEO in that it includes Saturday Academies held at the 
UCLA Law School and exposes students to the course materials used in law school, such as legal 
cases and law review articles.  Furthermore, the students learn how to conduct legal research and 
become familiar with legal procedures.  The Law Fellows Program seeks students who have 
overcome economic and educational hardships, or have demonstrated leadership experience in 
economically and educationally underserved communities (U.S. Department of Education, 
Office for Civil Rights, 2003). 
State of Texas’ Legislation (1997)
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Before President George W. Bush was President of the United States, he was Governor of 
the state of Texas.  In a bipartisan response to the Hopwood v. Texas decision that forbade race-
conscious admissions plans in institutions of higher education as well as the OCR’s reprimand 
for racial disparities in Texas universities, Governor Bush implemented the Texas 10 Percent 
Plan (Horn & Flores, 2003; U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  
Governor Bush signed House Bill 588 into law and the Texas Legislature approved it in 1997 
(Horn & Flores, 2003).  This Texas admissions plan, which is also known as the class-ranking 
approach, allowed for the top 10 percent of every state accredited public and private high 
schools’ graduates to be guaranteed admission into the University of Texas campus of their 
choice (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  After the student makes 
his choice, the selected university campus will review the applicant’s academic record to 
determine whether he needs to take additional college preparatory courses.  The University of 
Texas campus may then require the applicant to take the appropriate enrichment or orientation 
programs (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003). 
Proponents of Texas’ class-ranking approach contend that this system promotes diversity 
and presents opportunities to all students who have worked the hardest and the achieved the most 
in high school.  In 2000, the University of Texas at Austin admitted individuals in its freshman 
class that represented 135 high schools that had not attended the university prior to the Hopwood 
decision.  Many of these students were from the inner-city, largely minority sections of Houston, 
Dallas-Ft. Worth, and San Antonio as well as rural White high schools in the Eastern and 
Northeastern parts of Texas (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003). 
Because the Hopwood case focused on the University of Texas Law School’s admissions 
policy benefiting Blacks and Mexican Americans, the Fifth Circuit’s abolishment of the policy 
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could ultimately result in the Law School’s lack of a racially and ethnically diverse student body.  
In fact, the number of underrepresented minority law students decreased further between 1996 
and 2002.  Specifically, the already low number of Black law students enrolled in Texas’ public 
law schools declined from 42 in 1996 to 27 in 2002.  At the same time, the number of Latino law 
students decreased from 100 to 82, and the number of Native American law students decreased 
from 14 to 10 (Moore, 2005).  Therefore, after Governor George W. Bush created the Texas 10 
percent plan, the Law School took advantage of the requirements and eventually proposed a new 
admissions policy.  The Texas Law School now has a policy that offers admission to the top 5 
percent of graduates at five specified colleges mainly located in southern Texas (U.S. 
Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  These colleges in southern Texas have 
large student populations representing Blacks and Mexican Americans. 
State of Washington’s Referendum (1998) 
 On November 13, 1998, the state of Washington introduced the Washington State Civil 
Rights Initiative, which is also known as Initiative 200, to voters.  The purpose of this 
referendum was to prohibit the use of race and ethnicity in deciding student admissions, 
employment, and contract awards.  Approximately, 64 percent of the voters were in favor of 
abolishing race-based affirmative action, 25 percent of the voters were against it, and 11 percent 
were undecided (www.adversity.net/i200, 2004).  Initiative 200 was written almost identical to 
California’s Proposition 209.  Washington’s Initiative stated in relevant part that: 
 BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON: 
(1) The State shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. 
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 (2) For the purposes of this section, “state” includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the 
state itself, any city, county, public college or university, community college, school 
district, special district, or other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality 
of or within the state (Washington State Civil Rights Initiative 200, 1998). 
Unlike Proposition 209, there has not been much written or debated on a national level 
regarding Initiative 200.  However, in 2001, there was at least one federal reverse discrimination 
case that relied on this state policy, which made it to Washington’s appellate court in the Ninth 
Circuit, and it will be discussed in detail below.  The case regarded a law school admissions 
policy at the University of Washington Law School.  Interestingly, after the voters passed 
Washington’s Initiative 200, the very low number of underrepresented minorities in the law 
school went from bad to worse.  For example in 1995, there were 7 Black, 19 Latino, and 10 
Native American law students enrolled in the University of Washington Law School (Moore, 
2005).  In 1999, the number of minorities decreased to two Black, four Latino, and five Native 
American law students.  These numbers fell even further in 2000 to one Black, one Native 
American and three Latino law students enrolled in the law school (Moore, 2005).   
Washington’s Governor wanted to take action to improve the declining number of 
minorities enrolled in the institutions of higher education.  In 2004, Democratic Governor Gary 
Locke proposed a bill to repeal portions of Initiative 200 in order to permit race, gender, and 
ethnicity to be considered in college and university admissions (Senate Bill 6268 and House Bill 
2700, 2004).  Because of the public animosity for racial quotas, there was not enough favorable 
support for the bill to succeed, particularly in an election year (Trick, 2004).  Today, Initiative 
200 remains in effect. 
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State of Florida’s Executive Order (1999) 
In 1999, Ward Connerly, the mastermind behind the Proposition 209 referendum in 
California, was preparing a similar anti-affirmative action campaign in Florida (Horn & Flores, 
2003).  Florida’s Governor, Jeb Bush, beat Ward Connerly to the punch and implemented 
Executive Order 99-281 entitled “One Florida.”  On November 9, 1999, the One Florida 
Initiative eradicated the use of race- and gender-conscious decisions in higher education, 
government employment, and state contracting, which would go into effect in 2000.  Race-
conscious decisions, however, were still permissible in awarding scholarships, developing pre-
college summer programs, and conducting outreach with students (Executive Order 99-281).  
Governor Jeb Bush exclaimed, “With my One Florida Initiative, we can increase opportunity and 
diversity in the state’s universities and in state contracting without using policies that 
discriminate, or that pit one racial group against another” (One Florida, 1999).  Florida became 
the first state where a government official ended its affirmative action policies (Horn & Flores, 
2003). 
In addition, under the One Florida plan, Governor Bush offered a race-neutral alternative 
very similar to Texas’ class ranking approach, which is called the Talented 20 program.  This 
plan guarantees that the top 20 percent of all public high school seniors will be admitted to the 
state university system.  The rankings are determined after the senior’s seventh semester (first 
semester of senior year), but the student must prove that he remains in the top 20 percent after he 
has completed the eighth semester.  In addition to the class ranking’s approach, the state of 
Florida also requires that the students complete 19 credits of college preparatory programs.  
Additionally, the students must take the SAT or ACT, even though there is no minimum score 
requirement (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  
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Unlike the state of Texas’ plan, the Florida plan does not unconditionally guarantee 
admission into one of the state institutions of higher education.  After an applicant is admitted 
into the state system based on his ranking, he must still compete to earn a spot in the university 
that he chooses (U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  Although the 
plan does not specifically articulate how the students must compete, it is likely the competition is 
primarily based on standardized test scores, actual GPA scores, and the number and level of 
difficulty of college preparatory courses.  Given the competitive nature of the Talented 20 
program, the state of Florida has entered into several partnerships and offers financial incentives 
designed to help students from low-performing schools prepare for college (U.S. Department of 
Education, Office for Civil Rights, 2003).  Students in the Talented 20 are given priority to 
receive need-based financial assistance grants from the state.   
Like California, Texas, and Washington, Florida’s state law schools have seen a change 
in enrollment for underrepresented racial minorities since the state ban on affirmative action.  In 
1999, prior to the introduction of the One Florida initiative, there were 80 African Americans, 
108 Latinos, and 17 Native American students admitted to the flagship campus of the University 
of Florida Law School.  In 2001, however, after the full implementation of One Florida, there 
were 62 African Americans, 72 Latinos, and 3 Native Americans admitted to the law school.  
Between 1999 and 2002, the University of Florida Law School experienced a 27 percent decline 
in African Americans and a 37 percent decline in Latino law school students enrolled in the law 
school (Moore, 2005).  Governor Jeb Bush’s response to the lower number of minorities was that 
“we’ve got enough lawyers; the problem is we don’t have enough in 2001” (Moore, 2005, p. 58).  
In other words, even though there were fewer lawyers entering the legal profession in 2001, the 
state of Florida did not need anymore minority lawyers to fill those positions. 
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California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s I-200, and One Florida maintain their vigor 
for many reasons.  Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the power of one man and his 
organization that is backed by conservative and wealthy Whites.  Ward Connerly, a Black man, 
founded a non-profit civil rights organization in Sacramento, California called the American 
Civil Rights Initiative (ACRI) in 1996, around the time of the passage of Proposition 209.  
ACRI’s purpose is to educate the national public about racial and gender preferences, assist 
federal representatives with public education on the issue, and monitor the implementation and 
legal action on California’s Proposition 209, Washington’s I-200, and One Florida (ACRI, 
2007).  Ward Connerly and ACRI continue to lead the national anti-affirmative action movement 
in the 21st century by infiltrating other states with anti-affirmative action referenda and 
influencing national policy.  One Black journalist has argued that “Ward Connerly and his rich 
White benefactors want to erase Black people from the official American map” (Black 
Commentator, 2004).  Given the support for anti-affirmative action policies and referenda as 
well as the declining number of underrepresented minorities in higher education and law schools, 
this journalist may be on to something real and unfortunately true. 
4.1.3 The 2000s – Revisiting Bakke as the Legal Debate Intensifies 
Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, et al. (2000) 
The facts and claims in this case were reminiscent of the DeFunis lawsuit against the University 
of Washington Law School.  Unlike DeFunis, the present case did not make it to the United 
States Supreme Court, but it did make it to the appellate level at the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Smith case is important because both the district court and the 
appellate court revisited the Bakke holding and its precedential value.   
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In this present case, Katuria Smith, the lead plaintiff-appellent, along with Angela Rock 
and Michael Pyle, brought the reverse discrimination lawsuit against the University of 
Washington Law School and members of the administration and faculty on behalf of themselves 
and a class of White applicants who were denied admission to the Law School.  Smith claimed 
that racial and ethnic minorities were admitted to the Law School instead of the plaintiff-
appellents and considering race in the admissions process violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.  The Law School argued two 
crucial points: (1) Smith’s individual and class action claims were moot because the passage of 
Washington’s Initiative 200 prohibited the law school from using race-conscious admissions 
policy; and (2) according to Bakke, the Law School was permitted to have an admissions policy 
that promoted educational diversity, but in this case, the Law School did not use race as a factor 
to achieve diversity (Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, 2000).  Rather, the 
Law School defined diversity in other ways, such as considering applicants who spoke a foreign 
language, previously lived in a foreign country, overcame adversity or social hardships, had an 
interesting employment history, career goals, special talents, or had unique life experiences. The 
lower court agreed with the Law School and decided that the plaintiff-appellees’ individual and 
class action claims were moot because the passage of Washington’s Initiative 200 prohibited the 
law school from using race-conscious admissions policy.  In spite of Initiative 200, the lower 
court also determined that educational diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets 
the strict scrutiny standard and race may be considered to achieve such diversity (Smith, et al. v. 
University of Washington Law School, 2000).  The plaintiff-appellents appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion regarding the use of race and 
ethnicity to achieve educational diversity as a compelling state interest.  The Ninth Circuit found 
it necessary to reiterate the Bakke holding, which permitted using race as one of many factors in 
admissions decisions in order to obtain a diverse student body.  Although the Bakke decision had 
been unpopular and the Supreme Court later opposed race-based factors in employment cases, 
unless there were specific remedial purposes, such as eliminating the present effects of 
discrimination, the Ninth Circuit noted that Bakke was still the controlling precedence when it 
came to university admissions policies (Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, 
2000).  The Smith court realized it did not have the legal right to overturn the highest court 
decision regarding higher education admissions policy that was still binding on lower courts.  
The court opined that according to Bakke, the “Fourteenth Amendment permits University 
admissions programs which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-
conscious measures” (Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, 2000, p. 1201).  
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Law 
School was bound by Initiative 200, the Smith court would not assume that the Law School’s 
facially nondiscriminatory policy that promoted diversity was really a cover for a racial quota 
system, especially in light of Bakke.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the University of 
Washington Law School’s admissions policy was constitutional (Smith, et al. v. University of 
Washington Law School, 2000). 
Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al. (2001) 
 Unlike the Smith case that highlighted the importance of lower courts respecting the 
binding precedence of the Bakke decision, this current legal case renewed some of the court’s 
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disdain for the Supreme Court’s determination that a racially diverse student body is a 
compelling state interest.  In Johnson, et al. (2001), three White females were the lead plaintiffs 
who sued the University of Georgia (UGA) on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated 
White females who were denied admission to UGA.  The Johnson plaintiffs challenged UGA’s 
freshman admissions policy due to the preferential treatment given to non-White applicants and 
males in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  UGA admitted to awarding a fixed number of 
bonus points to non-White applicants and males; therefore, the district court found that UGA’s 
admissions policy was unconstitutional.  The district court held that a diverse student body was 
not a compelling interest sufficient to withstand the strict scrutiny standard (Johnson, et al. v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al., 2001).   
Because of the Bakke holding, UGA appealed the district court’s decision with regards to 
the issue of considering race in the freshman admissions process.  UGA argued that it did not 
unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race because the freshman admissions policy was 
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest of achieving a racially diverse student 
body (Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al., 2001). 12  On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with UGA’s claims 
and upheld the district court’s ruling that the University’s freshman admissions policy was 
unconstitutional.  The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that UGA’s admissions policy was 
unconstitutional because even if the court assumed that diversity was a compelling state interest 
                                                 
12 During its first 160 years, UGA did not admit African Americans.  As previously mentioned in this document, 
UGA admitted only two Black students when it was court ordered to do so in 1961, immediately after President 
Kennedy issued an executive order to eradicate racial discrimination (see page 48).   From 1970 to 1989, UGA was 
mandated by OCR to desegregate the University and to adopt necessary affirmative action programs to alleviate the 
vestiges of past discrimination.  In March 1989, OCR informed UGA that it had complied with the prescribed 
remedial measures and was now incompliance with Title VI, but UGA was required to maintain compliance 
(Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al., 2001). 
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as articulated in Bakke, UGA’s policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve this interest.  The 
Johnson court concluded that UGA’s policy failed strict scrutiny because it mechanically 
awarded arbitrary diversity points to each and every non-White applicant as a decisive stage in 
the admissions process and severely limited the other factors as relevant for diversity purposes 
(Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al., 2001). 
 Before discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s rationale for its decision, it is necessary to 
outline some of UGA’s admission policy that is in dispute, especially since race was only one of 
many factors that were assigned bonus points during the admissions process.  Many of these 
other factors held more weight and received more points towards admissions.  As part of the 
admissions policy, applicants were placed into a pool for further review if they had a certain 
score that was based strictly on the applicant’s combined SAT score and GPA.  At this stage, 
UGA then calculated a Total Student Index (TSI) for each applicant, in which each potential 
student would earn additional points based on 12 factors for the chance to gain admission.  The 
additional points available to applicants were based on the following: (1) 67 percent (5.40 points) 
of the maximum points available were based on the actual SAT score, GPA, and curriculum 
quality; (2) 18 percent (1.5 points) were based on the student’s parent or sibling ties to UGA, 
extracurricular activities, summer work, and whether the applicant would be a first-generation 
college student; and (3) 15 percent (1.25 points) were based on demographic factors, such as 
race/ethnicity, gender, and Georgia residency.  Specifically, applicants could receive 0.5 
additional points if they defined themselves on the application as Asian/Pacific Islander, Black, 
Hispanic, American Indian, or Multiracial, 0.25 points for being male, and 1.0 additional point 
for an SAT score between 1200 and 1660 (Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Georgia, et al., 2001).   
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 In its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit first mentioned that the United States Supreme Court 
still needed to determine whether student body diversity was a compelling state interest and 
whether race could be considered to achieve this diversity.  According to the Eleventh Circuit, 
the Supreme Court had not made this determination in Bakke, because the majority of the Court 
did not agree on this point.  Therefore, the Johnson court chose to follow the factors set forth in 
the 1987 United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Paradise, which was an 
employment case where the affirmative action plan at issue was designed to remediate past 
discrimination.  In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit customized the Paradise factors to evaluate 
UGA’s admissions policy, which allegedly served a compelling interest in achieving a diverse 
student body (Johnson, et al., 2001).  The Paradise factors used to examine UGA’s policy were:  
(1) whether the policy used race in a rigid or mechanical way that did not take sufficient account 
of the different contributions to diversity that individual candidates may offer; (2) whether the 
policy fully and fairly took account of race-neutral factors which may have contributed to a 
diverse student body; (3) whether the policy gave an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to 
members of the favored racial groups; and (4) whether the school had genuinely considered, and 
rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for creating student body diversity (Johnson, et 
al. v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al., 2001, p. 1253).   
After carefully reviewing UGA’s freshman admissions policy under these factors, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the policy lacked flexibility by mechanically and inexorably 
awarding arbitrary points to non-White applicants (Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Georgia, et al., 2001).  The Johnson court determined that out of all the factors 
considered during the critical TSI stage, race and first-generation college factors were the only 
factors that meaningfully captured characteristics of diversity.  Accordingly, the set amount of 
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bonus points given to minority students because of race in order to achieve a diverse student 
body was to the detriment of mainstream White applicants who could not obtain a similar 
number of diversity points.  Moreover, there was no evidence that UGA would ever end the 
practice of mechanically awarding points based on race, even though it was no longer federally 
mandated to correct past discriminatory practices (Johnson, et al. v. Board of Regents of the 
University of Georgia, et al., 2001).  Thus, UGA’s policy was unconstitutional because it was 
not narrowly tailored to fulfill the strict scrutiny requirements. 
The Johnson court’s holding and rationale for finding the UGA freshman admissions 
policy to be unconstitutional was surprising for several reasons but not shocking given the earlier 
federal race-based admissions cases.  First, the court did not consider UGA’s long and recent 
history of intentionally committing racial discrimination and the fact that the student body 
remained primarily White to be an important detail.  In fact, UGA was ordered by the OCR to 
implement affirmative action measures to ameliorate the vestiges of discrimination, and it took 
almost 20 years before the federal government found the measures to be sufficient.  Even then, 
UGA was still responsible for maintaining some level of racial parity within its student body, 
which the freshman admissions policy was helping to do.   
Second, UGA applicants had to make it through the first stage of the admissions process, 
which was clearly a race-neutral evaluation since only test scores and grades were considered, 
before making it to the TSI stage where race was just one of many factors given points.  When 
applicants reached the TSI level, they received more bonus points for non-racial characteristics 
that likely benefited more White applicants, such as SAT scores, GPA, curriculum quality 
(which is usually measured by the number of AP and honors courses taken during high school), 
and being a child or sibling of a UGA graduate.  Third, the Johnson court refused to deem the 
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other TSI factors as personal features of an individual that contribute to a diverse student body.  
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s long 36-page opinion was written in a way that primarily 
discounted the Bakke holding and analysis as binding precedence.  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion appeared in search of any other alternative affirmative action case that could supply a 
reasonable argument to invalidate UGA’s policy.  The Johnson court criticized Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke for not being supported by the majority of the Supreme Court.  However, in 
Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit relied on factors explained in a Supreme Court affirmative action 
employment case that was decided by plurality opinion,13and not by an opinion agreed upon by 
the majority of the Court.  Furthermore, at the time of the Johnson case, the factors relied upon 
by the Eleventh Circuit had only been adopted by one other federal appellate court.  In other 
words, the Johnson court seemed determined to find any reason to nullify UGA’s admissions 
policy regardless of legal precedence.  One other vital point about the Johnson opinion was that 
the long diatribe about the problems with the Bakke holding and whether a diverse student body 
was a compelling state interest was further proof that the issue had ripened and was in need of 
immediate attention from the highest court.  The Bakke decision was about to be revisited in time 
enough to add more confusion and controversy to the already explosive race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate. 
Gratz, et al. v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) 
In 2003, about 25 years after Bakke, the U.S. Supreme Court again confronted the legality 
of the use of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education with the cases of Gratz, et 
al. v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.  Both of these cases originated at the University of 
Michigan: one from the undergraduate school and the other from the law school.  These lawsuits 
                                                 
13 A plurality opinion means that more Supreme Court Justices joined one concurring opinion over other opinions, 
but a majority of the Justices did not join one particular opinion. 
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have become known simply as “the Michigan cases” due to the unrelenting and polarizing 
conversations that have resulted from the cases, especially with regards to the utility of race-
conscious affirmative action policies in higher education during this century.  The Bush 
Administration even submitted an Amicus Curiae, which means “friend of the Court” Brief to 
the Supreme Court in support of the petitioner-students’ arguments that race-based affirmative 
action in school admissions should be illegal.   
The Gratz case was a class action suit involving a White man and a White woman, both 
Michigan residents, who wanted to be admitted into the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
program.  The White woman, Jennifer Gratz, was the lead plaintiff-petitioner.  A White woman 
from Michigan, Barbara Grutter, was the sole petitioner in the University of Michigan Law 
School case.  The petitioners in both lawsuits alleged that the University of Michigan’s 
admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  All parties sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages.  In the analysis in Gratz and 
Grutter, the Court followed the precedence established in Bakke as well as subsequent 
affirmative action cases but reached different decisions in each case.   
In Gratz (2003), the Supreme Court found that the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate freshman admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state interest in diversity; thus, the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  The Court’s holding was based on the fact that 
underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities were automatically awarded 20 points out of the 
150 needed for undergraduate admission without assessing each applicant’s individual qualities 
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(Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003).  In opposition to the University of Michigan’s admission policies, 
President George W. Bush asserted that: 
The Michigan policies amount to a quota system that unfairly rewards or penalizes 
perspective students, based solely on their race….Our Constitution makes it clear that 
people of all races must be treated equally under the law.  Yet we know that our society 
has not fully achieved that ideal.  Racial prejudice is reality in America….Yet quota 
systems that use race to include or exclude people from higher education and the 
opportunities it offers are divisive, unfair and impossible to square with the Constitution 
(Remarks by President Bush, Press Release, January 15, 2003).   
The Supreme Court concluded that giving 20 points to underrepresented minorities was 
equivalent to a quota system and illegal, yet the Court and President Bush did not consider the 
points that other potential undergraduate students received.  For instance, an applicant could be 
awarded points for the following: (1) up to 16 points for being a Michigan resident and living in 
a county that was underrepresented in the university, usually the northern part of the state that 
has a large lower-class White population; (2) 12 points for receiving a perfect SAT score; (3) 4 
points if an applicant’s parents graduated from the university; (4) up to 8 points for the difficulty 
of the high school curriculum and whether the student took AP courses; and (5) up to 10 points 
based on the quality of a potential student’s high school (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003; Solorzano & 
Ornelas, 2004).  All potential undergraduate students are capable of receiving these points if they 
qualify, but education researchers have shown that typically White students benefit from this 
point system and gain entrance to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate program (See 
Bell, 2004; Solorzano & Ornelas, 2004).  Supporters of affirmative action questioned the points 
automatically awarded to many White applicants to the exclusion of Blacks and other racial 
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minorities who were not privileged enough to have the same advantages to earn such points.  
This type of preferential treatment in favor of White applicants, many of whom may have an 
economic advantage, is not considered problematic to the Supreme Court or President George 
W. Bush.   
Concurrently, the Supreme Court decided the other Michigan case - Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003).  The University of Michigan Law School receives more than 3,500 applications each 
year for a first-year class of 350 students (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  The Law School 
contended that it looks for individuals with “substantial promise for success in law school” and 
“a strong likelihood of succeeding in the practice of law and contributing in diverse ways to the 
well-being of others” (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, pp. 313-14).  Further, the Law School was in 
search of “a mix of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and 
learn from each other” (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 314).  During the admissions process, the 
University of Michigan Law School considered applicants’ LSAT scores, undergraduate GPAs 
as well as soft variables, such as the quality of the undergraduate institution, the applicant’s 
essay, the difficulty of undergraduate course selection, and the enthusiasm of the recommenders.  
The Law School averred that it contemplated all types of diversity contributions without giving 
significant weight to one type over the other, but the Law School was committed to racial and 
ethnic diversity.  The Law School strived to admit a critical mass of racial and ethnic minorities 
to add to the diverse student body (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003). 
The Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling 
state interest in attaining a diverse student body, and the admissions policy’s use of race was 
narrowly tailored to further that interest (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  The Law School’s policy 
of seeking to enroll a critical mass of minority students did not violate the Equal Protection 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act since it engaged in a 
highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file.  Furthermore, the Law School 
considered all pertinent elements of diversity and used race only as a “plus” factor, as set forth in 
Bakke, which did not unduly harm or exclude non-minorities from all consideration.  Justice 
O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in the Grutter case, in which she made some noteworthy 
observations and suggestions.  Justice O’Connor aptly mentioned that “[U]niversities, and in 
particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders” 
(Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 332).  Additionally, Justice O’Connor stated, “Individuals with 
law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United 
States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives” 
(Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 332).  For instance, as of the year 2000, 23 of 50 governors, 52 of 
100 senators, 159 of 435 congressional representatives, and 26 of 43 presidents had attended law 
school, which shows that the United States is being governed by many law school graduates 
(LSAC, 2002; Moore, 2005).  Most of these law school graduates and national leaders are White 
Americans, not people of color.  
Like Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, Justice O’Connor rejected the use of race-
conscious affirmative action policies to rectify past societal discrimination but embraced the 
diversity argument.  Justice O’Connor, however, went a step farther and required that all race-
conscious admissions policies have a logical end point of preferably 25 years or less (Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2003).  The other Supreme Court Justices did not attempt to define diversity or the 
educational benefits of diversity, but the majority of the Justices agreed that race-conscious 
policies needed to end very soon.  Only two Justices agreed that racism is still alive in this 
country, and that many schools in predominantly minority communities lag far behind in 
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achievement levels and educational resources; however, they hope optimistically that within the 
next generation it will be safe to end affirmative action (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).  This raises 
an intriguing question, “When half a century was not enough to desegregate the schools and a 
century of so-called freedom did not provide equity for slaves, can we now expect just 25 years 
to end the need for affirmative action?” (Moore, 2005, p. 154). 
 In response to the first research question, the evolution of federal race-conscious 
affirmative action legal cases in higher education and anti-affirmative action policies over the 
past 40 years has revealed a constant increase in legal claims, the number of plaintiffs, and 
contempt for any use of race in admissions.  For instance, in the earlier cases of the 1970s, each 
of the two Supreme Court cases involved one White male bringing traditional individual 
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Both young men in DeFunis and Bakke simply sought admittance into 
the institution of higher education that they were suing through mandatory injunctions.   
From the 1990s and forward, the reverse discrimination lawsuits and state anti-
affirmative action policies occurred more often and in a steady fashion.  From 1994 to 2003, 
federal legal cases and anti-affirmative action referenda and policies arose every one or two 
years.  Additionally, the typical reverse discrimination complaint and request for an injunction 
that was present in the 1970s cases soon were replaced with complicated lawsuits concerning 
multiple plaintiffs and criminalizing claims.  Specifically, the 1990s and 2000s consisted of class 
action lawsuits, primarily lead by White women, as well as state action claims, which are more 
criminal-like claims, and requests for punitive damages to punish the universities for having 
race-based policies in place.  Furthermore, the late 1990s and 2000s took dislike for race-
conscious affirmative action policies to another level when entire states moved to eliminate all 
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types of affirmative action policies and programs, with the focus being on ending racial quotas.  
Not surprisingly, the evolution of the legal debates showed some consistency in most of the 
cases, which was the familiar plaintiff argument that higher education admissions decisions 
should concentrate on test scores and ignore the Bakke holding that permits race to be used as a 
“plus” factor in the admissions process. 
4.1.4 Analyzing the Legal Debate from a Critical Race Theory (CRT) Perspective 
This section of the chapter now analyzes the evolution of the legal debate under the critical race 
theory (CRT) framework.  Specifically, the researcher’s examination of the legal debate is 
guided by CRT constructs of interest convergence theory and the property functions of 
whiteness.  Before analyzing the development of the legal debate according to the CRT 
constructs, it is imperative first to acknowledge that the majority of race-sensitive affirmative 
action legal cases in higher education stemmed from professional degree programs, namely law 
schools.  Specifically, out of the eight cases evaluated in this chapter, five of the cases, DeFunis, 
et al. v. Odegaard, et al., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Hopwood v. Texas, 
Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, and Grutter v. Bollinger, involved 
professional programs.  Out of those five legal cases, all but Bakke were entirely based on the 
constitutionality of law school admissions policies.  From the early race-based cases in the 1930s 
through the 1950s, law school admissions is the most heavily contested higher education 
program when it comes to race-sensitive affirmative action policies. 
The 1970s - Legal Cases and the Interest Convergence Theory 
In 1974, the DeFunis legal case, which was the first of two race-conscious affirmative 
action admissions cases to reach the United States Supreme Court in the 1970s, reflected the first 
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prong of Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory.  As previously mentioned, Bell (1980) 
defines interest convergence as the temporary alignment of the self-interest of elite Whites and 
the interest of Blacks, which creates an illusion that Black people are receiving a great benefit.  
The DeFunis case came at a time in the early 1970s when Blacks’ and Whites’ interests had 
converged and all racial groups appeared to have equal rights and opportunities.  During this 
time in history, there was an interest convergence because of society’s militancy concerning 
equal rights for minority groups and the insistence of the United States’ withdrawal from the 
Vietnam conflict.  The societal cataclysm remained at an all time high in the early 1970s.  Elite 
Whites, particularly lawmakers, had to be cautious about what laws were passed, enforced, and 
interpreted by the courts in this country to maintain a semblance of peace and order in the 
world’s Super Power known as the United States of America.  While the United States Supreme 
Court is not the lawmaker, it is the interpreter of the laws enacted, and the Justices who serve on 
the highest court are appointed and approved by the political party in power.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court is the interpreting legal arm that often times gets caught in the political quagmire and has 
to play political games.  Therefore, the DeFunis holding and rationale depicted an alignment of 
common interests between racial groups. 
Recall that Mr. DeFunis initiated his case as one White male bringing a reverse 
discrimination claim against a lower profile law school on behalf of himself and his family under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Mr. DeFunis requested mandatory injunctive relief for the 
University of Washington Law School to abolish its separate race-based admissions policy that 
favored racial and ethnic minorities and to admit him into the Law School.  Although there were 
more non-minorities with lower scores that were selected for admission, Mr. DeFunis did not 
have an issue with their acceptance into the Law School.  The Supreme Court considered Mr. 
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DeFunis’ claims to be moot because it was not the time to address the constitutional merits of 
reverse race discrimination case on behalf of a disgruntled White male when national peace as 
well as race and gender equality had not been achieved.  After all, it was barely a decade after 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   
Although the case was moot, Supreme Court Justice Douglas found it necessary to make 
some powerful and liberal remarks that would be looked upon favorably by many disadvantaged 
minority groups.  First, Justice Douglas commended the University of Washington Law School 
for considering other qualifications in its admissions process.  Justice Douglas expressed concern 
that law schools rely too heavily on the LSAT as a determining factor for law school admissions 
when the test is racially and culturally biased and works against disenfranchised racial 
minorities, especially Black people.  He noted that there are so many other admirable factors, 
such as perseverance, commitment, and resilience that can be translated into leadership skills and 
academic success.  Additionally, the Justice also commented that institutions of higher education 
should have the latitude to structure their admissions process as they see fit, so long as they are 
not blatantly discriminatory, since university faculty are the experts at crafting a capable student 
body.  In this case, Justice Douglas did not deem the University of Washington Law School’s 
separate admissions programs to be unconstitutional given the United States’ history of slavery 
and racism.  Finally, Supreme Court Justice Douglas warned that the relics of slavery could be 
found in the continual stalled progress of Black people and the arrogance of White people like 
Mr. DeFunis who consider themselves superior and entitled to his life choices over Blacks.   
Simply put, at the time of the DeFunis case, many political and social issues were in sync 
amongst racial and ethnic groups.  Interests had converged amongst racial groups, so the 
existence of race-sensitive affirmative action policies and programs were acceptable.  
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s decision, or lack thereof, in DeFunis was a prime opportunity 
for the Court to avoid making a binding legal decision that would potentially enrage both Black 
and White people, especially White women who were also benefiting from affirmative action 
policies and programs.  Rather, the DeFunis Court was able to show its support for the plight of 
disadvantaged minority groups.  More race-based affirmative action policies and programs were 
being created due to the United States Supreme Court’s legal reasoning articulated in DeFunis.  
When the Bakke case was decided, however, the second rule of interest convergence 
theory was activated.  Bell’s second rule states that “even when the interest-convergence results 
in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the point that policymakers fear 
the remedial policy is threatening the superior societal status of whites” (Bell, 2004, p. 69).  In 
1978, the Bakke reverse discrimination case was the first time the United States Supreme Court 
fully addressed the constitutional merits of race-based affirmative action admissions policies in 
higher education.  It was also a time in history when more racial groups, particularly Blacks, 
were realizing some prosperity.  For instance, the rate of Black high school graduates attending 
college rose from about 39 percent in 1973 to approximately 48 percent in 1977, which was 
almost equal to White high school graduates (Jaynes & Williams, 1989).  Furthermore, there 
were more Blacks in higher income brackets as well as in graduate and professional programs, 
and more specialized occupations like business, medicine, and law.  In 1979, about 10.7 percent 
of Black men and 14.8 percent of Black women who were working were employed in 
professional careers, such as business, medicine, and law (Jaynes & Williams, 1989).  These 
percentages represented a noticeable increase when compared to 1969, when only 7.8 percent of 
Black men and 10.8 percent of Black women were employed in professional careers (Jaynes & 
Williams, 1989).  By the early 1980s, Black men between the ages of 25 to 34 with at least some 
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college education earned 80 to 85 percent as much as their White counterparts (Jaynes & 
Williams, 1989).  With these kinds of statistics, White America was probably ready for race-
based affirmative action remediation to come to a close. 
In Bakke, Allan Bakke had been denied admission to a University of California Medical 
School for two consecutive years.  He claimed that reserved seats for racial and ethnic minorities 
as part of the Medical School’s special admissions program was discrimination.  Mr. Bakke 
argued that the special admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Bakke case 
represented the first time that the Civil Rights Act was being used to hamper racial minorities’ 
progress rather than help progress.  Like DeFunis, Mr. Bakke was just one White male bringing 
the lawsuit on behalf of himself, as opposed to a group of White individuals in a class action.  
Mr. Bakke was seeking injunctive relief and demanding admittance into the Medical School.   
The majority of the Supreme Court Justices agreed with Bakke and determined that the 
Medical School’s special admissions program that reserved a specified number of spaces for 
racial minorities was an unconstitutional quota system in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court’s Justices could not agree on the reasons why the policy was 
unconstitutional or whether it was illegal under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, but the Bakke 
holding was setting the stage for abolishing future race-conscious admissions programs.  The 
Court straddled the fence with this decision and rationale by shutting down the Medical School’s 
policy as unconstitutional on one hand.  On the other hand, the Court left the door open for other 
public institutions to consider race as a “plus” factor in the admissions process in order to 
achieve a diverse student body as a compelling state interest.  The Supreme Court did not agree 
on this point, offering no legal guidance on how to make race a factor in admissions programs, 
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but Justice Powell clearly stated that societal discrimination was not a valid justification for such 
programs.  The Bakke case left dangling the future of race-sensitive admissions policies and 
programs in higher education and disconnected the converging interests between Blacks and 
Whites that were temporarily aligned in the mid-1960s and early 1970s.   
The disconnection of interests became clearer during the 1980s.  The Supreme Court’s 
decisions in the 1980s concerning race-conscious affirmative action employment policies were 
very critical of and opposed to race-based affirmative action, except in very limited 
circumstances.  This attitude carried over to the higher education legal cases and anti-affirmative 
action policies of the 1990s in order to regain the privileges that Whites had enjoyed for so long. 
The 1990s and 2000s - Anti-Affirmative Action Legal Cases, Policies, and the Property 
Functions of Whiteness 
 The 1990s and 2000s have been busy times for debating the constitutionality of race-
conscious affirmative action.  As white privilege in America’s elite and prestigious universities 
are threatened by the increasing number of racial and ethnic minorities, the number of reverse 
discrimination legal cases and the amount of plaintiffs continue to grow.  Furthermore, anti-
affirmative action policies and legislation in several different states were introduced in the late 
1990s, which also seemed to be in response to myriad angry and frustrated Whites who were 
losing prime employment and college admission opportunities to racial minorities.   
Unlike the legal cases of the 1970s, in which individual White males were the plaintiffs, 
the legal cases of the 1990s, and even now, welcome groups of White plaintiffs in the form of 
class action lawsuits.  The Podberesky case was one of the first reverse discrimination legal cases 
of the 1990s, and it also was an outlier from the later cases.  Podberesky was a Hispanic plaintiff, 
and the legal issues focused on the constitutionality of a college scholarship program that was 
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exclusively for Blacks.  Nevertheless, the Podberesky case showed that even Hispanics, another 
disadvantaged racial minority group, have little regard for African Americans receiving 
educational access and financial opportunities from institutions of higher education that have 
intentionally excluded Blacks for hundreds of years.  Additionally, in the 1990s and currently, 
more White females are plaintiffs criticizing the use of race-conscious affirmative action policies 
and programs, which is ironic since White females have been the main beneficiaries of 
affirmative action since the 1970s.  It appears as though affirmative action policies that promote 
gender discrimination are acceptable so long as they are to the advantage of White women, but 
any type of race-based policy is unthinkable.  Legal scholar Cheryl Harris would explain this 
phenomenon as part of the property functions of whiteness. 
When explaining the property functions of whiteness, Cheryl Harris (1993) noted that the 
critical characteristics of white privilege are displayed by the fact that White people can use the 
law to establish and protect an actual property interest in whiteness, as illustrated in the legal 
legacy of slaves as property and the seizure of land from Native Americans.  According to Harris 
(1993), the “property functions of whiteness,” are: (1) the right of disposition, (2) the right to use 
and enjoyment, (3) reputation and status property, and (4) the right to exclude.  Ladson-Billings 
and Tate (1995) expanded the property functions of whiteness to analyze how poor and minority 
students are denied access to certain types of learning and educational experiences in 
Kindergarten through 12th grade.  These education researchers created a critical race theoretical 
approach to education that examines the intersection of race and social class, since according to 
them, society is based on class, which translates into property rights rather than human rights 
(Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  Ladson-Billings & Tate (1995) utilize Harris’ property 
functions of whiteness to support the construct of how property rights relate to educational 
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inequality and inequity.   Specifically, they and other critical race theorists posit that the school 
curriculum is a form of intellectual property, and the quantity and quality of curriculum in 
schools is based on actual property values (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Lynn & Adams, 
2002).  Curriculum represents a form of intellectual property undergirded by the ownership of 
real property:  state-of-the-art technologies, well-prepared teachers, AP curricula, weighted AP 
grades, gifted or other sorts of honors programs all leading to admission to more elite colleges 
and better jobs (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Lynn & Adams, 2002).  This researcher is 
extending the property functions of whiteness to include how the law is used as a vehicle to deny 
racial minorities, particularly Blacks, access to higher education and law school, because Blacks 
lack the proper intellectual and economic property values.  
(1) The Right to Disposition 
The right to disposition describes property rights as alienable or transferable (Harris, 
1993).  In an educational setting, whiteness can be conferred as property when students conform 
to “white norms” through certain cultural practices such as dress, speech patterns, and 
unauthorized conceptions of knowledge (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  This particular 
property function of whiteness is almost always alienable for White students who may be better 
able to conform but may be inalienable to Black students who do not want to or know how to 
conform to the so-called White norms.  For instance, in the educational arena, high SAT scores 
and GPAs are a cultural practice for admissions in the majority of White universities.  Average 
and less than stellar standardized test scores and GPAs may be the most common inalienable and 
unattainable types of white property for Blacks.  For decades, standardized tests such as the 
SATs and LSATs have been viewed as racially and culturally biased, and Justice Douglas 
mentioned this fact in his opinion in the DeFunis case.  Because so many poor Black students, as 
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well as other racial minorities, do not have the resources or access to private schools, tutoring, 
advanced placement (AP) classes, or preparation courses to prepare for standardized tests, their 
scores may not be as high as White students who have those advantages.  Unfortunately, 
standardized test scores and GPAs are the primary criteria to determine a potential student’s 
qualifications for admission into institutions of higher education and where many racial minority 
students fall short.  High scores are a type of intellectual property that cannot be transferred or 
simply conferred on people; rather, they must be individually earned to get students from 
kindergarten through 12th grade to higher education.  Therefore, in order to keep certain racial 
groups out of higher education, the low test scores have become a mainstay of the legal 
arguments against any use of race in admissions decisions.  In other words, it is unconstitutional 
to allow unqualified (Black) applicants to be admitted over the more qualified (White) 
applicants.   
 (2) The Right to Use and Enjoyment 
According to Ladson-Billings and Tate (1995), White people have the right to use and 
enjoy the social, cultural, and economic privileges of whiteness.  In school, whiteness allows for 
extensive use of what certain schools have to offer or the type of privileges certain students have 
at these schools (Kozol, 1991; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  The right to use and enjoyment is 
reflected in legal cases like Gratz and Johnson, when the plaintiffs complained of the points 
assigned to racial minorities, but enjoyed the points that benefited them.   
In Gratz, 20 points were assigned to underrepresented racial minority applicants at the 
University of Michigan, and in Johnson, 0.5 arbitrary points were assigned to racial and ethnic 
minorities at the University of Georgia.  In both legal cases, there was no problem with the 
points assigned that chiefly benefited the White applicants.  In fact, in Johnson, all applicants 
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could earn far more additional points, besides a half point, for factors not specifically related to 
race, such as being a Georgia resident, hours worked at a summer job, hours spent in 
extracurricular activities, and one whole point for receiving a certain number on the SATs.  
Nevertheless, the Johnson court deemed the University of Georgia’s policy as unconstitutional 
because the half point awarded to racial and ethnic minorities was mechanical, arbitrary, and 
unfair to White applicants who could not earn those points.  Likewise, in Gratz, both the 
Supreme Court and President George W. Bush considered the 20 points assigned to racial 
minorities to be equivalent to a quota system and unconstitutional.  The almost 50 points 
assigned to the many White applicants for being a legacy, attending certain high schools in 
specified elite areas of Michigan, receiving a perfect SAT score, or having a set type and number 
of AP courses, however, are permitted under a White applicants’ right to use and enjoy the 
social, cultural, and economic privileges of whiteness.   
(3) Reputation and Status Property 
According to the property functions of whiteness, White people possess reputation and 
status property, in which to damage their reputation is to damage some aspect of their personal 
property (Harris, 1993; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  The recent and sudden move from the 
individual White plaintiff to class action lawsuits with multiple White plaintiffs is an example of 
a group banding together to reclaim their reputation and status, which is being damaged by the 
drops of colored blood.  This is reminiscent of the 1970s and 1980s occurrences of White flight, 
in which Whites fled the city to seek refuge and higher property values in the suburbs because 
too many Blacks and other racial minorities were moving into the once-influential urban areas.  
Today, elite and selective schools are living this phenomenon.  Prestigious universities like the 
University of Texas Law School, which has a history of racial exclusion, the University of 
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California’s system, and the University of Michigan have been infused with too many people of 
color, which may bring down the esteemed name and celebrated degree that comes from these 
schools.  Thus, groups of Whites have joined forces to maintain reputation and status property, as 
evidenced in recent legal cases and in state anti-affirmative action referenda and policies.   
Moreover, since Hopwood, other plaintiffs that followed in later reverse discrimination 
cases have demanded compensatory and punitive damages from schools that are trying to add 
racial and ethnic diversity to the student body.  Pursuing these kinds of damages are the same 
damages sought when a person’s reputation is damaged by libel or slander.  Thus, the current 
legal debate reflects groups of Whites fighting for their privileged reputation and against the 
tainting and belittling of White people’s elevated status with racial and ethnic diversity. 
(4) The Right to Exclude 
 The final aspect of the property functions of whiteness is the right to exclude.  Whiteness 
in this society is constructed by the complete absence of any contaminating influence of 
blackness, such as one drop of Black blood (Bell, 1980; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995).  In the 
school environment, the absolute right to exclude was initially demonstrated in slavery by 
denying Blacks access to any education.  Later, the right to exclude appeared in the Jim Crow 
laws created to maintain separate schools for Black and White children.  More recently, the right 
to exclude has presented itself in the actions taken to pass legislation abolishing race-based 
affirmative action in Florida as well as the anti-affirmative action referenda in California and 
Washington.  For example, in the 1996 vote on Proposition 209 in California, of those in favor of 
eliminating all race-based affirmative action policies, 63 percent were Whites, and 65 percent 
and 59 percent were in the higher income brackets of $60,000 to $74,000 and $75,000 or more, 
respectively.  The privileged Whites had voted to maintain power and to exclude racial 
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minorities from a real chance to compete equally for employment, higher education opportunities 
in the University of California system, the defendant-school in the Bakke case, and public 
contracts.  With the racial and economic disparity that already plagues the state of California’s 
public primary and secondary schools, in combination with the mandate of Proposition 209, 
many Blacks and Latinos will be ultimately excluded from most jobs and higher education 
institutions.   
Furthermore, California’s 4 Percent Plan, Texas’ 10 Percent Plan, and the 20 percent 
program under the One Florida Initiative are simply masks for exclusion.  Since these three states 
require that high school graduates who qualify under the plans have a certain number of college 
preparatory courses prior to entering the state universities, many racial and ethnic minorities may 
be excluded by the fact that their high schools do not offer college preparatory courses.  
Additionally, racial and ethnic minorities may not be able to afford to take such courses 
elsewhere.  Once again, there are certain types of knowledge that become necessary forms of 
intellectual property in order for students to make the transition from high school to higher 
education; however, some disadvantaged racial groups did not and will not have this knowledge, 
and will be left behind – utterly excluded.   
This is all quite similar to the old 1896 legal case of Plessy v. Ferguson when that 1/8th of 
Black blood contaminated Mr. Plessy’s whiteness.  That little bit of Black blood excluded Mr. 
Plessy from the all-White railway car because he lowered the status and reputation property with 
his blackness.  Of course, the Plessy case resulted in the Supreme Court’s legalization of the 
separate-but-equal doctrine.  The recent state anti-affirmative action referenda, legislative action, 
and policies are clear indications of the absolute right to exclude racial minorities and another 
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slap in the face to racial minorities who have endured years of legal discrimination and are still 
fighting to play catch up. 
Finally, the property function of whiteness that gives White people the absolute right to 
exclude is illustrated in the continual disrespect and denunciation of Bakke as binding precedent.  
Throughout the legal debates of the 1990s and 2000s, the Bakke holding, which announced that 
universities could consider race as a “plus” factor to achieve a diverse student body as a 
compelling government interest, has been ignored and censured.  Simply put, sharing classroom 
space with individuals who look different and are of a different race or ethnicity was not going to 
be permitted, except under very special and strict circumstances.  Fortunately, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grutter reminded the world that Bakke remained good law, despite the 
incoherent nature of the Bakke opinion.   
In Grutter, the Court even offered some clarification on how race could be used in an 
admissions process.  Justice O’Connor informed society that the University of Michigan Law 
School was in search of a mix of students from different backgrounds and experiences who could 
learn from each other.  While diverse experiences may be contributed in numerous ways and one 
way should not necessarily be given more significant weight, it is legal for a university, 
specifically a law school that generates many of the nation’s leaders, to be committed to racial 
and ethnic diversity.  Despite the Supreme Court’s opinion in favor of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s policy, Justice O’Connor mentioned a 25-year sunset period when race-
conscious affirmative action policies and programs should no longer be needed.  In other words, 
the Supreme Court has told us that time is ticking and the racial remedy in the form of 
affirmative action is soon coming to an end, especially with state bans on affirmative action 
lurking at voting booths during almost every major election year.   
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One wonders if a 25-year time limit to realize a level playing field between Whites and 
disadvantaged racial minorities can actually occur.  As minds wonder, the historical guide that 
society can consider and follow is that it took over 200 years to abolish the atrocities of legalized 
slavery.  It took another 100 years after slavery and Reconstruction to ameliorate all legalized 
racial segregation and discrimination; and now, here it is 43 years after the implementation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the first race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs.  
A level playing field still does not exist.  In fact, the playing field is smothered in inequality 
because of the different rules that apply to Blacks and Whites during the higher education 
admissions and legal processes.  In 2003, Justice O’Connor gave 25 more years for the viability 
of race-based affirmative action, which then will be about 65 years after the advent of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  Will 65 years of modest racial and economic progress, which has been 
consistently challenged since the 1970s throughout the race-conscious affirmative action legal 
debate, truly fulfill parity amongst the racial groups after over 300 years of lawful and intentional 
discrimination as well as racial and economic inequality?  Perhaps, Whites’ and Blacks’ interests 
will converge again, in which some benefits will inure to racial minorities, or maybe white 
privilege will finally win the legal fight and the battle against racial and economic equality and 
equity. 
This section of the Fourth Chapter addressed the second research question, which is: 
how, if at all, do the ongoing legal debates in higher education reflect the support for, or 
maintenance of, white privilege as defined by the interest convergence and whiteness as property 
constructs of critical race theory?  In summary, the interest-convergence period occurred in the 
early 1970s, which was on the heals of the passage of the Civil Rights Act and around the time of 
the DeFunis case.  This was a time when the needs and wants of Blacks and Whites, namely 
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policymakers, were very similar and in alignment.  Because of the new desire to achieve racial 
equality and end the United States’ part in the Vietnam Conflict, all parties were in favor of 
equity, peace, and harmony instead of societal rebellion, which led to a no contest opinion in 
DeFunis.   
However, a political and societal shift seemed to happen after Bakke in 1978 - more 
underrepresented minorities were prospering educationally and economically.  Additionally, a 
more conservative political party and Supreme Court emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Suddenly during this time, the Supreme Court implemented a more stringent strict scrutiny 
standard with regards to analyzing the use of racial classification in legal cases.  Thus, a surge of 
reverse discrimination cases in higher education flooded the legal system, and state anti-
affirmative action referenda and policies became commonplace.  As previously mentioned, the 
legal cases included, groups of White students, instead of individuals, as well as entire states of 
citizens, namely upper-middle class Republican White males, fighting for all race-based 
admissions policies to be abolished.  Although Ward Connerly, a Black man, is the ringleader of 
the state referenda, he has allowed himself and his organization to become a puppet to rich and 
conservative Whites who want to eradicate civil rights and all things resembling Black power 
and privilege, such as educational opportunity.  Nevertheless, these same people and the 
Supreme Court have no problem with admissions policies that give special consideration and 
points to legacies, students from certain elite schools, and students with a certain number of AP 
courses, all which benefit more White students than people of color.  Yes, white privilege seems 
alive and living in this ongoing legal debate through critical race theory as well as the property 
functions of whiteness - the right to disposition, right to use and enjoyment, status and reputation 
property, and the right to exclude.  
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5.0  FIFTH CHAPTER 
5.1 THE CLEO PROGRAM: THE FINDINGS 
This chapter explicates the development of the CLEO program during the growth of the legal 
debates surrounding race-based affirmative action from the 1970s through 2006.  The chapter 
presents findings on how the CLEO program has functioned in light of the specific legal cases 
and policies that were deconstructed and examined in Chapter Four.  Specifically, the findings in 
this chapter describe CLEO’s purpose, funding, summer institutes, the creation of new programs, 
and the demographic profiles of CLEO students (i.e., race/ethnicity, LSAT scores, and GPAs), 
all which may have been impacted by the analyses and outcomes in the legal cases and policies.  
As previously mentioned, the findings are both qualitative and quantitative.  These 
findings address the third research question, which asks, “How, if at all, is the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate in higher education related to the original intent, current 
operations, and the future viability of the CLEO program?”  This research question is answered 
based on the findings regarding CLEO’s purpose, funding, summer institutes, and the creation of 
new programs, which were primarily derived from the analysis of CLEO’s archival records, 
annual reports, and other documents.  The responses given by key CLEO informants were used 
as secondary data in order to bring clarity to the information found in the archival records and 
other documents. Furthermore, the findings from the demographic profiles of CLEO students, 
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which were a result of statistical analysis using ANOVA and Chi-Square, address the third 
research question.   
5.1.1 CLEO’s Operations: Then and Now 
As the political and legal questions about special admissions programs increased in the 1970s, 
the CLEO program was one of many higher education programs subjected to scrutiny.  The 
number of minority law applicants and law students was slowly starting to creep upwards in the 
1970s, with the number of students of color in law school reaching about 9,500 by 1976 from 
1,468 in 1970.  By 1977, the total number of students who successfully completed the CLEO 
summer institutes (fellows) was 2,337.  Nevertheless, the reverse discrimination lawsuits were 
starting to inundate the courts.  As previously mentioned, the first case reached the United States 
Supreme Court in 1974, which was the law school admissions case of DeFunis, et al. v. 
Odegaard, et al., and this occurred around the same time that CLEO began to have funding 
problems.  Coincidentally, Mr. DeFunis initiated his racial discrimination lawsuit in 1971, the 
school year after the University of Washington Law School hosted its first CLEO summer 
institutes, in which racial minorities were the primary beneficiaries of CLEO’s pre-law program.  
In fact, the director of the CLEO summer institute at the University of Washington Law School 
served on the school’s Admissions Committee and reviewed the applications of underrepresented 
minority students (DeFunis, et al. v. Odegaard, et al., 1974).  While DeFunis’ racial 
discrimination lawsuit progressed through the judicial system from 1971 until the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in 1974, the Law School hosted the CLEO summer institutes in both 
1973 and 1974.  The University of Washington Law School has not sponsored another summer 
institute program since 1974. 
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Since its inception, funding has been a constant issue for CLEO because it was primarily 
funded by federal agencies (Burns, 1975).  From 1968 to 1973, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) provided CLEO with most of its funding.  Due to legislative changes, 
however, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) became responsible for 
providing funding to CLEO through grant money after 1973 (Burns, 1975).  Federal funding 
covered the law school students’ stipends, the summer institutes, the CLEO office and staff, and 
the ABA’s administration services.  By the 1976-77 fiscal year, approximately two years after 
the DeFunis case, HEW experienced budget reductions and would not make any requests to 
Congress on CLEO’s behalf for the necessary funds to run the organization (Burns, 1975).  
Consequently, CLEO’s federal funding diminished significantly.  When HEW became the U.S. 
Department of Education in the late 1970s, however, CLEO received federal money authorized 
in Title XI of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and administered by the U.S. Department of 
Education.  According to CLEO’s Executive Director, this federal funding came through the 
Assistance for Training in the Legal Profession (ATLP) program and was generally less than $3 
million annually.  Therefore, CLEO began to rely on private donors, bar associations, and law 
schools in addition to the federal government for assistance with funding the summer institutes 
and providing financial assistance to CLEO fellows during the late 1970s through the early 
1990s.   
By 1990, the number of minority law students enrolled in law school was 17,330, or 13.6 
percent of the total number of law students.  During the same period, the number of minority 
lawyers was 56,39714, many of whom were CLEO fellows, but the number of minority lawyers 
still only represented 7.6 percent of the total number of lawyers in the country (American Bar 
                                                 
14 Minority includes African American, Hispanic/Latinos, Asian American, and Native Americans. 
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Association, 2004).  Furthermore, the number of Black and Latino students enrolled in law 
school hit their peak in 1994 with approximately 3,600 and 1177 students, respectively.  
Similarly, the number of law school enrollment for Native American students hit its peak during 
the 1995-96 school year with about 436 students (American Bar Association, 2000).   
While it seemed like CLEO was achieving its original purpose of helping to increase the 
number of minorities, with the focus being on Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans, in law 
school and the legal profession, maintaining adequate funding to run the summer institutes and 
assist minority law students was a problem.  Financial support from the federal government 
changed drastically in the 1990s, almost simultaneously with the lawsuits of Podberesky v. 
Kirwan (1994), Hopwood v. Texas, and the passage of Proposition 209 in California in 1996.  
CLEO’s 1998 annual report indicated that by 1994 the program was entering a financial crisis 
due to budget cuts.  Nineteen ninety-four was also one of the first years that CLEO revealed its 
new financial eligibility requirements.  Many potential minority law students did not apply for 
the summer institutes, because they now would have to pay to attend the institutes due to 
CLEO’s financial constraints.  According to CLEO’s 1995 annual report, CLEO had a budget 
that only included federal funding for the 1995-96 school year, and the CLEO staff was down to 
one employee – the Executive Director.  After 1995, CLEO completely loss the federal funding 
for its summer institutes and student stipends, the heart of the CLEO program, which also meant 
a potential decrease in the number of minority law students (CLEO Annual Report, 1998).  
When CLEO lost its federal funding, the Executive Director and the Board of Directors decided 
that since the organization could no longer rely on government dollars, they would need a plan to 
fund the summer institutes with private dollars.  In 1997 and 1998, CLEO’s sole financial 
resources to support the organization and manage the summer institutes and related programs 
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came from member law schools, student and application fees, legal associations, individuals, 
private donors, corporations, and law firms (See Table 4).  At that point, CLEO had to take a step 
back to review its purpose and whether it should continue in its pursuit to diversify the legal 
profession.     
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Table 4: CLEO’s Financial Statements for 1997 and 1998 
Revenues 1998 1997 
Membership Fees $318,400 $260,000 
Student and Other Fees $150,872 $110,500 
Corporations and Law Firms   $30,000   $81,650 
Individuals     $6,000     $4,400 
Law Related Associations   $58,400   $41,000 
Publications        $950     $1,400 
Other   $62,000           $0 
Total Revenue $626,622 $498,950 
 
Expenditures 1998 1997 
Program Services   
      Information Dissemination $61,257 $43,256 
      Program Development $75,489 $62,000 
      Program Support $10,297   $8,800 
      Scholarships   $4,300   $4,000 
      Summer Institutes              $373,043                 $222,636 
Support Services   
        General and Administrative $47,325  $26,143 
Total Expenses              $571,711                  $366,835 
Source: Council on Legal Education Opportunity, 2002-03 Annual Report. 
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5.1.1.1  CLEO’s Purpose, Funding, and Programs 
In response to the loss of federal funding, CLEO and its partners amended the By-laws, 
reworked the operation and funding of the summer institutes, modified the governing council 
structure, and designed the Thurgood Marshall Legal Educational Opportunity Program 
(hereinafter called “Thurgood Marshall Program”), which would be “a more comprehensive 
approach to achieving diversification of the legal profession” (CLEO Annual Report, 1998, p. 
10).  The Executive Director boasted that CLEO, with the help of its many partners in legal 
education, was successful in convincing the 105th Congress to incorporate the Thurgood 
Marshall Program into the Higher Education Act Amendments of 1998 (P.L. 105-244).  The 
Executive Director further noted that since 2001, the Thurgood Marshall Program has helped to 
expand CLEO to help college students become better law school applicants and has added 
academic and professional development programs for law students.  However, CLEO’s 
Associate Director mentioned that Congress permitted CLEO to administer the Thurgood 
Marshall Program but it had to be distinguished and kept separate from the CLEO program itself, 
which had been known for the summer institutes for minority students.  In other words, the 
Thurgood Marshall Program and all federal funding donated to that program could not benefit 
the summer institutes.   
The federal statute governing the Thurgood Marshall Program states that it is “designed 
to provide low-income, minority, or disadvantaged college students with information, 
preparation, and financial assistance to gain access to and complete law study” (emphasis added) 
(20 U.S.C. § 1136).  As such, CLEO’s By-laws were amended to focus on diversifying the legal 
community by helping members of educationally and economically disadvantaged groups or 
minorities; the statute does not specify any particular minority groups, in hopes of receiving 
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federal funds (CLEO By-laws, as amended, 1998; 2004).  According to the Executive Director, 
CLEO’s mission has not changed since 1968; however, CLEO has expanded its programs to 
serve today’s students better.  CLEO’s Chairman of the Board stated that, “This country is more 
racially and ethnically diverse.  It is not just Blacks and Whites, but Asians and Latinos are more 
omnipresent and want their piece of the pie [an opportunity to enter the legal profession].”  
CLEO’s Chairman also pointed out that in the beginning CLEO’s purpose as a program focused 
largely on race, mainly helping African Americans, but now CLEO is more diverse than it has 
ever been.  
Since the implementation of the Thurgood Marshall Program, CLEO now distinguishes 
between those students who are “fellows” and those who are “associates.”  Students who attend 
and complete the pre-law summer institute programs are categorized as “fellows,” and students 
who did not attend the summer institutes but are enrolled in law school and are educationally or 
economically disadvantaged students are categorized as “associates.”  According to the LSAC 
representative, the Thurgood Marshall Program was created so that CLEO could get federal 
funding.  The federal funding, however, is not for the traditional summer institutes but for 
scholarships for “qualified” students who were already admitted to a law school.  CLEO is now 
known for its scholarships, not its minority summer institutes, which attract more diverse 
applicants to the CLEO programs.   
Beginning in 2001, CLEO began receiving federal funding through the Thurgood 
Marshall Program to aid educationally and economically disadvantaged students.  The funding 
provides financial assistance awards to law students, which include both CLEO fellows and 
associates.  Most of the Thurgood Marshall Program funding supports pre-law school, law 
school, and post-law school seminars, such as: 
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(1) Attitude Is Essential (AIE) – a summer program for students already admitted to law 
school (i.e., Associates).  CLEO sponsors a two-day weekend seminar prior to the 
first year of law school, which includes workshops such as legal analysis and writing, 
the Socratic method of law teaching, time management, and legal education 
financing;   
 
(2) Mid-Winter Academic Enhancement Seminar – a refresher course for fellows and 
associates that reinforces analytical reasoning skills and writing for first-year law 
students; 
 
(3) Bar Preparation Seminar – for third-year fellows and associates who intend to take 
the July or February bar examination after graduation; and 
 
(4) The College Scholars Program, which is funded by the U.S. Department of 
Education, is specifically for undergraduate students: 
 
(a) Sophomore Summer Institute – a four-week residential summer program 
typically for Sophomore and Junior college students who want to be lawyers 
and may need assistance bringing up their undergraduate GPAs and preparing 
for the LSAT exam.  For the past four years, the summer program has been 
held at the Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois and simulates a law 
school environment;  
 
(b) Road to Law School Seminars – the seminars are for Freshman and 
Sophomore college students who may want to attend law school and become 
lawyers.  These students are exposed to lawyers, and they attend weekend 
seminars that discuss analytical reasoning, logic, critical reading and writing, 
and an appropriate college curriculum in preparation for law school; and 
 
(c) Junior Jumpstart the LSAT – this program is typically for Junior college 
students who want to practice LSAT examination and prepare for the law 
school admissions process (CLEO Annual Reports, 2001-02; 2003-04).   
 
What is interesting and perhaps telling is that none of the federal funding covers the six-
week summer institute program or anything similar to the summer institutes, which simulate the 
first-year experience in law school.  CLEO’s summer institutes were originally created to help 
underrepresented racial minorities and prepare these students for the challenging substantive 
courses prior to law school.  The summer institutes offered students a better chance of getting 
into law school despite low test scores as well as an opportunity of succeeding in law school and 
in the legal profession.  As the LSAC representative commented, CLEO was known for its 
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summer institutes and preparing at-risk minority students for law school.  Nevertheless, 
according to the federal government, there was no real way to evaluate the success of the 
summer institutes since there was not a control group comprised of non-CLEO attendees to 
compare to the CLEO graduates who ultimately became law school graduates and practicing 
attorneys.  The federal government did not want to give CLEO federal dollars for the summer 
institutes when there was no way to tell whether the success of CLEO fellows in law school and 
the legal profession were directly related to the summer institute program. 
At the end of 2003, after the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in the 
two University of Michigan race-based admissions legal cases, CLEO did not receive federal 
funding for the Thurgood Marshall Program for 2004 (CLEO Annual Reports, 2004-05).  Each 
fall, Congress approves its federal budget appropriations to cover October 1st through September 
30th of the following year.  Fortunately, CLEO had money remaining in its budget since the 
federal appropriations are awarded as five-year grants.  The Thurgood Marshall Program also 
was not included in Congress’s education appropriations in 2005 until Senators Barack Obama 
and Richard Durbin of Illinois wrote compelling letters to members of Congress (CLEO 
Government Affairs Committee Report, 2005).  On October 27, 2005, an amendment sponsored 
by Senator Obama and supported by Senator Durbin restored a $3.5 million appropriation for the 
Thurgood Marshall Program.  As of this writing, CLEO has not received any financial 
appropriations for 2007, so it may be a critical point to note that the United States Supreme Court 
recently heard oral arguments on two race-based affirmative action education cases on December 
4, 2006.  The Supreme Court will not likely release its legal opinions in these cases until the 
summer of 2007.   CLEO executives are optimistic that the organization will eventually receive 
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appropriations for 2007, especially since the Democratic Party now controls Congress.  What 
shall happen to CLEO’s funding levels and operations in the meantime?   
Table 5 reflects CLEO’s funding sources, levels, and how the money has been applied to 
the various programs since 2001 – when CLEO began to receive federal funding for the 
Thurgood Marshall Program.  Table 5 shows that most of the money flowing through CLEO is 
federal funding, which must be used to benefit the Thurgood Marshall Program’s specifically 
defined purposes, but not CLEO’s original purpose – the operation of the summer institutes.  
Between 2001 and 2005, federal funding has remained around $3 million to $4 million.  Private 
funding lingers at $400,000 to $600,000, of which 50 percent of the private funding is used for 
the summer institutes.  The summer institutes now function on a lower operating budget than 
they had at CLEO’s inception in 1968, which was more than $500,000.  
  Year  2001-2002   2002-2003  2003-2004  2004-2005 
  Total Revenue $4,628,380    $4,012,787   $3,699,498  $3,552,000  
           
Source of Revenue:          
Federal Government Funding  $4,003,549 (86.5%)  $3,625,152 (90.34%)         $3,162,331 (85.48%)  $2,952,067 (83.11%) 
Private Funding:      
   CLEO Member Schools  $   402,669 ( 8.7%)  $   253,608 ( 6.32%)          $   391,777 (10.59%) $   427,306 (12.03%) 
   Student Fees   $   129,595 ( 2.8%)  $     86,676 ( 2.16%)          $     86,568 (  2.34%) $   107,981 (  3.04%) 
   Contributions   $     83,310 ( 1.8%)  $     36,918 ( 0.92%)          $     52,903 (  1.43%) $     49,728 (  1.40%) 
   Application Fees   $       9,257 (  0.2%) $     10,433 ( 0.26%)          $       5,919 (   0.16%) $     14,918 (   0.42%) 
Total Private Funding    $   624,831 (13.5%)  $ 387,536 (9.66%)  $   537,167 (14.52%) $   599,933 (16.89%) 
 
Federally Funded 
Expenses:          
Financial Assistance Awards & 
Stipends  $ 2,241,987 (56%)  $ 1,667,570 (46%)             $ 1,391,426   (44%) $1,416,992 (48%) 
Program Development:       
   Early Outreach Initiatives   $    320,284 ( 8%)  $    362,515 (10%)             $    284,610    (9%) $   354,248 (12%) 
   Law School Preparation &  
    Enhancement Activities   $    600,532 (15%)  $    652,527 (8%)               $     442,726 (  14%) $    442,810 (15%) 
   Bar Preparation Activities   $      40,035 (1%) $      72,503 (2%)               $       31,623    (1%) $      29,521 (1%) 
Program Support    $    400,355  $   435,018 (12%) $     284,610   (9%) $    236,165 (8%) 
Information 
Dissemination    $    320,284 (8%)  $ 362,515 (10%) $     474,350   (15%) $    236,165 (8%) 
Indirect Costs    $      80,071 (2%)  $   72,503 (2%)  $     252,986 (8%) $    236,165 (8%) 
           
Privately Funded 
Expenses:           
CLEO Summer Institutes    $   362,402 (58%)  $   228,705 (59%)  $     273,955 (51%) $    251,972 (42%) 
Program Support    $   106,221 (17%)  $   58,145 (15%)  $       69,832 (13%) $    101,989 (17%) 
MSSI Support Services    $     87,476 (14%)  $   69,774 (18%)  $     128,920 (24%) $    173,981 (29%) 
Alumni Development & 
Outreach    $     68,731 (11%)  $   31,011 (8%)  $       64,460 (12%) $      71,992 (12%) 
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Table 5: CLEO’s Financial Statements for 2001 through 2005 
No federal funding for the summer institutes.  The summer institutes were once CLEO’s 
recruitment, preparation, and evaluation vehicle for law schools, which served so many now 
successful lawyers and offered opportunities to those minority students who may have been 
otherwise considered “under-qualified” for law school because of lack of access to the best 
schools and low standardized test scores.  Today, the summer institutes continue to struggle 
financially with only private funding.  According to the representative from LSAC, CLEO has 
faced many financial hardships throughout its years of existence, perhaps more than most 
organizations.  The private funding comes from revenue raised through private donors and law 
firms as well as from the CLEO Consortium on Diversity of Legal Education.  The Associate 
Director recalled that the consortium is comprised of over 130 law schools that are categorized 
as Member, Sustaining, or Supporting Institutions, and contributes $5,000, $3,000, or $1,500 per 
year, respectively.  The fees that the students pay for the summer institutes are based on each 
student’s income.  Low-income students, which are determined according to the federal 
guidelines, pay approximately $200 for the summer institute, while all other students pay $2,000.  
Summer institute participants also do not receive any stipends while they attend the summer 
institutes and do not automatically receive funding during their law school tenure; CLEO fellows 
have to apply for scholarships through the Thurgood Marshall Program along with associates.   
Following the loss of federal funding in 1995 and the reorganization of CLEO, the 
number of summer institutes dramatically decreased; thus, the number of summer institute 
participants also decreased greatly.  In 1969, CLEO hosted 10 summer institutes for about 448 
students (see Figure 1).  Every year after 1969 until 1996, there were approximately seven 
summer institutes located in different regions around the country.  In 1996, CLEO financed three 
summer institutes, and since 2003, CLEO has offered only two summer institutes each summer.  
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Although CLEO receives about 750 applications each year from students who are interested in 
attending the summer institutes, the program accepts approximately 80 to 90 students, about 40 
per summer institute, since there are only two summer institutes offered.  Comparatively, the 
federally funded AIE summer program has hosted two weekend seminars since 2002, which 
hosted 211 students in 2004 and 187 students in 2005.  On average, AIE admits about 200 to 250 
law students each year. 
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Figure 1: Number of Summer Institutes – by Time Period 
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5.1.2 CLEO’s Students:  Past and Present 
Similar to other higher education preparatory programs, CLEO’s purpose and programs revolve 
around the students.  The CLEO program was established after the creation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the tragic deaths of several civil rights leaders.  The development of the program 
was a direct result of the community and political outcry regarding civil rights, particularly as 
they pertained to equal opportunity and access to higher education institutions for racial 
minorities.  As earlier noted, CLEO’s original By-laws explained that its purpose was to expand 
and enhance the opportunity for disadvantaged groups, namely Blacks, Native American, and 
Hispanic/Latinos, who historically have been denied access to law school because of lower 
LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs compared to White students, to attend law school and 
enter the legal profession.  After almost 40 years of CLEO being in existence and enduring some 
programmatic and funding changes along the way, the question arises as to whether students 
from underrepresented minority groups are still the primary beneficiaries of CLEO programs.  
Simply put, what type of students does the CLEO program currently serve as compared to the 
earlier years? 
In this section of the chapter, the researcher reveals the results of comparing CLEO 
students’ demographic profiles over several periods.  Data were collected on specific profile 
characteristics, including students’ undergraduate GPAs, LSAT percentile scores, and 
racial/ethnic background, for the selected periods of 1968 and 1969, 1975, 1980, 1991, 1998-
2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006, which were around the time of the key legal cases and policies 
that were discussed in Chapter Four.  The students’ undergraduate GPAs and LSAT percentile 
scores were analyzed using ANOVA, while chi-square analysis was used to examine the 
race/ethnicity of students.  A significance level of .05 was used for statistical analyses. 
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5.1.2.1 Students’ Undergraduate GPAs and LSAT Percentile Scores 
CLEO’s annual reports clearly indicate its guidelines - students with LSAT scores and 
undergraduate GPAs below 14015 and 2.5 respectively should not apply to CLEO programs, 
unless they have recommendations from a member school.  The current guidelines for today’s 
CLEO students would have likely eliminated many of the CLEO students of yesteryear.  In the 
beginning years, many summer institute (SI) fellows had undergraduate GPA scores in the low C 
average and high D average ranges, but many of these fellows successfully completed the 
summer institutes, law school, and the bar examination.  In fact, CLEO’s annual reports boast a 
success rate of over 95 percent of its SI fellows graduating from law school, passing a bar 
examination, and practicing law in some capacity.  A CLEO informant noted that law school has 
become increasingly competitive over the past 30 years, so CLEO had to set specific standards in 
order to keep CLEO students competitive for law school admissions.   
During the first two years of CLEO in 1968 and 1969, the mean GPA score of SI fellows 
was a 2.61 (SD = .43), with a low GPA score of 1.33 and high of 3.80 (see Table 6).  In more 
recent years, the mean GPA score for the SI fellows showed a meaningful improvement.  In the 
combined 2004, 2005, and 2006 summer institutes, the fellows had a mean GPA score of 3.12 
(SD = .46), with a low GPA score of 1.89 and a high of 4.00.  When considering all seven time 
periods, the overall mean GPA for CLEO’s summer institute fellows was 2.96 (SD = .46).  The 
results of an ANOVA analysis showed that there was a significant difference in average GPA 
scores of summer institute fellows across time periods (F(6,1262) = 41.05, p < .001).  
Furthermore, Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed that the average GPA scores for the summer 
                                                 
15 Since 1996, the national LSAT score of 140 has been approximately equivalent to a LSAT percentile of 13 to 15.5 
percent.  This percentile is slightly higher than the 400 (13th percentile) minimum that most law schools required of 
law students in the 1960s, which barred most minority students. 
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institute fellows in the 1968-69 time period were significantly lower than all later time periods, 
and average scores in 1991 were significantly lower than averages in 1980, 2001-2003, and 
2004-2006 (see Tables 6 and 7).     
Table 6: Students’ GPAs in Summer Institutes – by Time Period  
Program 
Year N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
1968-1969 251 2.6133 .42711 .02696 1.33 3.80 
1975 157 3.0314 .34679 .02768 2.08 4.00 
1980 127 3.0474 .38194 .03389 2.19 3.96 
1991 117 2.8913 .41313 .03819 1.83 3.85 
1998-2000 93 2.9937 .41639 .04318 2.01 3.84 
2001-2003 288 3.0775 .42088 .02480 1.79 4.00 
2004-2006 236 3.1244 .46457 .03024 1.89 4.00 
 
Total 1269 2.9624 .45543 .01278 1.33 4.00 
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Table 7: Students’ GPAs in Summer Institutes - Post-Hoc Results       
time period N Subset for alpha = .05 
   
 
1 2 3 
 
1968-1969 251 2.6133   
 
1991 117  2.8913  
 
1998-2000 93  2.9937 2.9937 
 
1975 157  3.0314 3.0314 
 
1980 127   3.0474 
 
2001-2003 288   3.0775 
 
2004-2006 236   3.1244 
 
Sig.  1.000 .050 .086 
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In 2001, CLEO started Attitude is Essential (AIE) with the federal funding received 
through the Thurgood Marshall Program.  Unlike the summer institutes that were created for law 
school hopefuls, AIE was created specifically for students who had already been accepted into 
and were attending law school.  After 2002, the AIE program was getting more publicity and 
becoming more popular, so the total numbers of AIE associates increased dramatically as did the 
GPA scores of AIE associates when compared to SI fellows.  In 2003, the number of AIE 
associates was about 220, while the number of SI fellows was 72.  The results of an ANOVA 
analysis indicated that there was a significant difference in GPA scores between AIE associates 
and SI fellows during the years of 2003, 2004, and 2005 (see Table 8).  The greatest difference in 
GPA scores occurred in 2004, with the mean GPA score of 3.32 (SD = .37) for AIE associates 
and 3.04 (SD = .44) for SI fellows.  Additionally, there was no significant difference in GPA 
scores in 2002 or 2006.  AIE associates and SI fellows had very similar GPA scores in 2002 
(AIE = 3.02, SI = 3.05) and 2006 (AIE = 3.24, SI =  3.23).   
ProgYear Program N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum F P 
 
2002 AIE 36 3.0236 .47182 .07864 2.11 3.93   
 SI 110 3.0478 .41994 .04004 2.18 3.92   
 Total 146 3.0418 .43175 .03573 2.11 3.93 .085 .771 
2003 AIE 220 3.2764 .38329 .02584 2.24 4.00   
 SI 72 3.1163 .41880 .04936 2.11 3.92   
 Total 292 3.2369 .39767 .02327 2.11 4.00 9.042 .003 
2004 AIE 210 3.3182 .36729 .02535 2.36 4.00   
 SI 72 3.0422 .44072 .05194 1.98 3.96   
 
 Total 282 3.2477 .40490 .02411 1.98 4.00 27.231 .000 
 
2005 AIE 180 3.3166 .36890 .02750 2.42 4.00   
 SI 70 3.0714 .48886 .05843 1.89 4.00   
 Total 250 3.2479 .41978 .02655 1.89 4.00 18.392 .000 
2006 AIE 256 3.2403 .42666 .02667 2.00 4.00   
 SI 94 3.2267 .44927 .04634 1.98 4.00   
 Total 350 3.2367 .43224 .02310 1.98 4.00 .068 .794 
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Table 8: Students’ GPAs – Comparison by Program (AIE and SI) 
 
The students’ LSAT percentile scores also have shown a considerable increase 
throughout the years.  Since CLEO’s inception, it has been typical for SI fellows to have LSAT 
percentile scores well below the 10th percentile, which means about 90 percent of LSAT test 
takers had higher scores than some of the SI fellows.  This analysis found that there have been SI 
fellows with minimum LSAT percentile scores in the first, second, and third percentiles in all 
time periods, but also fellows with maximum scores in the 90th percentile and higher (see Table 
9).  
ANOVA results showed that there have been significant increases in mean LSAT 
percentile scores in every period (F(6,1272) = 40.39, p < .001).  In addition, Tukey’s post-hoc 
analysis revealed that average scores in the 2004-2006 were significantly higher than in any 
other time period (see Table 10).  In other words, the mean LSAT percentile of SI fellows in the 
2004-2006 time period (47.29) was significantly higher than the mean percentiles of fellows who 
attended the 1968-1969, 1975, 1980, 1991, 1998-2000, and 2001-2003 summer institutes, whose 
mean LSAT percentile scores were 23.42 (SD = 19.81), 34.41 (SD = 17.05), 29.25 (SD = 17.30), 
29.72 (SD = 16.04), 33.80 (SD = 18.04), and 40.54 (SD = 20.69), respectively.  The average 
LSAT percentile for SI fellows in 2004-2006 time period was equal to the 47th percentile (SD = 
19.61), which indicates that the average LSAT scores for SI fellows were almost equal to the 
average LSAT test taker who took the test during the same time.  The post-hoc analysis also 
revealed that the mean LSAT percentile in 2001-2003 was significantly higher than the means of 
all other time periods except 1975 and 2004-2006 and that the mean LSAT percentile in 1968-
1969 was significantly lower than the mean in 1975 and in 1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-
2006.   
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When comparing the mean LSAT percentile scores of SI fellows and AIE associates, an 
ANOVA analysis showed that the associates’ scores were significantly higher than the fellows’ 
scores in all years except 2002 (see Table 11).  In 2004, the mean LSAT percentile score for AIE 
associates was 57.52 (SD = 21.77), while SI fellows had a mean score of 50.01 (SD = 17.18).  In 
2006, there was a greater difference in mean LSAT percentile scores between fellows and 
associates.  The mean LSAT percentile score of the 94 SI fellows in 2006 was 43.60 (SD = 
19.85), with a minimum score in the 10th percentile and the highest score in the 93rd percentile.  
The 255 AIE associates who were in the program in 2006, however, scored remarkably higher 
with a mean LSAT percentile score of 51.58 (SD = 22).  In the same year, the lowest score for 
associates was in the 11th percentile and the highest score was in the 100th percentile. 
Table 9: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores in Summer institutes - by Time Period 
Prog Year N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum 
 
 
1968-1969 263 
 
23.4068 19.81108 1.22160 1.00 94.00 
 
 
1975 156 
 
34.4103 17.04676 1.36483 3.00 84.00 
 
 
1980 126 
 
29.2460 17.30327 1.54150 3.00 71.00 
 
 
1991 117 
 
29.7179 16.04081 1.48297 2.00 75.00 
 
 
1998-2000 93 
 
33.7957 18.04858 1.87155 2.00 88.00 
 
 
2001-2003 289 
 
40.5398 20.68663 1.21686 2.00 99.00 
 
 
2004-2006 235 
 
47.2894 19.60664 1.27900 2.00 95.00 
 
 
Total 1279 
 
34.9163 20.66269 .57777 1.00 99.00 
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Table 10: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores – Post-Hoc Results 
Time  period N     
   
 
1 2 3 4 
 
1968-1969 263 23.4068    
 
1980 126 29.2460 29.2460   
 
1991 117 29.7179 29.7179   
 
1998-2000 93  33.7957   
 
1975 156  34.4103 34.4103  
 
2001-2003 289   40.5398  
 
2004-2006 235    47.2894 
 
Sig.  .054 .201 .068 1.000 
Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
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Table 11: Students’ LSAT Percentile Scores – Comparison by Program (AIE and SI)  
 
ProgYear Program N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Std. Error Minimum Maximum F P 
2002 AIE 19 
 
32.7368 11.57508 2.65551 11.00 58.00 
 
 SI 111 40.3964 19.10986 1.81383 2.00 91.00  
 Total 130 39.2769 18.37044 1.61119 2.00 91.00 2.861 .093 
2003 AIE 217 
 
56.0230 20.19590 1.37099 15.00 99.00   
 SI 72 50.3472 21.39051 2.52090 9.00 99.00   
 Total 289 54.6090 20.60953 1.21233 9.00 99.00 4.145 .043 
 
2004 AIE 209 
 
57.5215 21.76736 1.50568 7.00 98.00   
 SI 72 50.0139 17.17884 2.02455 20.00 90.00   
 Total 281 55.5979 20.91868 1.24790 7.00 98.00 7.047 .008 
 
2005 AIE 180 
 
57.0944 22.61351 1.68551 8.00 99.00   
 SI 69 49.4783 21.07731 2.53741 2.00 95.00   
 Total 249 54.9839 22.41812 1.42069 2.00 99.00 5.870 .016 
 
2006 AIE 255 
 
51.5765 21.99609 1.37745 11.00 100.00   
 SI 94 43.5957 19.85015 2.04739 10.00 93.00   
 Total 349 49.4269 21.70276 1.16172 10.00 100.00 9.515 .002 
  
The LSAC representative remarked that during its first twenty years, CLEO selected the 
riskiest students who were the hardest to get admitted into law school because of their very low 
LSAT and GPA scores.  Since the Reagan Administration, however, CLEO has had to change 
the type of students they admit because the law schools do not want to admit at-risk students.  
The LSAC representative indicated that the affirmative action legal debates have had a direct 
effect on CLEO’s funding and how it functions, including the students participating in the 
programs.  He noted that CLEO was once known for being a special admissions program, and in 
today’s political and legal climate, no law schools want to be accused of having a special 
admissions program or be associated with one.  Accordingly, CLEO now admits the students that 
law schools will take – those who have higher GPAs and LSAT scores.   
5.1.2.2  Students’ Race/Ethnicity     
Over the past 38 years, CLEO also has seen a change in the race/ethnicity of students that attend 
the programs.  Because the CLEO program originated with the summer institutes (SI) that 
primarily served disadvantaged racial minorities, Blacks and Hispanic/Latinos have been the 
dominant racial and ethnic groups involved in CLEO programs from the beginning.  As seen in 
Table 12, Blacks and Hispanic/Latinos remain the first and second largest racial and ethnic 
groups, respectively, with Asian Americans usually being the third largest.  However, chi-square 
analysis indicated a significant difference in the racial composition for SI across time periods 
(x²(36, N = 1304) = 154.01, p < .001).  In 1968 and 1969, SI was comprised of Black, 
Hispanic/Latino, and Asian American students, which represented 75.1 percent, 23.5 percent, 
and 1.4 percent of the SI population, respectively.  By 2004 through 2006, there was a 
noteworthy shift in the racial makeup of SI; 58.2 percent of SI fellows were Black, 20.7 percent 
were Hispanic/Latino, 10.1 percent were Asian American, and 6.3 percent were characterized as 
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“Other16.”  There were no White students in CLEO’s SI in 1968 or 1969.  In 2001 through 2003, 
however, the number of White SI fellows greatly increased to 15 (5.2%), and in 2004 through 
2006, there were 11 (4.6%) White SI fellows (see Table 12).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 The category “Other” represents those students who are biracial or multiracial, or students who listed “Other” as  
their race on the application, so CLEO listed them as a separate category called “Other.” 
    
Race/Ethnicity 
     
Time 
Period Asian Black Hispanic/Latino 
Native 
American 
Native 
Hawaiian White Other Total 
 
1968-1969 4 (1.4%) 208 (75.1%) 65 (23.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 277 (100%) 
 
1975 8 (5.2%) 100 (64.5%) 41 (26.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 (3.9%) 0 (0%) 155 (100%) 
 
1980 7 (5.3%) 87 (65.9%) 33 (25%) 1 (0.8%) 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.3%) 3 (2.3%) 132 (100%) 
 
1991 8 (6.8%) 63 (53.8%) 36 (30.8%) 4 (3.4%) 1 (0.9%) 3 (2.6%) 2 (1.7%) 117 (100%) 
 
1998-2000 4 (4.2%) 59 (62.1%) 22 (23.2%) 1 (1.1%) 0 (0%) 3 (3.2%) 6 (6.3%)   95 (100%) 
 
2001-2003 48 (16.5%) 145 (49.8%) 60 (20.6%) 2 (0.7%) 0 (0%) 15 (5.2%) 21 (7.2%) 291 (100%) 
 
2004-2006 24 (10.1%) 138 (58.2%) 49 (20.7%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 11 (4.6%) 15 (6.3%) 237 (100%) 
 
Total 103 (7.9%) 800 (61.3%) 306 (23.5%) 8 (0.6%) 2 (0.2%) 41 (3.1%) 44 (3.4%) 1304 (100%) 
Note: The actual total number in the sample was 1,357, but 53 SI fellows did not indicate any race on their applications so their race was unknown. 
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Table 12: Race/Ethnicity of Students in Summer Institutes (SI) 
Post-hoc comparisons showed that the percentage of Black SI fellows in 1968-1969 SI 
(75.1%) was significantly greater than the percentage in any other time period.  Additionally, the 
percentages of Black SI fellows in 1975 (64.5%), 1980 (65.9%), and 1998-2000 (62.1%) were 
significantly greater than the percentage in 2001-2003 (49.8%).  In general, the percentage of 
Asian-American SI fellows has increased over time, as the percentages in 1991 (6.8%), 2001-
2003 (16.5%), and 2004-2006 (10.1%) were significantly higher than the percentage in 1968-
1969.  Furthermore, the percentage of Latino SI fellows in 1991 (30.8%) was significantly higher 
than the percentage in 2001- 2003 (20.6%) and 2004- 2006 (20.7%) (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison by Time Period (SI) 
The Attitude is Essential (AIE) program also has experienced some movement in racial 
composition since 2002.  While the largest percentages of AIE associates have been Black and 
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Hispanic/Latino, and the smallest percentage have typically been Native American, the order of 
percentages amongst the racial and ethnic groups has fluctuated throughout the years (see Table 
13).  In fact, chi-square analysis showed a significant change in racial composition across the 
years (x²(20, N = 1075) = 74.97, p < .001).  Results of the post-hoc comparisons showed the 
percentage of Black AIE associates in 2002 (49.7%) was significantly less than the percentage in 
2003 (62.6%), 2004 (61.8%), and 2005 (63.6%) (see Figure 3).  Additionally, the percentage of 
Blacks in 2006 (51.9%) was significantly less than the percentage in 2003 (62.6%), 2004 
(61.8%), and 2005 (63.6%).  In 2002, the percentage of Hispanic/Latino AIE associates (26.7%) 
was significantly greater than the percentage in 2004 (17.9%) and 2006 (17.4%).  The percentage 
of Asian American AIE associates in 2002 (13.9%) was significantly greater than the percentage 
in 2003 (7.7%).  Moreover, the percentage of White AIE associates in 2004 (7.1%) was 
significantly larger than the percentages in 2002 (2.1%) and 2003 (1.8%).  
Table 13: Race/Ethnicity of Students in Attitude is Essential (AIE) 
   
Race/Ethnicity 
     
Time Period Asian Black Hispanic/Latino
Native 
American White Other Total 
 
2002 26 (13.9%) 93 (49.7%) 50 (26.7%) 4 (2.1%) 4 (2.1%) 10 (5.3%) 187 (100%) 
 
 
2003 17 (7.7%) 139 (62.6%) 49 (22.1%) 2 (0.9%) 4 (1.8%) 11 (5.0%) 222 (100%) 
 
 
2004 18 (8.5%) 131 (61.8%) 38 (17.9%) 9 (4.2%) 15 (7.1%) 1 (0.5%) 212 (100%) 
 
 
2005 15 (8.2%) 117 (63.6%) 37 (20.1%) 2 (1.1%) 6 (3.3%) 7 (3.8%) 184 (100%) 
 
 
2006 27 (10%) 140 (51.9%) 47 (17.4%) 8 (3.0%) 10 (3.7%) 38 (14.1%) 270 (100%) 
 
 
Total 103 (9.6%) 620 (57.7%) 221 (20.6%) 25 (2.3%) 39 (3.6%) 67 (6.2%) 1075 (100%) 
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           Figure 3:  Students’ Race/Ethnicity - Comparison by Time Period (AIE) 
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Since 2002, there have been about twice as many AIE associates than SI fellows; 
however, there only has been a meaningful difference in the racial composition between 
programs during two time periods.  Chi-square analysis showed a significant difference in racial 
composition when comparing AIE and SI in 2004 (x²(5, N = 284) = 24.02, p < .001) and 2006 
(x²(5, N = 365) = 15.87, p = .007.  Post-hoc comparisons indicated that in 2004, the percentage 
of Black AIE associates (61.8%) was significantly larger than the percentage of Black SI fellows 
(47.2%) (see Figure 4).  The percentage of Native Americans in AIE was considerably higher in 
2004 (4.2%) than the percentage in SI (0.0%).  Likewise, in 2006, the percentage of Native 
Americans in AIE (3.0%) was significantly higher than the percentage in SI (0.0%).  Moreover, 
the percentage of Blacks in AIE in 2006 (51.9%) was significantly lower than the percentage in 
SI (67.4%) (see figure 5).    
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Figure 4: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison of AIE and SI (2004)  
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Figure 5: Students’ Race/Ethnicity – Comparison of AIE and SI (2006) 
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When asked about the noticeable changes in the percentage of Black students in both the 
summer institutes and Attitude is Essential, a key CLEO employee revealed that CLEO has to 
make a conscious effort not to accept too many Blacks into any of its programs, especially the 
summer institutes.  Accepting too many Black students looks too much like race-based 
affirmative action, and there is a constant fear of losing federal funding for the Thurgood 
Marshall Program.  Similarly, CLEO’s Chairman affirmed that the CLEO program does not want 
to be “painted by that brush” of affirmative action, but CLEO is trying to help qualified 
minorities enter the legal profession.  Despite the concern of CLEO resembling a race-based 
affirmative action program, CLEO’s Executive Director opined that:  
The affirmative action legal cases and legislation have not impacted CLEO’s operations 
because participation in CLEO programs is open to all students from low-income and 
economically or otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds.  Although minority students who 
are not from disadvantaged backgrounds also participate in the programs, CLEO has 
never denied a student the opportunity to participate in the program because of his/her 
race.  In fact, because we receive very few applications from American Indians and 
Caucasians, every effort is made to accept these applicants in order to increase the 
diversity of CLEO participants. 
CLEO’s Board Chairman has a different point of view regarding the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debates.  He maintains that how people react to the legal cases is more 
disastrous to CLEO than the legal cases themselves; people’s negative reaction has resulted in 
CLEO not experiencing a complete positive impact as a program.  The Chairman believes that 
the chilling effect that happens from the race-conscious affirmative action legal cases is the 
arguments that arise in the lawsuits, such as “these people [minorities] are not qualified” and 
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“they are not getting in because of merit,” but the legal cases are really about certain people’s 
sense of entitlement.  CLEO’s Chairman highlighted a salient issue, which is that nobody 
questions the qualifications of the legacies who are admitted into law school, many of whom are 
less academically qualified than minority applicants. 
The researcher questioned the key informants about CLEO’s future as a program for 
disadvantaged and minority students, particularly in light of the continuous political and legal 
debates surrounding affirmative action.  Most were perplexed or unsure of how to answer the 
question; however, CLEO’s Board Chair chose to speak candidly.  He admitted that the public 
funding aspect is always going to be an issue for CLEO in an anti-affirmative action society; 
however, he is pleased that at least the American Bar Association (ABA) and the minority bar 
associations understand the dubious situation.  CLEO’s Chairman declared that the ABA and 
minority bars all understand that the numbers of racial minorities in law school and the legal 
profession are low, but minorities have proven that they can be successful lawyers.  Therefore, 
according to the Chair, the question that remains is whether law schools are going to pursue 
students who can be successful or just those who have the high scores?  Unfortunately, CLEO’s 
summer institutes are limited to private funding and by state anti-affirmative action policies, but 
CLEO’s Chairman is hoping for a brighter future for racial minorities’ access to law school 
because of the state initiatives in places like Indiana, Kentucky, and Georgia where law school 
specific programs have been modeled after the CLEO summer institutes. 
This chapter addressed the third research question and whether the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate is related to the original intent, current operations, and the future 
viability of the CLEO program.  In response to the third question, there does appear to be a 
correlation between the timing of the federal legal cases and state anti-affirmative action 
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referenda and the changes in CLEO regarding its original intent, current operations, and future 
viability.  In particular, CLEO was created in 1968 and its original By-laws stated that CLEO 
was to expand and enhance the opportunity to study and practice law for members of 
disadvantaged groups – chiefly Negroes, American Indians, and Ibero-Americans 
(Hispanic/Latinos) – and thus help to remedy the present imbalance of these disadvantaged 
groups in the legal profession of the United States.  The six-week summer institutes were the 
academic mechanism developed to properly prepare and evaluate potential minority law students 
for the rigors of law school.  In 1969, there were 10 summer institutes with over 400 students.   
The summer institutes were doing a great job of preparing successful law students and 
lawyers, even those with low LSAT scores and GPAs.  Also, the national number of minority 
law students and lawyers was on the rise by the late 1970s.  Nevertheless, after the affirmative 
action legal debate got underway in the 1970s, some of CLEO’s federal funding was reduced, 
and the number of summer institutes decreased.  By the time the legal debates in higher 
education increased and strengthened in the 1990s, mainly in 1996 after the Hopwood case and 
the implementation of Proposition 209, CLEO lost all its federal funding for the summer 
institutes, had one full-time employee, and had only three summer institutes.  In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, the reverse discrimination legal cases continued to crowd the federal courts and 
anti-affirmative action referenda and policies continued to surface in individual states.  
Simultaneously, CLEO created a new comprehensive program, amended its By-laws to cater to 
more disadvantaged and low-income students already attending law school, and received federal 
funding for the new programs but not for the summer institutes.  The summer institutes currently 
exist off of private funding.  The budget for the summer institutes has decreased from about 
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$3,000,000 in the 1970s to around $500,000 today, and there are only two summer institutes for 
80 students total.   
Federal funding for the new program also have been threatened almost every year, but 
especially in 2004 and 2005, which were the years immediately following the Gratz and Grutter 
legal cases.  Furthermore, the racial composition of CLEO’s summer institutes and other 
programs have shifted significantly since 1968.  CLEO’s programs are increasingly becoming 
more racially and ethnically diverse with more Asian, White, and Other racial students, but fewer 
Black and Latino students.  CLEO now has specific academic performance levels (i.e., LSAT 
scores and GPAs) that is required of the summer institute participants.  Thus, the more recent 
CLEO fellows have significantly higher LSAT percentile scores and GPAs than the early 
fellows, many of whom went on to become competent practicing lawyers.  Key informants admit 
that the legal debates have been detrimental to the present and future existence of CLEO.  
Moreover, CLEO has to be cautious about the number of Black students that are accepted into 
any of its programs as well as the qualifications of the students, because CLEO cannot be viewed 
as a race-based program or it may lose funding for good.  Given all of this information, there 
seems to be some relationship between the evolution of the race-conscious affirmative action 
legal debate and the changes in the CLEO program. 
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6.0  SIXTH CHAPTER 
6.1 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to examine critically how the race-conscious affirmative action 
legal debate in higher education has evolved since the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  Additionally, the intent of the study was to investigate how the debates may be related to 
the current operations of a specific legal program that was created as a result of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO).  CLEO was a federally 
mandated program developed because of the low numbers of racial and ethnic minorities in law 
school and the legal profession.  CLEO’s six-week summer institutes were established to help 
prepare underrepresented minorities for the demanding law school curriculum and evaluate those 
who may be qualified for law school and potentially become successful lawyers, but typically 
would not be admitted to law school because of lower than average LSAT scores and 
undergraduate GPAs.   
The research also was to help gain an understanding of why there has been a constant 
legal and political debate regarding race-based admissions policies and programs in higher 
education, especially with regards to legal education and whether the debates are related to the 
United States’ legal history with race and maintaining white privilege.  Bowen & Bok (1998) 
previously noted that because professional schools like law and medicine are so highly selective, 
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the effect of barring any consideration of race would exclude more than half of the current 
minority population from these professions.  The analysis in the study reveals that the legal and 
political debate continues to strengthen and race-sensitive affirmative action policies and 
programs in higher education, particularly those associated with law school admissions, are close 
to being eradicated completely.    
The First Chapter outlined the purpose of this study, the background on how and why the 
CLEO program was originally created, and the researcher’s assumptions.  Additionally, the First 
Chapter offered a brief introduction of the critical race theory (CRT) framework and the specific 
CRT constructs used in this study.  In the Second Chapter, the review of related literature began 
with a discussion of the outcomes and analyses of federal race-based legal cases, especially those 
related to racial minorities’ access to education, and civil rights legislation implemented from the 
mid-1800s until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Furthermore, the review of 
literature examined the initial creation and purpose of affirmative action policies and a few 
programs that were created after the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to assist 
disadvantaged racial minorities in gaining access to higher education.  Finally, the literature 
review explored CRT’s origins, its tenets, major criticisms about the theory, and how CRT 
constructs have expanded into analyzing race and equity issues in education, including the legal 
debates regarding race-conscious affirmative action.  In the Third Chapter, the researcher 
identified case study as the research design as well as data collection methods, sources, and the 
use of the CRT constructs of interest convergence and whiteness as property in order to analyze 
the evolution of the race-based affirmative action legal debate.   Furthermore, the Third Chapter 
described the research questions for the study, which are:  
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(1) How have the federal race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher 
education and state anti-affirmative action policies evolved since 1964? 
(2) How, if at all, do the ongoing legal debates in higher education reflect the support for, 
or maintenance of, white privilege as defined by the interest convergence and whiteness as 
property constructs of critical race theory? 
(3) How, if at all, is the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate in higher education 
related to the original intent, current operations (i.e., the admissions criteria of fellows and 
associates, the number of summer institutes, funding, and the creation of new programs), and 
future viability of the CLEO program? 
(4) Given the legal debates, what are the future implications for race-based affirmative 
action policies and programs, and the admittance of racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, in law schools and the legal profession? 
The analysis in the Fourth and Fifth Chapters confirmed the researcher’s assumptions that 
law school admissions policies are the most challenged in reverse discrimination lawsuits 
because law is a powerful profession.  The Fourth Chapter examined the decisions and analyses 
in federal legal cases and state anti-affirmative action policies affecting the use of race in higher 
education admissions decisions.  The Fourth Chapter also evaluated the findings through the 
theoretical lens of the CRT constructs.  The Fifth Chapter presented findings related to CLEO’s 
purpose, funding, summer institutes, the creation of new programs, and the demographic profiles 
of CLEO students in light of the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate.   
In this present chapter, the researcher summarizes how the legal debate has evolved since 
the 1970s until 2006 in relation to how the CLEO program has developed during the same 
period.  This Sixth Chapter also considers the current climate of the race-conscious affirmative 
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action legal debate and reviews the most recent numbers of racial minorities in law schools and 
the legal profession.  From the historical analysis of earlier race-based legal cases to the current 
affirmative action legal debate, the recent findings regarding the CLEO program, and the 
existing environment in law schools and the legal profession, the researcher draws conclusions in 
this chapter about the reasons behind the incessant debates and whether they are related to 
maintaining white privilege in this country.  The summaries and conclusions in this Sixth 
Chapter address the special fourth and final question that is meant to sum up the research 
findings:  Given the legal debates, what are the future implications for race-based affirmative 
action policies and programs, and the admittance of racial minorities, particularly African 
Americans, in law schools and the legal profession? 
6.1.1 Summary of Research Findings 
In 1968, the CLEO program was created as a federally mandated race-conscious affirmative 
action program to address specifically the low numbers of racial and ethnic minorities in law 
schools and the legal profession.  CLEO’s six-week summer institutes were created as a 
motivational and educational catalyst to encourage underrepresented minorities to attend law 
school and pursue a legal career, to introduce minorities to a challenging curriculum in law 
school, and to test their ability to do law school work despite lower test scores.  These types of 
special minority programs sparked many passionate and conflicted feelings regarding race-based 
affirmative action, especially since institutions of higher education hosted and supported 
programs like CLEO by accepting underrepresented minorities into their academic programs.  
These feelings revealed themselves prevalently in the continuous legal and political debates since 
the 1970s.  The research conducted in this study with regards to the escalation of the race-
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conscious affirmative action legal cases in higher education over the past 30 years revealed some 
major changes to the CLEO program’s original purpose and offered insight into the dubious 
future of CLEO generally and CLEO’s summer institute program specifically. 
The 1970s 
The 1970s introduced the first reverse discrimination lawsuits in the cases of DeFunis, et 
al. v. Odegaard, et al. (1974) and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978).   In 
both legal cases, White males sued institutions of higher education for illegally having special 
admissions programs for racial and ethnic minorities, which they claimed was in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  DeFunis involved a law school 
admissions policy and Bakke implicated a medical school’s admissions policy.  Bakke, the first 
time the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of race-sensitive policies, 
held that the University of California at Davis Medical School violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it reserved a specified number for racial minorities.  The Court, however, or 
at least Justice Powell who wrote the main opinion, also concluded that race could be considered 
a “plus” factor during the college admissions process to achieve educational diversity.   
During the time of DeFunis and Bakke between 1974 and 1980, the CLEO program had 
experienced some modest changes.  For instance, CLEO’s summer institutes went from almost 
complete federal funding through the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to relying more on private funding.  By 
the late 1970s, CLEO was receiving about $3 million a year of federal funding administered by 
the U.S. Department of Education through the Assistance for Training in the Legal Profession 
(ATLP) as well as small amounts of private funding from bar associations, laws schools, and 
corporate donors.   
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Additionally, in 1968-1969, CLEO hosted 10 summer institutes for approximately 448 
students, which were mainly Black, Hispanic/Latino students, and about one percent of Asian 
students.  By 1975 and 1980, there were about seven summer institutes, and the percentage of 
racial minorities changed slightly.  Black students decreased from over 75 percent to about 65 
percent, Hispanic/Latinos remained stable, Asian students increased from 1 percent to just over 5 
percent, and White students increased from zero to approximately 3 percent.  Moreover, the 
median LSAT percentile scores and GPAs of CLEO fellows in the summer institutes were higher 
in 1975 and 1980 than at CLEO’s inception.  
The 1980s- 1990s 
The Republican Party politically controlled the country in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Ronald Reagan was President of the United States from 1980 to 1988, and George Bush was 
President from 1988 to 1992.  President Reagan was against civil rights enforcement and 
suspended most of the Title VI actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that forced many 
southern universities to desegregate and end discrimination.  In 1990, the Bush administration 
issued an opinion that stated that scholarship set-asides for racial and ethnic minority students 
violated civil rights laws.  During the same period, there was a steady stream of reverse 
discrimination lawsuits, in which the majority of them were based on the constitutionality of 
considering race when making employment decisions or assigning public contracts.  The 
Supreme Court decided that using racial categories is always suspect, so racial classifications 
may be used only if the policies meet the strict scrutiny standard.  Race-conscious affirmative 
action policies had to be narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, 
such as rectifying existing discrimination, but not for diversity purposes.  Therefore, the mid-
1990s brought about dramatic developments regarding race-based affirmative action, particularly 
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as it pertained to higher education admission policies and the legitimacy of Justice Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke. 
In the 1990s, there were two federal legal cases addressing the legality of race-sensitive 
higher education policies – Podberesky v. Kirwan (1994) and Hopwood v. Texas (1996).  The 
Podberesky case concerned a Hispanic student disputing a scholarship program exclusively for 
African Americans.  However, the infamous Hopwood case, which was based on the 
constitutionality of a law school admissions policy, brought national attention to the contempt for 
the Bakke holding and fueled the disapproval for any use of race in higher education admissions 
decisions.  Hopwood involved four individual plaintiffs, with a White woman as lead plaintiff, 
requesting that the University of Texas School of Law cease and desist using its special 
admissions program to enroll a certain number of Black Americans and Mexican Americans, 
which they claimed was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  The plaintiffs also requested compensatory and punitive damages from the 
State of Texas and the University of Texas system because of the alleged discriminatory action.  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Texas agreed with the Hopwood 
plaintiffs and held that the University of Texas School of Law’s policy was unconstitutional, 
forbade the use of race as a factor to achieve a diverse student body, and demanded the lower 
court to reconsider awarding the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages for what they 
endured.  Interestingly, Hopwood along with the several reverse discrimination cases that 
followed were class action lawsuits with multiple plaintiffs in which White women were the lead 
plaintiffs.   
Immediately following the Hopwood decision in 1996, government officials and citizens 
around the country pushed for outlawing all forms of affirmative action.  The majority of voters 
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in the state of California were in favor of the Proposition 209 referendum to abolish the use of all 
affirmative action policies in the operation of public employment, education, or contracting.  
Most of those who voted in favor of the referendum were White males and Republicans who 
made $60,000 or more annually.  1n 1998, the state of Washington passed a similar referendum 
eliminating affirmative action.  Governor Jeb Bush signed an Executive Order into law in 
November of 1999, which eradicated the use of race- and gender-conscious decisions in higher 
education, employment, and state contracting in Florida.  The states of California, Texas, and 
Florida implemented class-ranking systems as race-neutral alternatives, which allows for the top 
high school graduates to be conditionally admitted into the states’ public universities so long as 
certain requirements are met.  For example, the top high school graduates also have to have a 
certain number of college preparatory courses, which are not available to many disadvantaged 
minorities, in order to be considered for admissions by the public state universities of their 
choice. 
The 1990s also brought about serious changes to the CLEO program, especially related to 
funding and the operation of the summer institutes.  In 1995, CLEO lost all federal funding for 
its summer institutes and student stipends, and it could afford only to employ one staff member – 
the Executive Director.  By 1998, CLEO’s yearly budget dropped from approximately $3 million 
dollars annually to about $600,000.   During this period, CLEO remained afloat by changing the 
organizational and financial structure of the program.  CLEO began charging CLEO fellows a 
fee to attend the summer institutes and seeking private funding from the new member law 
schools, law associations, and corporations.  Of course, the number of summer institutes offered 
dropped yet again from seven in the mid-1970s to approximately two or three a year in the mid-
1990s.  Additionally, the total number of CLEO fellows attending the summer institutes declined 
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by more than half compared to the first two years of the program in 1968 and 1969.  The racial 
composition as well as the mean GPAs and LSAT scores of the fellows in the program in the 
1990s remained stable when compared to the time periods of 1975 and 1980.  When measured 
against the 1968-1969 period, the racial composition had changed greatly with a significant 
increase in the percentage of Asian, White, and Other fellows, and a significant decrease in the 
percentage of Blacks; the percentage of Hispanic/Latinos remained steady.   
In response to the loss of federal funding for the summer institutes, CLEO and its 
partners designed the Thurgood Marshall Legal Educational Opportunity Program (Thurgood 
Marshall Program) in 1998.  CLEO’s By-laws were amended so that it did not appear as though 
CLEO primarily benefited racial minorities in order to receive some federal funding.  CLEO 
presented the Thurgood Marshall Program to Congress as being more comprehensive in 
achieving diversity by serving low-income, educationally disadvantaged, or minority students 
presently in law school.  Congress eventually approved federal funding for the Thurgood 
Marshall Program to be administered by CLEO, but the funding and the Thurgood Marshall 
Program had to be distinguished and kept separate from the CLEO program itself as well as the 
summer institutes known for helping racial minority students enter law school.   
The 2000s 
The twenty-first century welcomed four more legal cases challenging the consideration of 
race in higher education admissions decisions, with the last two cases resulting in a definitive 
moment – an opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to revisit and interpret the Bakke 
decision and determine whether race can be a factor in higher education admissions.  The first 
two cases were Smith, et al. v. University of Washington Law School, et al. and Johnson, et al. v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, et al. in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  The Smith 
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case was a class action lawsuit lead by a White female plaintiff-appellant who sued on behalf of 
herself and other White applicants who were denied access to the Law School because the 
school’s admissions policy favored racial and ethnic minorities.  The plaintiff-appellant argued 
that she and others were not admitted because the Law School considered race in the admissions 
process in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Initiative 200, which abolished 
affirmative action policies in the state of Washington.  The appellate court concluded that the 
Law School was bound by Initiative 200, but its admissions policy was legal because the school 
considered other factors besides race to achieve a diverse student body.   
Contrariwise, the appellate court in the Johnson case, which was a class action lawsuit 
led by three White females, held that the University of Georgia’s (UGA) freshman admissions 
policy was unconstitutional.  Specifically, the Johnson court found that UGA’s freshman 
admissions policy lacked flexibility by mechanically and inexorably awarding an arbitrary 0.5 
points to non-Whites during a decisive stage of the admissions process, even though all students 
could receive far more additional points for factors unrelated to race.  Furthermore, the Johnson 
court refused to follow the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bakke to use race as a plus factor in 
admissions decisions, while the Smith court recognized Bakke as binding precedence.  This 
conflict over the Bakke holding and the consideration of race in admissions decisions had 
become all too familiar throughout lawsuits around the country.  By the time the Smith and 
Johnson cases were heard in two different federal appellate courts, it had become clear to the 
legal community that the issue was ripe enough for the United States Supreme Court to assert its 
jurisdiction and interject its wisdom.  The 2003 University of Michigan cases of Gratz, et al. v. 
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger came along at a prime time when the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate in higher education reached a peak.   
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 The Gratz case was a class action suit involving a White man and a White woman, both 
Michigan residents, who wanted to be admitted into the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
program.  The White woman, Jennifer Gratz, was the lead plaintiff-petitioner.  A White woman 
from Michigan, Barbara Grutter, was the sole petitioner in the University of Michigan Law 
School case.  The petitioners in both lawsuits alleged that the University of Michigan’s 
admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for the University’s unlawful use of race 
in its admissions decisions.  All parties sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Moreover, the George W. Bush Administration filed legal 
briefs with the Supreme Court in support for the plight of the plaintiff-petitioners and other 
White people like them who were denied admission to the institution of higher education of their 
choice because of preferences to racial minorities.   
The Gratz and Grutter cases yielded very different decisions, but in both cases the 
Supreme Court relied on the Bakke holding as binding precedence and attempted to add clarity to 
the confusing and controversial analysis in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  Furthermore, in 
its majority opinions in both Gratz and Grutter, the Supreme Court reached a consensus on how 
the high court would handle racial classifications when a higher institution is trying to achieve a 
diverse student body as a compelling state interest.  In Gratz (2003), the Supreme Court found 
that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate freshman admissions policy was 
unconstitutional.  The Court’s holding was based on the fact that underrepresented racial and 
ethnic minorities were automatically awarded 20 points out of the 150 needed for undergraduate 
admission without assessing each applicant’s individual qualities.  In the Grutter (2003) case, 
however, the Supreme Court held that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling 
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state interest in attaining a diverse student body, and the admissions policy’s use of race was 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.  The Law School’s policy of seeking to enroll a critical 
mass of minority students was constitutional since it engaged in a highly individualized, holistic 
review of each applicant’s file.  The Law School considered all pertinent elements of diversity 
and used race only as a “plus” factor, as set forth in Bakke, which did not unduly harm or 
exclude non-minorities from all consideration.  The vital point in the Grutter decision was that 
Justice O’Connor specifically acknowledged that law schools are essential in training and 
preparing the nation’s leaders, so it is necessary that racial minorities be represented in a law 
school’s student body.   
In this new millennium, the CLEO programs have continued to feel the increasing 
negative publicity surrounding the race-conscious affirmative action legal debate, especially after 
the 2003 Michigan cases.  For instance, CLEO did not receive federal funding for the Thurgood 
Marshall Program for 2004, nor did Congress appropriate funds for 2005 until Senators Barack 
Obama and Richard Durbin of Illinois wrote compelling letters to members of Congress on 
CLEO’s behalf.  Currently, the federally funded Thurgood Marshall Program receives $3 million 
to $4 million per year, of which approximately 20 to 30 percent of the funds are used for 
educational programs for college and law school students, such as Attitudes is Essential (AIE) 
associates.  The AIE summer programs host about 200 students per year.  On the other hand, 
since 2000, CLEO’s summer institutes have perpetually struggled with private funding, so each 
year after, there have been only two summer institutes hosting about 40 students each.  CLEO’s 
private funding hovers around $500,000 each year, of which approximately 50 percent of the 
funding is used for the summer institutes.  Thus, the pre-law summer institutes, which had been 
CLEO’s original legacy and purpose in recruiting, educationally preparing, and evaluating 
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disadvantaged racial minority law school hopefuls who may have otherwise been denied access 
to law schools because of their low LSAT scores and GPAs, are slowly diminishing and may 
likely become nonexistent.   
The mean GPAs and LSAT scores of both summer institute fellows and AIE associates 
were significantly higher in the 2000s than they were in the earlier decades.  In fact, CLEO set 
minimum academic requirements for students who apply for its programs. In addition, since 
2001, the racial composition for both the summer institutes and AIE programs have become 
increasingly more racially diverse, with significant increases in White and Asian students and 
fewer Black and Latino students.   
While it is encouraging that the research shows that CLEO’s programs are reaching a 
more diverse student body, it is unfortunate that the changes to CLEO also may mean a slow 
death to the once federally mandated summer institutes that have helped so many racial 
minorities enter and succeed in law schools since the late 1960s.  Moreover, there are now many 
underrepresented racial minorities who will not qualify for the summer institutes or AIE because 
of new academic and financial standards.  There are even more underrepresented racial 
minorities who will not benefit from the law school training offered by the almost extinct 
summer institutes and who may not be accepted into law school because of their low scores or 
lack of adequate preparation for the rigorous law school coursework.  Finally, the research 
findings have established that funding also will remain an issue for CLEO so long as all the 
programs primarily benefit racial minorities, namely Blacks.  All of these changes to CLEO 
appear to be related to the continuous race-conscious affirmative action legal debates.  
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Table 14 briefly delineates the timeline of race-conscious affirmative action legal cases in 
higher education and anti-affirmative action policies as well as changes that occurred within 
CLEO operations during the corresponding time periods. 
Table 14: Outline of Legal Cases/Policies and Changes in CLEO’s Data (By Decade) 
 
TIME 
PERIOD 
LEGAL CASES AND 
POLICIES CLEO’S FUNDING AND PROGRAMS CLEO’S STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
1970s DeFunis, et al. v. 
Odegaard, et  al. 
 (1974) 
 
Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke 
(1978) 
1968-73 – Summer institutes (SI) federally-
funded by OEO. 
 
1973-76 –  HEW (later U.S. Dept. of ED) 
issued grants to CLEO to fund SI and student 
stipends. 
 
1976-77 - budget reductions, but CLEO still 
received federal funding from ATLP as well as 
some private funding. 
SI Mean GPAs: 
1968-69 – 2.61, 1975 – 3.03 
 
SI Mean LSAT: 
1968-69 – 23.41, 1975  - 34.41 
 
SI Racial Composition: 
More Black SI fellows in 1968-69 (75.1%) than 
in any other time period. 
 
 
1980s-1990s Podberesky v. Kirwan 
(1994) 
 
Hopwood v. Texas 
 (1996) 
 
California Civil Rights 
Initiative, Proposition 
209 (1996) 
 
Texas’ Ten Percent Plan 
(1997) 
 
Washington State Civil 
Rights Initiative 200 
(1998) 
 
One Florida Initiative 
(1999) 
1994-95 – No more free institutes.  Financial 
eligibility requirements created for SI 
participants. 
 
1995-96 - SI loses federal funding.  CLEO has 
one staff member and is dependent on private 
funding and membership school fees. 
 
1996-98 – CLEO’s operations were funded with 
about $500,000 per year, as opposed to 
$3,000,000 in years past. 
 
1998-99 – CLEO modified governing council 
structure, amended By-laws to include 
disadvantaged and low-income students, and 
created Thurgood Marshall Program to be more 
diverse and inclusive.  CLEO applies for 
funding from Congress. 
SI Mean GPAs: 
1980 – 3.05, 1991 – 2.89, 1998-2000 – 2.99 
 
SI Mean LSAT: 
1980 – 29.25, 1991 - 29.72, 1998-2000 – 33.80 
 
SI Racial Composition: 
More Black SI fellows in 1975 (64.5%), 1980 
(65.9%), and 1998-2000 (62.1%) than in 2001-
03 (49.8%). 
 
The percentage of Asian SI fellows has 
increased over time from 1968 to 2006. 
More Asian SI fellows in 1991 (6.8%), 2001-03 
(16.5%), and 2004-06 (10.15%) than in 1968-
69. 
 
More Latino SI fellows in 1991 (30.8%) than in 
2001-03 (20.6%) and 2004-06 (20.7%). 
  220
221
 
TIME LEGAL CASES AND 
POLICIES CLEO’S FUNDING AND PROGRAMS CLEO’S STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS 
  
PERIOD 
2000s Smith, et al. v. University 
of Washington law 
School, et al. 
 (2000) 
 
Johnson, et al. v. Board 
of Regents of the 
University of Georgia, et 
al. (2001) 
 
Gratz, et al.  v. Bollinger 
(2003) 
 
Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003) 
2001 - CLEO receives federal funding through 
the Thurgood Marshall Program to aid 
educationally and economically disadvantaged 
student, but not for the summer institutes.  
Federal funding for Thurgood Marshall 
Program averages $3 or $4 million per year, 
while private funding for summer institutes 
averages $400,000 to $600,000 per year. 
 
2001-current - AIE summer programs were 
established for already admitted law school 
students.  AIE hosts about 200 to 250 students 
per year, while the summer institutes host about 
80 students per year. 
 
2004-05 - No federal funding appropriated in 
2004, but funding restored in 2005. 
 
2006-07 - CLEO is awaiting federal 
appropriations for 2007.  Because of funding 
issues, the summer institutes have been reduced 
from 10 institutes in 1969 to 2 institutes since 
2000. 
 
SI Mean GPAs: 
2001-03 - 3.08, 2004-06 - 3.12 
AIE Mean GPAs: 
2002 - 3.02, 2003 -  3.28, 2004  - 3.32, 
2005 - 3.32, 2006 - 3.24 
 
SI Mean LSAT: 
2001-03 - 40.54, 2004-06 – 47.29 
AIE Mean LSAT: 
2002 – 32.74, 2003 – 56.02, 2004 – 57.52,  
2005 – 57.09, 2006 – 51.58 
 
AIE Racial Composition: 
Less Black AIE associates in 2002 (49.7%) and 
2006 (51.9%) than in 2003 (62.6%), 2004 
(61.8%), and 2005 (63.6%). 
 
More White AIE associates in 2004 (7.1%) than 
in 2002 (2.1%) and 2003 (1.8%). 
 
More Asian AIE associates in 2002 (13.9%) 
than in 2003 (7.7%).  Similarly, more Latino 
AIE associates in 2002 (26.75%) than in 2004 
(17.9%) and 2006 (17.4%). 
6.1.2 Current Climate Surrounding the Legal Debate, Law School, and the Legal 
Profession 
The research findings show that the race-conscious affirmative action legal debates in higher 
education have intensified since the mid-1990s and early 2000s.  During this time, there was a 
discernable increase in the number of reverse discrimination legal cases, and the states of 
California, Texas, Florida, and Washington abolished affirmative action policies and programs or 
severely limited the use of them in favor of race-neutral alternatives.  Today, in 2007, the legal 
debate maintains a strong and divisive atmosphere, with yet another state voting to ban anti-
affirmative action and other legal decisions on the horizon, but with little change in the number 
of underrepresented minorities in law schools and the legal profession. 
There was a litigation lull after the 2003 Michigan cases, but now the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate in higher education has regained its impetus.  In November of 
2006, the citizens of Michigan decided that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Grutter, which was in favor of the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy that 
used race as a factor to attain a diverse student body, was unacceptable.  Accordingly, the 
Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (MCRI) Committee, which was spearheaded by Jennifer Gratz, 
the lead-petitioner in the 2003 Gratz case, with help from Ward Connerly and ACRI, sponsored 
Proposal 2 to propose a constitutional amendment banning affirmative action in the state of 
Michigan.  Proposal 2 appeared on the November 2006 ballot in Michigan and stated that the 
proposed constitutional amendment say, in relevant part: 
Ban public institutions from using affirmative action programs that give preferential 
treatment to groups or individuals based on their race, gender, color, ethnicity, or national 
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origin for public employment, education, or contracting purposes.  Public institutions 
affected by the proposal include state government, local governments, public colleges 
and universities, community colleges, and school districts (MCRI, 2006). 
Fifty-eight percent of the Michigan voters agreed with the proposed constitutional amendment; 
42 percent disagreed with the prospect of completely ending affirmative action.  Approximately 
56 percent of the White voters were in favor of Proposal 2; 86 percent of Black and 69 percent of 
Latino voters were opposed to the ballot.  A journalist observed that the strongest opponents in 
favor of the measure either never earned a high-school diploma, had graduated from college, or 
gone on to graduate and professional school (Schmidt, 2006).  Ward Connerly proclaimed 
proudly that if they could win in a democratic state like Michigan, they could win anywhere.  
Currently, the University of Michigan is considering legal action to block Proposal 2 from being 
applicable to colleges and universities (Schmidt, 2006).   
 Another recent development with the incessant debates is the United States Supreme 
Court cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2005) 
and Meredith, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, et al. (2005) pertaining to the use of 
race in public school student assignments.  While both of these cases are related to students in 
Kindergarten through 12th grade, institutions of higher education and public schools around the 
country are looking to the Supreme Court’s holdings and analyses in these cases for guidance on 
how to interpret the divergent holdings in Gratz and Grutter and to better understand the utility 
of race-based policies and programs.  In both cases, the United States Supreme will address the 
same issue of whether a race-based student assignment plan violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, No. 05-908; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 05-
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915).  Legal briefs were submitted by amici curiae in support of the petitioners and respondents 
in each case.    
In the first case of Parents Involved in Community Schools, the Seattle School District 
operates ten, four-year public high schools.  Ninth-grade students may choose to attend any of 
these schools under the District’s Open Choice plan.  The District, however, has implemented 
four tiebreakers to prevent one school from being oversubscribed with one particular race and be 
more racially balanced.  The first tiebreaker considers whether a sibling is enrolled in the 
oversubscribed school, and if so, the ninth-grader is given priority admission.  In the second 
tiebreaker, the District considers race (not ethnicity) when trying to maintain a racial balance of 
White and Non-White students within an oversubscribed school.  The District’s overall public 
school enrollment is about 60 percent Non-White and 40 percent White, so the District alleges 
that a student’s race is considered only to bring a school’s racial composition closer to the overall 
enrollment percentages.  The third tiebreaker depends on a student’s distance from an already 
racially balanced school, and the fourth tiebreaker is a lottery system, which is rarely used.  In 
the amicus brief in support of Parents Involved in Community Schools, the parent-petitioners 
claim that their children were not or might not be admitted into the high school of their choice 
because of the race-based student assignment plan, which is illegal under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 
and state law.   
On the other hand, Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a federal court order 
since 1975 to desegregate its public schools and to cease its practices of de jure segregation.  In 
2001, after the decree was dissolved, Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) adopted a 
voluntary race-based student assignment plan that required each public school to seek to enroll at 
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least 15 percent Black students and no more than 50 percent in order to ensure a racially 
balanced school system.  JCPS categorized its students as either “Black” or “Other,” and the 
racial demographics of the total student population in the school district were approximately 34 
percent Black and 66 percent other.  Like the former case, a group of parents in Meredith, et al., 
including the petitioner, contend that their children were not admitted into, or denied a transfer 
into, the schools of their choice because of the race-based student assignment plan.  The parents 
challenge the legality of the plan under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Both of the legal cases rely on the holdings in Gratz and Grutter and question 
whether the race-based student assignment plans implicate the compelling interest of diversity in 
the public school context.  Furthermore, similar to the Michigan cases, the parents’ primary 
arguments are that: (1) the plans are not narrowly tailored because they do not provide for a 
holistic, individualized consideration of students, which is necessary for a constitutionally 
permissible race-conscious admissions process, and (2)the plans are almost identical to a quota 
system.   
Social scientists and scholars submitted amici briefs on behalf of the respondents in both 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2005) and Meredith, et 
al. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, et al. (2005).  The briefs concentrated on the use of 
scientific evidence in race-based education cases as well as the type of evidence presented in 
Brown, et al. and Grutter that supported race-conscious education policies (Brief of 553 Social 
Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Nos. 05-908 & 05-915).  Specifically, the 
social scientists argue and offer research findings that (1) racially integrated schools provide 
significant benefits to students and communities, (2) racially isolated schools have harmful 
educational implications for students, and (3) race-conscious policies are necessary to maintain 
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racial integration in schools.  The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in both cases in 
December and will render its decisions in summer of 2007.   
Undoubtedly, the legal debate has propelled forward on all education levels – challenging 
race-sensitive policies from Kindergarten through 12th grade to graduate and professional 
schools, especially law school.  As previously mentioned, legal and education scholars question 
whether these events will affect the number of underrepresented minorities applying, being 
accepted into, and attending institutions of higher education, such as law school.  If less 
underrepresented minorities are applying to and accepted into law schools, then obviously less 
will be attorneys practicing law in the near future.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) 
reported that out of approximately 965,000 employed lawyers (excluding judges) in the United 
States in 2006, 5 percent of them were Black or African American, 3 percent were Hispanic or 
Latino, and 2.9 percent were Asian.   
In terms of minority representation in law schools, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
revealed that in the 2005-2006 academic school year, there was a total of 148,273 law students 
enrolled in 191 ABA-approved law schools, of which 11,252 (8%) were Asian or Pacific 
Islander, 9,126 (6%) were African American, 8,248 (6%) were Hispanic or Latino, 1,142 (1%) 
were American Indian or Alaska Native (2006).  As of the fall of 2006, there were 56,000 first-
year students admitted into ABA-approved law schools (LSAC, 2006).  The racial and ethnic 
breakdown of students admitted into law schools in fall 2006 was as follows: (1) 39,850, or 71 
percent, were White; (2) 4,560, or 8 percent, were Asian/Pacific Islander; (3) 4,020, or 7 percent, 
were Hispanic/Latino; (4) 3,920, or 7 percent, were Black/African American; (5) 400, or 1 
percent, were American Indian/Alaskan Native; and (6) 2,690, or 5 percent, were Other (LSAC, 
2006).  It is important to note that since the fall of 2001, the percentage of racial/ethnic groups 
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admitted into ABA-approved law schools, in relation to those who apply from those groups, have 
remained consistent (see Table 15).  Percentage-wise, fewer Blacks are admitted into law school, 
with approximately 40 percent admitted out of those who apply, than other racial/ethnic groups.  
   
Race/Ethnicity 
    
School Year 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
Black/African 
American Hispanic/Latino Native American White Other 
 
Fall 2001 3,750 (68%) 3,770 (44%) 3,580 (57%) 370 (64%) 37,670 (74%) 2,110 (63%) 
 
Fall 2002 4,370 (63%) 3,770 (39%) 3,620 (51%) 380 (59%) 40,660 (68%) 2,360 (59%) 
 
Fall 2003 4,610 (57%) 3,630 (34%) 3,880 (50%) 400 (54%) 40,230 (63%) 2,560 (55%) 
 
Fall 2004 4,800 (56%) 3,720 (35%) 3,820 (58%) 430 (55%) 39,150 (60%) 2,510 (54%) 
 
Fall 2005 4,720 (59%) 3,660 (37%) 3,980 (51%) 410 (54%) 40,020 (64%)  2,600 (56%) 
 
Fall 2006 4,560 (63%) 3,920 (42%) 4,020 (54%) 400 (55%) 39,850 (69%) 2,690 (61%) 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses represent the percentages of each racial/ethnic group admitted into law school in relation to the 
number who applied from that particular group. 
  
Table 15: Number and Percentage of Racial/Ethnic Groups Admitted Into Law Schools 
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6.1.3 Conclusions and Implications 
In the beginning of this document, the researcher explained the United States’ contentious 
history with race-based legal cases and legislation, particularly in education, from the mid-1800s 
until now.  Additionally, the researcher described some federal programs that have helped many 
disadvantaged racial minorities enter colleges and universities over the past 40 years but that are 
currently in jeopardy of losing funding or being eliminated altogether.  The research findings in 
this study indicate that as more and more reverse discrimination lawsuits saturate the legal 
landscape, the CLEO program, which has primarily benefited underrepresented racial minorities 
by assisting them in entering and graduating from law schools, has experienced some noticeable 
changes to its funding, programs, and the racial/ethnic and academic profiles of the students 
involved in CLEO programs.  Based on the findings, the researcher concludes that there is a 
correlation between the ongoing  race-conscious affirmative action legal debates over the past 30 
years, and the significant changes in CLEO’s funding, the types of programs offered, the types of 
students served (i.e., already admitted law students in the AIE program, rather than aspiring 
lawyers trying to gain access to law school with the help of the summer institute program), as 
well as the notable differences in the racial/ethnic composition of students and the students’ 
academic profiles. 
The United States has developed a notorious history, past and present, of race-based legal 
cases, legislation, and policies that negatively affect education and federal education programs 
benefiting disadvantaged minorities like CLEO.  Given the current numbers of underrepresented 
minorities in law schools and the legal profession, the researcher outlines some conclusions and 
future implications in this section regarding the future of race-conscious affirmative action 
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policies and programs in higher education in light of the legal debates as well as white privilege.  
This section also addresses the special fourth question that serves as a summative analysis, which 
is: Given the legal debates, what are the future implications for race-based affirmative action 
policies and programs, and the admittance of racial minorities, particularly African Americans, 
in law schools and the legal profession? 
6.1.3.1  The Future of Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Legal Debates and the 
Implications for CLEO and Other Race-Based Programs 
Based on history and the findings in this study, it can be concluded that the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debate in higher education will continue until all traces of race-sensitive 
policies and programs are obliterated.  Although the number of racial and ethnic minorities in 
law school and the legal profession are minute when compared to Whites, the research findings 
support the conclusion that the legal claims will persist.  More White students are joining 
together in class action lawsuits and fighting against race-based admissions policies and 
programs and are asking for punitive and compensatory damages as a way to punish financially 
those threatening the white privilege of accessing the colleges of their choice.  Further, the 
findings show that the CLEO program’s original purpose of assisting specific underrepresented 
racial minorities, namely Blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans, with entering law school is 
quickly becoming a dream of the past.  Thus, CLEO’s summer institutes are dying a low death.   
As the legal debate began in the 1970s, the annihilation of the CLEO program started 
with a subtle decline in funding and financial support, and by the 1990s, moved to a complete 
change in federal funding, the program’s purpose, members, and beneficiaries.  Today, in the 
2000s, as the CLEO program moves farther away from its original intent and continues to lose 
direction, funding, and followers, it may be concluded that CLEO itself will eventually perish or 
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completely change its objectives and the type of students it serves (e.g., students who are more 
economically and educationally advantaged and able to pay for the programs and receive the 
higher test scores).  The people who need the CLEO program the most also will have the most to 
lose – an opportunity to attend law school and enter the legal profession.  Academically 
successful programs like CLEO and perhaps even TRIO programs, such as Upward Bound and 
Talent Search, have helped a plethora of underrepresented racial minorities gain access to higher 
education institutions and graduate, yet these programs are well on their way to financially going 
down a forlorn road to oblivion given the legal climate.  The data supports that at a minimum, 
CLEO will continue to have less funding for the summer institutes and fewer summer institute 
participants.  Additionally, a lower percentage of Black students will be accepted into both the 
summer institutes and AIE programs, when compared to the earlier years, because of the 
increased academic requirements of the programs and the fear of CLEO being deemed a race-
conscious program.  Finally, the findings support the conclusion that the racial composition of 
students in CLEO programs will continue to shift, with more and more Asian, Other Race, and 
White students and less Black and Latino students in both AIE and the summer institutes.  No 
matter how one looks at the situation, CLEO’s future is dubious. 
6.1.3.2  The Future of Underrepresented Minorities in Law Schools and the Legal 
Profession 
A historical and legal examination has shown that the majority of race-based legal cases in 
education are related to law school admissions.  As such, the number of underrepresented racial 
minorities applying and being accepted into law schools has fallen or been stagnant since the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  The researcher concludes that the current reverse discrimination lawsuits 
challenging the use of race in law school admissions policies are due to the power associated 
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with the legal profession.  Lawyers have held and still hold most of the leadership positions of 
power in state and federal government.  Therefore, those trained in law are in control of making, 
enforcing, and interpreting the laws of this country.  The historical evidence indicates that legal 
challenges will remain on the rise, particularly in law schools, until any consideration of race is 
discontinued from the admissions decisions.   
Although Blacks and other racial minorities each represent less than 10 percent of law 
students and employed lawyers in the United States, it appears that some White people are not 
going to be happy until law schools and the legal profession represent far more than 70 percent 
of Whites.  After all, the findings show that White people represent more than 70 percent of the 
total population, more than 70 percent of law students enrolled in ABA-approved law schools, 
and more than 80 percent of those in the legal profession and yet the legal debate lives on.  As of 
fall of 2006, Blacks and other underrepresented racial minorities, such as Latinos and Native 
Americans, together represent about 15 percent of the law school student population (American 
Bar Association, 2007).  Prior to the 2003 Grutter legal case, Blacks students were already being 
admitted into law schools at lower percentages (i.e. less than 40 percent) than White students and 
other racial/ethnic minority groups.  Based on the findings in this study, it can be concluded that 
the numbers of underrepresented racial minorities, particularly Blacks, admitted into law schools 
and the legal profession will vacillate and eventually fall off.   Even if the numbers of Black law 
students do not fall off of too much or remain consistent, one can still expect that no matter how 
many Black students apply, they will still be accepted in numbers representing less than 40 
percent of those who have applied and well-below the Whites and other racial and ethnic 
minorities who have been accepted into law school. 
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6.1.3.3  Conclusions from a Critical Race Theory Point of View 
Interest Convergence Theory 
According to Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory, the race-sensitive affirmative action 
policies implemented in the late 1960s were only meant to be the temporary alignment of the 
self-interest of elite White policymakers and the interests of Blacks (1980).  As race-sensitive 
affirmative action policies and programs have benefited more racial minorities, particularly 
Blacks, and have started leveling the playing field over the past 40 years, Bell’s second rule of 
the interest convergence theory took effect in the form of reverse discrimination legal cases as 
well as anti-affirmative action policies and referenda.  The second rule states that “even when the 
interest-convergence results in an effective racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated at the 
point that policymakers fear the remedial policy is threatening the superior societal status of 
whites” (Bell, 2004, p. 69).   
Based on the findings, the researcher concludes that throughout history, the United States 
continuously enters a never-ending interest-convergence cycle of briefly creating legal remedies 
for equity and equal opportunities for Black people and other racial minorities and then taking it 
all away before there can be a power shift in racial, educational, and economic dominance in this 
country.  Think back to the time between President Lincoln and members of Congress 
constitutionally banning slavery and creating race-sensitive legislation and policies to assist 
Blacks to the time that the United States Supreme Court legally sanctioned racial segregation.  
More than 30 years had elapsed between those periods.  Similarly, it has been more than 40 years 
since the implementation of the Civil Rights Act and race-conscious policies and programs, so 
the time of race-conscious policies and programs are quickly slipping away and soon will be 
replaced with some form of re-segregation and racial discrimination in education.  At this point 
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in time, the historical research shows that the United States has once again come full circle, and 
the legal remedy of race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs is fading away.  
Historically, the United States has had controversy surrounding racism and 
discrimination, particularly between Blacks and Whites.  Although other racial and ethnic 
groups, such as Asians, Latinos, and Native Americans, have experienced racism and 
discrimination, it was between the Black and White racial groups where active and overt racism 
began in America.  Unlike other minority or migrant groups, Africans were forced to come to a 
country to serve White Americans, which automatically created an oppressive, authoritarian 
relationship, with White people holding the power over Blacks.  Even after the abolishment of 
slavery in 1863, racism abounded against Blacks because they were viewed as property whose 
purpose was to serve others, not to gain or accomplish anything.  A series of constitutional 
amendments, civil rights legislation, and race-based policies were passed in the late 1800s in 
order to create equal treatment and opportunities for newly freed Black people but to the 
consternation of many Whites.  Congressional lawmakers and Supreme Court Justices were more 
concerned about how these benefits or any type of preferential treatment for Black people would 
harm the educational advancement as well as the personal and financial comfort-levels of White 
citizens.  For instance, the Freedman’s Bureau Act went through several amendments until all 
types of economic reparations, such as housing, medical treatment, and 40 acres and a mule were 
eradicated, reduced, or at least offered to White people who already had these opportunities.  The 
changes to the Freedmen’s Bureau Act along with the Supreme Court’s holdings in legal cases 
like Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which glorified white privilege and legalized the separate-but-
equal doctrine, also helped sustain racism and inequality. 
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From the mid-1860s until the Brown case of 1954, public education was one thing made 
available to Blacks.  After hundreds of years of no formal education, Blacks and other racial 
minorities could receive some form of public education, so long as it was separate from White 
people.  Of course, Black people were seen as an inferior race, so the educational facilities and 
materials were well below par when compared to White people.  The lawsuits that Black students 
filed in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s to gain access to institutions of higher education were 
successful, but only opened the doors for just a few Blacks; racism and segregation prevailed.  
The opportunity to network with people of power or privilege was unknown in the Black 
community or on a much lower scale than in the White community.  Unlike Whites, the chance 
of Blacks working as an apprentice in any professional capacity, such as doctor, lawyer, or 
accountant, was simply unheard of or very unlikely since so few Black people had these types of 
careers.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the race-sensitive affirmative action policies and 
programs that followed offered that shred of hope as well as racial and economic equality for 
which so many Blacks and other subjugated minorities had long awaited.  Nevertheless, in less 
than a decade, White people were complaining that Blacks were unfairly benefiting from special 
admissions policies to their detriment, so the Supreme Court was hearing its first reverse 
discrimination lawsuit in 1974.   
As discussed throughout this paper, the lawsuits are still continuing and higher education 
policies that use race as a factor in admissions are constantly being struck down as 
unconstitutional.  Meanwhile, the number of underrepresented minorities within institutions of 
higher education and in professional careers is no way equal or comparable to White people.  
The educational opportunities and economic wealth that Whites have amassed are also 
unmatched.  The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights 
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Act were enacted legally to enforce equality for Blacks and other underrepresented and 
disenfranchised minority groups and to end discrimination.  The race-based affirmative action 
policies and programs were the vehicle to ensure that the enforcement occurred and benefited 
underrepresented minorities in order to the level the playing.  Unfortunately, like the Freedmen’s 
Bureau Act amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act, and new state anti-
affirmative action referenda and policies are now being used against Blacks and other racial 
minorities.  Again, Congressional lawmakers are more concerned about how benefiting Black 
people will harm the educational advancement as well as the personal and financial comfort-
levels of White people.  While the Supreme Court is no longer maintaining overt racism, the 
Court is upholding white privilege in America.  The Supreme Court is permitting race-conscious 
affirmative action legal cases to move forward as legitimate claims, without acknowledging the 
United States’ legal and societal history of perpetuating racism, or the diminutive numbers of 
racial minorities in institutions of higher education and professional careers, as compared to 
Whites, that still stain this country.   
The Scales of Justice represent a balance of power in this country.  For example, the 
Legislative Branch makes the laws, while the Judicial Branch interprets the laws, but these scales 
are unleveled.  Citizens of the United States vote to place people within the state and federal 
legislature trusting that the lawmakers will make fair and impartial laws that are in the best 
interests of society on a whole and not colored by racial, ethnic, or economic prejudices.  
Nevertheless, the legislatures in the states of California, Washington, Florida, and now Michigan 
allowed anti-affirmative action referenda and legislation to pass knowing that they were 
influenced by racial and economic privilege and not in the best interest of all citizens.  The state 
referenda banning affirmative action is an example of the Scales of Justice being unleveled and 
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unequal in favor of maintaining white privilege.  For example, the majority of California voters 
that were in favor of the state anti-affirmative action policies were primarily more affluent White 
males.  One can conclude that the demographic profiles of voters in favor of the anti-affirmative 
action policies in Washington, Florida, and Michigan were very similar to California.  
Furthermore, one can conclude that other states with similar demographic profiles as 
Washington, California, Florida, or Michigan, or states that have been involved in race-based 
lawsuits, may soon move for anti-affirmative action policies. 
Given this country’s legal history and the evolution of the current race-based affirmative 
action legal debates, it is very likely that the Supreme Court will decide this summer that race-
based student assignment plans are unconstitutional in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 (2005) and Meredith, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 
et al. (2005).  Thus, legalized school segregation will probably re-appear on all education levels, 
from Kindergarten to 12th grade to higher education.  If that occurs, we will have come full circle 
– the entire 360 degrees back to the starting point of fighting for equity and equal opportunities 
for Black people and other racial minorities, while awaiting another interest convergence period.   
Property Functions of Whiteness 
In the meantime, society can expect to watch the property functions of whiteness at work 
while Blacks and Whites interests are divergent.  As discussed earlier, the property functions of 
whiteness include: (1) the right of disposition; (2) right to use and enjoyment; (3) reputation and 
status property; and (4) the right to exclude (Harris, 1993).  The “property functions of 
whiteness” explicate the privileges and benefits that the law gives to White people (Harris, 
1993).  Like the examples of Black school children in Ladson-Billings & Tate’s (1995) analysis 
of the property functions of whiteness, the Black children in Parents Involved in Community 
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Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2005) and Meredith, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education, et al. (2005) will be separated and educated in crowded public schools with less 
resources, course offerings, and academic opportunities.  One may conclude that the Black 
children in these legal cases will be excluded from certain public high schools where White 
children have chosen to attend, and as such, these same Black children may be excluded from 
certain colleges and universities. 
In race-conscious affirmative action programs like CLEO, some of the property functions 
have been active since the mid-1990s.  The researcher has concluded that based on CLEO’s data, 
the changes in CLEO’s funding and the new financial requirements where students now have to 
pay a fee for the summer institutes is indicative of the right to use and enjoy.  Only those who 
can economically afford the right to use and enjoy the educational benefits of the summer 
institutes may do so.  Perhaps that is why more White students are partaking in the summer 
institutes because there is now a monetary value placed on them, and the summer institutes are 
now more selective.  The right to use and enjoyment also is prevalent in some of the legal cases.  
For example, in both the Gratz and Johnson cases, White law applicants received additional 
points during the admissions process that benefited them more than Black applicants, such as 
being a legacy, hours spent working a summer job or doing extracurricular activities, taking a 
certain level of AP courses.  However, these kinds of additional points were legal, acceptable, 
and enjoyed by many White applicants, but not Black applicants.  Any consideration of race in 
the admissions process in both legal cases was deemed unconstitutional.   
One may also conclude that CLEO’s minimum LSAT score and undergraduate GPA 
requirements exclude many students who are capable of succeeding in law school.  Because of 
the competitive nature of law schools and the negativity around the race-conscious affirmative 
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action legal debate, CLEO now reserves the right to exclude many students based on their scores 
just like law schools.  Although 750 potential law students apply to CLEO’s summer institutes 
each year, CLEO accepts approximately 80 to 90 students because of the augmented academic 
requirements and budgetary limitations.  The other applicants are excluded from CLEO’s six-
week law school preparation process.  The research findings further support the conclusion that 
the development of CLEO’s AIE program represents the reputation and status property.  AIE 
was created to change the reputation of CLEO from a race-conscious program for law school 
hopefuls to a scholarship program for successful law students.  AIE is for students already 
admitted into law school and most of the students have higher LSAT scores and undergraduate 
GPAs than the students attending the summer institutes.  CLEO’s improved status and reputation 
has gotten them more national recognition and federal funding for the AIE and other programs.   
The researcher concludes that the present lack of interest convergence between Blacks 
and Whites and the domination of the property functions of whiteness mean that the CLEO 
program may never function as originally intended, especially with the incessant legal debates.  
CLEO has already changed since its inception in 1968.  In fact, it is now known as a scholarship 
program for disadvantaged law students, not a program to help underrepresented minorities gain 
access to law school.  The United States’ legal history involving race show a support for white 
privilege, and race-sensitive policies and programs like CLEO lose out almost every time.  
Perhaps the Supreme Court summed up this country’s racial history best when it explained that 
“[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon 
physical differences…. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United 
States cannot put them upon the same plane” (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, p. 551-52).   
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In other words, an equal and level playing between Whites and Blacks in the United 
States of America, where racial and economic domination reign amongst its White citizens, may 
be an unreachable goal in this lifetime.  Racial equity and equal access to institutions of higher 
education, such as law school, have improved some since 1964, but not enough to level the 
playing field.  More work needs to be done for complete racial equality and equity to occur, 
whether it is with the use of race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs or with a 
total overhaul of racist and prejudice hearts and minds in this country.  
6.1.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
First, this researcher’s study may be continued with a follow-up on the race-conscious 
affirmative action legal debates.  Specifically, the cases of Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2005) and Meredith, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education, et al. (2005) have been mentioned throughout this paper, but the Supreme Court has 
yet to make its ruling.  When the Supreme Court’s decisions are rendered, a study should be 
done on the Court’s opinions and analyses as well as the future of race-based student assignment 
plans in Kindergarten through 12th grade or on the higher education level.  Additionally, this 
researcher’s study revealed that more White women are bringing lawsuits regarding special 
admissions policies and programs in institutions of higher education.  Researchers may want to 
study the history and overall increasing rate of women, especially White women, entering 
graduate and professional programs and certain professional careers in relation to the 
implementation of affirmative action policies and programs - in employment or higher education 
- and the existing legal debates.  Moreover, a natural progression of this present study also 
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includes a research of how institutions of higher education are formulating race-conscious 
affirmative action policies that will withstand constitutional muster. 
In addition, this study focuses on one specific federal education program that has assisted 
underrepresented racial minorities, particularly Blacks, with gaining access to law schools since 
the 1960s.  Since that time, many similar affirmative-action programs have been created for 
undergraduate and graduate studies.  Some of these programs primarily benefit or spotlight 
access for women, low-income students, older or elderly students, students from other 
racial/ethnic groups, or particular religious groups.  Future researchers may want to conduct a 
study almost identical to the present study as it relates to the legal implications of having a 
special admissions policy or program that mainly benefits one of the above-referenced groups of 
students.  This particular study could be based on a local university, state, or federal education or 
scholarship program for one of the above-referenced groups in either an undergraduate or 
graduate program.   
Furthermore, this researcher intentionally limited the analytical lens of this study to the 
critical race theory framework.  Critical race theory is known for its examination of historical 
events and legal analyses in cases in concert with current civil rights legislation and racial equity 
issues in society.  More research, however, is necessary to analyze the affirmative action legal 
debate from a political, economic, or market theory contextual frame.  Another research study 
may concentrate on more class-based or socioeconomic issues, which also seem to correlate with 
access to institutions of higher education and certain career opportunities.   
Finally, this researcher’s study consistently mentioned law schools’ reliance on and legal 
claims emphasizing standardized test scores, such as LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs, 
when considering the qualifications of potential law students and the legality of law school 
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admissions procedures.  An interesting research project would be a longitudinal and comparative 
study on how a sample of law students with lower scores (i.e., LSAT scores and/or 
undergraduate GPAs) progressed in law school, bar examinations, and the legal profession 
compared to a sample of law students with the higher scores.  This type of study could identify 
the academic and non-academic strengths and weaknesses of each sample of students as well as 
examine whether there are any correlations between the racial, economic, or educational 
backgrounds of each sample of students and their test scores and/or success in law school and the 
legal profession. 
6.1.5 Final Thoughts 
In response to the fourth summative research question, the researcher concludes that the future 
implications for the existence of race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs are 
bleak.  Race-based programs are being eliminated or extremely restricted far and wide and 
probably will not be sustained over the next decade because of the ongoing legal debates.  The 
CLEO program is just one example of a program that has been constrained because of its focus 
on helping racial minorities prepare for and get into law school.  CLEO now is concentrating 
more on helping disadvantaged and racial minorities who are already attending law school, in 
which the legal issues associated with race-based access have been bypassed. 
This entire study - from the literature review to the summary of research findings - 
supports the notion that most analyses and outcomes of federal legal cases, legislation, and 
policies maintain white privilege in American society.  Those who have exerted white privilege 
in the reverse discrimination legal cases discussed earlier have claimed a right to name their 
place in the undergraduate, graduate, or professional school of their choice, over and above the 
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equally qualified racial minorities.  Those who have exercised white privilege and their right to 
admission throughout the years have argued that their test scores are higher, their parents or 
siblings also went to their university of choice, their high school or undergraduate institution 
from which they graduated was superior, and their Advanced Placement courses should be given 
more weight in the admissions process.  These arguments, which are often not available or 
applicable to many disadvantaged racial minorities, are absolutely fair, legal, and permitted for 
the persons who have been fortunate enough to know white privilege.  However, race, at least 
according to those who have filed or supported the reverse discrimination lawsuits, as well as the 
long history of intentional discrimination, mistreatment, and lack of educational access that goes 
along with race, may not be given a second thought in the admissions process because it is 
unconstitutional.  Many people of color have had to develop survival, resilience, and leadership 
skills because of the barriers set in their path to bar them or severely impede their entrance into 
economic, employment, and educational arenas.  Nevertheless, those skills typically do not stack 
up against money, test scores, private schooling, and networking opportunities that white 
privilege provides.   
The Courts’ maintenance of white privilege is probably inadvertent.  The fact is this 
country’s judicial system adheres to legal precedence, and white privilege was created and 
promoted in legal decisions long before the Supreme Court’s unjust opinions were rendered in 
Plessy v. Ferguson or Dred Scott v. Sanford.  Although slavery and legal segregation were 
eventually abolished by the courts, white privilege itself was never overturned.  Not to say that 
the United States is hopeless, because this country has made great strides to overcome the great 
racial divide and to achieve parity amongst all groups of people.  The increased numbers of 
women and underrepresented minorities in institutions of higher education and professional 
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careers show the improvement over the past 40 years.  However, history as well as the research 
findings in this study show that the numbers of racial minorities in law school and the legal 
profession are miniscule compared to Whites.  Nevertheless, the legal debates will probably 
continue until race as a “plus” factor is completely removed from the higher education 
admissions equation.  The examination of the evolution of the legal cases in the Fourth Chapter 
indicate that combined groups of White litigants are still flooding the courts with reverse 
discrimination claims, and in most cases, White women are the lead-plaintiffs.   
Thus, based on the findings in this study, one can conclude that diversity in an 
educational setting will be achieved within institutions of higher education, especially law 
schools, with more White women, Asian Americans, and Other races (biracial and multiracial) 
sitting in the classrooms.  Those who classify themselves as “Black” or “African American” will 
continue to be the smallest percentage admitted into law schools when compared to those who 
apply.  Furthermore, the majority of Blacks and Latinos that are admitted into law schools will 
have had some economic privileges that allowed them to attend private high schools, elite and 
selective colleges, and the best LSAT preparation courses so that they could academically 
compete with white privilege.  Most of these Blacks and Latinos would have had the benefit of 
the first rule of the property functions of whiteness – the Right of Disposition, which is a good 
thing in today’s world.  According to Ladson-Billings & Tate (1995), the right of disposition is 
the transfer of certain property rights, such as Black students conforming to “White norms” 
through certain cultural practices such as dress, speech patterns, and unauthorized conceptions of 
knowledge.   
In conclusion, race-conscious affirmative action policies and programs are soon a thing 
of the past.  Diversity is the key to constitutional higher education admissions policies, but racial 
  244
diversity is starting to mean very little in the diversity analysis.  Additionally, law schools and 
other post-secondary, graduate, and professional programs will likely continue to rely heavily on 
standardized test scores and GPAs during the admissions process.  Therefore, underrepresented 
minorities must find other ways to set themselves apart from others.  Drawing on the events of 
history and on the strength of those, such as Thurgood Marshall, who previously fought for equal 
educational access with perseverance, resilience, wisdom, and a thirst for knowledge would be a 
great place to start.  After all, white privilege is not going anywhere anytime soon, especially 
with individuals like Ward Connerly and his elite White supporters campaigning to maintain 
white privilege through the passage of state referenda and policies.  In the meantime, the United 
States needs more attorneys who will be active in pushing for social change, particularly those 
who may live or experience racism, prejudice, and disenfranchisement on a daily basis and will 
not succumb to the pressure of supporting white privilege and unequal treatment in society.  Who 
better to be the agents of this social change than Blacks, Latinos, and other people of color who 
want to be lawyers and gatekeepers of the law.  If people of color could have a fair and equal 
opportunity to compete and to be admitted into law school, then perhaps the playing field would 
become level in the near future. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. What is your role/position with CLEO?  Please briefly describe your duties. 
2. How long have you worked for CLEO? 
3. Has your role/position changed since you have been with the CLEO program?  How? 
4. In your own words, what would you say is CLEO’s purpose and mission?  How has the 
purpose or mission changed since CLEO’s inception in 1968?  Do you consider CLEO to 
be a race-based affirmative action program? 
5. What is the purpose of the summer institutes?  Please explain the admissions criteria that 
are considered when selecting CLEO summer institute fellows each year (e.g., LSAT 
scores, GPA scores, race/ethnicity, income levels, undergraduate institution, etc.).  Has 
there been a change in the demographics of the students accepted into CLEO’s programs 
since its inception?  If there has been a change, why do you think there has been change? 
6. How have the funding levels and funding sources changed since CLEO’s inception until 
now?  Are there limitations and/or requirements for federal funding that CLEO receives?  
Do you receive federal funding for the summer institutes?   
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7. What kind of impact, if any, have the race-conscious affirmative action legal cases (e.g., 
Bakke, Hopwood, Grutter and Gratz) or legislation had on CLEO’s operations (e.g., 
admissions criteria for prospective students, funding, programming)?  Are there any 
specific legal cases or legislation that have had more of an impact than others?  If so, 
which ones?  Please explain. 
8. When was the Thurgood Marshall Legal Education Opportunity Program started?  What 
were the reasons for starting the Thurgood Marshall Legal Education Opportunity 
Program, and how does its purpose differ from the traditional CLEO summer institutes?   
9. Are there any additional programs for students interested in law school besides the 
summer institutes?  How are these new programs different from the summer institutes 
and what type of students are being impacted by these programs?  How are the student 
demographic profiles different for each program? 
10. How has the structure of CLEO’s Board of Directors, committees, or subcommittees 
changed since its inception in 1968? 
11. Has CLEO’s Board of Directors amended the organization’s By-laws since CLEO’s 
inception?  If so, how and why?  How, if at all, were the amendments related to the race-
conscious affirmative action legal and political debates? 
12. What do you envision for CLEO’s future as a program for disadvantaged and minority 
students?  Do you think the continuous political and legal debates regarding race-based 
affirmative action policies and programs will have an affect on the CLEO program’s 
viability?  How?  Please explain. 
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